The Third Corps of North China Should Concentrate Its Forces in Operations at Present[1]

(October 3, 1948)

Yang, Li, Li, and inform Yang, Luo, Geng[2]:

Your telegram of the 2nd[3] received. (1) Your fundamental intention is correct. (2) Your telegram only gives the positions of the 1st Column, 6th Column, 8th Column, the Cavalry Brigade, and the Beiyue Group. Where is the 2nd Column now? (3) Detaching two brigades to move west to attack and occupy Bikeqi, Chasuqi, and Tuo County[4] carries the suspicion of dispersing forces. If it is necessary

to detach them, you must first obtain our consent. We hold that, at the present stage, you should concentrate your forces in operations, and all units should be able to reach the battle within a march of one day, or at most two days. (4) As long as the enemy at Jining moves out, it is better to let the enemy come near Zhuozishan or near Fengzhen before fighting, and not to fight near Jining. Because near Jining the enemy has nine infantry and cavalry divisions or brigades concentrated there, and under no circumstances should we fight in that area. (5) Your view that when the enemy comes out with a first-line force of about two divisions, you should resolutely make up your minds to fight, but if too many enemy forces come, you should not fight, is correct. (6) We have stipulated that you are subordinate to the Military Commission in matters of operations and political guidance, and to the North China and Jin-Sui authorities in matters of logistics. However, your telegram did not distinguish between these two categories of matters, listing the titles of the Military Commission and the Military Region side by side, leaving the recipients uncertain as to whom you were actually requesting a reply. This is incorrect. Hereafter, when requesting instructions from the Military Commission on certain matters, you may simultaneously inform the Military Region; when requesting instructions from the Military Region on certain matters, you may simultaneously inform the Military Commission, so as to clarify responsibilities.

The Military Commission
0800 hours, 3rd

--- Notes

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, addressed to Yang Chengwu, commander of the Third Corps of the North China Military Region; Li Jingquan, political commissar; and Li Tianhuan, deputy political commissar and director of the Political Department.


[2] Yang, Luo, Geng refers to Yang Dezhi, Luo Ruiqing, and Geng Biao, who were respectively commander, political commissar, and chief of staff of the Second Corps of the North China Military Region at the time.


[3] Refers to the telegram sent by Yang Chengwu, Li Jingquan, and Li Tianhuan to the Military Commission of the Central Committee on October 2, 1948. The telegram proposed three plans for the next phase of operations by the Third Corps of the North China Military Region in eastern Suiyuan: 1. If the enemy main force remains inactive for another one or two days, we intend to send two brigades westward to strike the Suiyuan-Baotou sector, attacking and annihilating the enemy in the Bikeqi, Chasuqi, and Tuo County area, threatening Baotou and Suiyuan City, thereby drawing the enemy main force westward, while our main force seeks to annihilate the enemy east of Zhuozishan. 2. If the enemy attacks us with a first-line force of about two divisions, we are determined to fight north of Fengzhen and seek to annihilate the greater part of it. If the entire enemy main force comes, it will be difficult to fight; we then plan to send part of our main force westward to strike the Suiyuan-Baotou sector or eastward to strike the Xinghe-Chaigoubao sector, so as to maneuver and disperse the enemy main force, and then seek an opportunity to commit our main force into battle at the right moment to annihilate the enemy on the front. 3. If the enemy main force moves westward on its own, we will seek to annihilate the enemy in the Jining-Xinghe area. In sum, we must strive to annihilate one or two enemy divisions of the main force at an early date, which alone would be advantageous to us. Therefore, we must avoid a standoff with the enemy; otherwise, difficulties will increase after the weather turns cold. If the enemy does not move, we must move; by our movement, we induce the enemy to move, and only then can we possibly seize an opportunity for battle.


[4] Bikeqi, a town name, located in the eastern part of present-day Tumd Left Banner, Inner Mongolia. Chasuqi, a town name, now the seat of the government of Tumd Left Banner, Inner Mongolia. Tuo County, i.e., present-day Togtoh County, Inner Mongolia.