[1] Lin, Luo, and Liu also informed the Northeast Bureau: [2] After today’s telegram at 17:00 was sent, we have further considered the issue of your attack direction. We firmly believe that you should by no means deviate from your established plan—to forgo the capture of Jinzhou and instead march on Changchun.


In addition to the reasons set forth in our previous dispatch, suppose you were to alter your course and [3] capture Changchun. Even then, your next objective would still be to take both Jinzhou and Jinxi. In that case, first, the enemy forces in those two cities would certainly not be reduced; they might even be reinforced, thereby increasing the difficulty of your subsequent assault. Second, at present, the enemy garrison in Shenyang, owing to the existence of Changchun, does not dare to ignore it and commit all its resources to reinforcing Jinzhou. You can exploit this situation: during the next ten to twenty days—this time frame is crucial—to pin down the entire Shenyang force, or at least a substantial portion of it.


If you were to seize Changchun first and then proceed to attack Jinzhou and Jinxi, not only would the task of capturing those two cities become more challenging than it is now, but the Shenyang enemy could also dispatch its entire strength to come to Jinzhou’s aid. The threat posed by such a concentrated counterattack would be far greater than it is today.


Therefore, we do not endorse any further changes to your plan. We maintain that you should concentrate your efforts on capturing Jinzhou within approximately ten days, while simultaneously committing the necessary forces to annihilate four to five enemy divisions advancing from Jinxi to reinforce Jinzhou.


Once Jinzhou is taken, you will gain the initiative in the campaign. By contrast, capturing Changchun will not help you secure the initiative; on the contrary, it will only complicate your next phase of operations.


We urge you to carefully weigh these considerations and look forward to your reply.


Issued by the Central Military Commission at 19:00 on the third day, based on Mao Zedong’s handwritten draft.


Notes [1] “Lin, Luo, and Liu” refers to Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou, who at the time served as commander, political commissar, and chief of staff, respectively, of the Northeast Field Army.


[2] Refers to the telegram drafted by Mao Zedong on October 3, 1948, at 17:00, on behalf of the CPC Central Committee’s Military Commission, and addressed to Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou. This telegram was a response to a message received from Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou at 22:00 on October 2, 1948, to the CPC Central Committee’s Military Commission. Based on intelligence regarding the New Fifth Army and the 95th Division being transported by sea to Huludao, Lin, Luo, and Liu’s telegram informed the Military Commission: “We are currently considering two operational options—either to attack Jinzhou or to attack Changchun—and request that the Commission likewise consider these alternatives and provide guidance.” The Military Commission’s reply stated: “You should take advantage of the critical window while the Changchun garrison has yet to move and the Shenyang force dares not reinforce Jinzhou independently. Concentrate your main forces to swiftly capture Jinzhou, and under no circumstances should this plan be altered.” The telegram further called for the rapid relocation of the command post to the Jinzhou front line to prepare for the attack, emphasizing: “Prolonged delay carries the risk of placing you in a passive position.” [3] “Two Jin” refers to Jinzhou and Jinxi in Liaoning Province.