[1]


September and October 1948

[These telegrams addressed to Lin Piao, Lo Jung-huan and other comrades were
drawn up by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Revolutionary Military Commission
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The concept of
operations he set forth here for the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign was fully
carried out later. The results of the campaign were as follows:

  (1) The destruction of 470,000 enemy troops, plus the victories in other
  theatres during that period, made the qualitatively superior People's Liberation
  Army superior to the Kuomintang army in numbers as well.


  (2) The entire territory of northeastern China was liberated, and the conditions
  were created for the liberation of Peiping, Tientsin and all northern China.


  (3) Our army gained experience in fighting large-scale campaigns of annihilation.


  (4) As a result of the liberation of northeastern China, a strategically
  secure rear area with a fair industrial base was won for the War of Liberation,
  and the Party and the people obtained favourable conditions for gradually
  turning to economic rehabilitation.


The Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign was the first of the three greatest campaigns
of decisive significance in the Chinese People's War of Liberation. The other
two were the Huai-Hai and the Peiping-Tientsin campaigns. In these three
great campaigns, which lasted four months and nineteen days, 144 divisions
(brigades) of the enemy's regular troops and 29 divisions of its irregular
troops, or more than 1,540,000 men in all, were wiped out. During this period
the People's Liberation Army also launched offensives on other fronts, destroying
large numbers of the enemy. In the first two years of the war, the People's
Liberation Army had wiped out an average of about 8 enemy brigades per month.
Now the number of enemy troops destroyed by the People's Liberation Army
no longer averaged 8 brigades per month but 38 brigades. These three major
campaigns virtually annihilated the crack troops on which the Kuomintang
relied for waging the counter-revolutionary civil war and greatly speeded
victory in the War of Liberation all over the country. For the Huai-Hai and
Peiping-Tientsin campaigns, see "The Concept of Operations for the Huai-Hai
Campaign", pp. 279-82 and "The Concept of Operations for the Peiping-Tientsin
Campaign", pp. 289-93, of this volume. ]

I. THE TELEGRAM OF SEPTEMBER 7

We are prepared to bring about the fundamental overthrow of the Kuomintang
in about five years, counting from July 1946.[2] This
is possible. Our objective can be attained provided we destroy about 100
brigades of Kuomintang regular troops every year, or some 500 brigades over
the five years. In the past two years our army has annihilated a total of
191 brigades of enemy regulars, an average of 95 brigades a year,
or nearly 8 brigades a month. In the next three years it is required that
our army should wipe out 300 or more brigades of enemy regulars. Between
July this year and June next year we expect to destroy some 115 brigades
of enemy regulars. This total is apportioned among our various field armies
and armies.[3] The Eastern China Field Army is required
to wipe out about 40 brigades (including the 7 already wiped out in July)
and capture Tsinan and a number of large, medium and small cities in northern
Kiangsu, eastern Honan and northern Anhwei. The Central Plains Field Army
is required to wipe out about 14 brigades (including the 1 1/2 brigades wiped
out in July) and capture a number of cities in the provinces of Hupeh, Honan
and Anhwei. The Northwest Field Army is required to wipe out about 12
brigades (including the 1 brigades wiped out in August). The army in
northern China commanded by Hsu Hsiang-chien and Chou Shih-ti is required
to wipe out about 14 brigades under Yen Hsi-shan (including the 8 brigades
annihilated in July) and capture Taiyuan. You are required, in co-ordination
with the 2 armies commanded by Lo Jui-ching and Yang Cheng-wu, to wipe out
about 35 brigades of the 2 army groups under Wei Li-huang and Fu Tso-yi
(including 1 brigade wiped out by Yang Cheng-wu in July) and capture all
the cities along the Peiping-Liaoning, Peiping-Suiyuan, Peiping-Chengteh
and Peiping-Paoting Railways, except Peiping, Tientsin and Shenyang. The
decisive factors for the achievement of this objective are the proper disposition
and command of troops in campaigns and a proper balance between fighting
and rest. If in the two months of September and October, or a little longer,
you can wipe out the enemy along the line from Chinchow to Tangshan and take
Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and Tangshan, you will have achieved the task of wiping
out some 18 enemy brigades. In order to wipe them out, you must now prepare
to employ your main force on this line, leaving the enemy forces at Changchun
and Shenyang alone. When you are attacking Chinchow, be prepared also to
wipe out the enemy forces that may come to its rescue from Changchun and
Shenyang. Because the enemy forces in and near Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and
Tangshan are isolated from each other, success in attacking and wiping them
out is pretty certain, and there is also a fair hope of success in capturing
Chinchow and in attacking enemy reinforcements. If, however, you were to
dispose your main force at Hsinmin and its northern environs in preparation
for attacking the enemy forces which might come out from Changchun and Shenyang,
then the enemy might not dare come out at all because you would be too great
a menace. On the one hand, the enemy at Changchun and Shenyang might not
come out. And, on the other hand, because the forces you dispatch towards
Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and Tangshan would be too small, the enemy in and near
these three cities (comprising 18 brigades) would probably fall back on Chinchow
and Tangshan, and you would find it rather difficult and yet necessary to
attack them, wasting time and energy and thus perhaps landing yourselves
in a passive position. For these reasons, it will be better to leave the
enemy at Changchun and Shenyang alone and focus your attention on the enemy
at Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and Tangshan. Another point: you must prepare to
fight three big campaigns in the ten months from September to next June and
to spend about two months on each campaign, making a total of about six months
and leaving four months for rest. During the Chinchow-Shanhaikuan-Tangshan
campaign (the first big campaign), if the enemy at Changchun and Shenyang
sallies forth in full strength to rescue Chinchow (because your main force
will be disposed not at Hsinmin but around Chinchow, Wei Li-huang will be
emboldened to come to the rescue), then, without leaving the
Chinchow-Shanhaikuan-Tangshan line, you can follow up immediately with
large-scale annihilating attacks on the enemy reinforcements and strive to
wipe out all Wei Li-huang's troops on the spot. This would be the ideal
situation. Hence, you should pay attention to the following:

  (1) Be firmly determined to attack and capture Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and
  Tangshan and to take control of the entire line.


  (2) Be firmly determined to fight a battle of annihilation on a scale larger
  than you have ever fought before, that is, dare to fight all Wei Li-huang's
  army when it comes to the rescue.


  (3) In keeping with these two resolves, reconsider your plan of operations,
  make arrangements to meet the military requirements of your whole force (food,
  ammunition, recruits, and so on) and to handle captives.


Please consider the above and telegraph your reply.
II. THE TELEGRAM OF OCTOBER 10

1. From the day you start attacking Chinchow, there will be a period when
the tactical situation will be very tense. We hope that you will inform us
by radio every two or three days of the enemy's situation (the strength of
the resistance by his forces defending Chinchow, the progress of his
reinforcements from Hulutao and Chinhsi and from Shenyang and the probable
course of action of his troops in Changchun) and of our own situation (the
progress of our attack on the city and the casualties sustained in attacking
the city and holding off enemy reinforcements).

2. It is highly possible that, as you have said, the tactical situation during
this period will develop most favourably, that is, that you will be able
to wipe out not only the enemy's forces defending Chinchow but also a part
of his reinforcements from Hulutao and Chinhsi and some or most of his forces
fleeing from Changchun. If the enemy's reinforcements from Shenyang advance
to the area north of the Taling River just after you have taken Chinchow
and when you are thus able to shift your forces to encircle them, then it
will be possible to wipe out these reinforcements as well. The key to all
this lies in striving to capture Chinchow in about a week.

3. Decide on the disposition of your troops for checking the enemy reinforcements
according to your progress in attacking Chinchow and their progress in advancing
both from the east and from the west. In case the enemy reinforcements from
Shenyang advance rather slowly (as may happen if, during your attack on Chinchow,
the enemy besieged in Changchun breaks out but is caught and crushed by our
12th Column and other forces, in which case the enemy reinforcements from
Shenyang may be so bewildered as to advance rather slowly or halt or turn
back to rescue the Changchun forces) while the enemy reinforcements from
Hulutao and Chinhsi advance rather quickly, you should be ready to throw
in your general reserves to help the 4th and 11th Columns wipe out part of
the latter reinforcements and, first of all, to check their advance. If the
enemy reinforcements from Hulutao and Chinhsi are being tied down and checked
by our 4th and 11th Columns and other forces and therefore advance rather
slowly or halt, if the enemy forces in Changchun do not break out, if the
enemy reinforcements from Shenyang advance rather quickly, and if most of
the Chinchow enemy forces have been wiped out and the capture of the city
is imminent, then you should let the enemy forces from Shenyang advance deep
into the area north of the Taling River, so that you can make a timely shift
of your forces to encircle them and wipe them out at your convenience.

4. You must centre your attention on the operations in Chinchow and strive
to capture this city as quickly as possible. Even if none of the other objectives
is attained and Chinchow alone is captured, you will have won the initiative,
which in itself will be a great victory. It is hoped that you will give due
attention to all the above points. Especially during the first few days of
the battle for Chinchow, the enemy reinforcements from both the east and
the west will not make any major moves, and you should concentrate all your
energies on the operations on the Chinchow front.
NOTES

1. The Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign was a gigantic campaign
fought by the Northeast People's Liberation Army in the western part of Liaoning
Province and in the Shenyang-Changchun area between September 12 and November
2, 1948. On the eve of the campaign, the total strength of the Kuomintang
forces in northeastern China consisted of 4 armies, made up of 14 corps,
or 44 divisions. These forces had shortened their lines and dug themselves
in at three sectors isolated from each other, Changchun, Shenyang and Chinchow.
With the aim of completely wiping out the enemy troops in the Northeast and
quickly liberating the whole of the Northeast, the People's Liberation Army
in this region, supported by the broad masses of the local people, began
the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign in September 1948 with a main force of 12 columns,
1 artillery column and regional armed forces, altogether totalling 53 divisions
or over 700,000 men. Chinchow, on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, was the strategic
link between northeastern and northern China. The enemy forces garrisoning
the Chinchow sector consisted of 8 divisions, with more than 100,000 men
under Fan Han-chieh, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang's Northeast
"Bandit Suppression" Headquarters. The capture of Chinchow was the key to
the success of the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign. Acting on the directives of
Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Northeast People's Liberation Army used 1 column
and 7 independent divisions to continue the siege operations against Changchun;
6 columns, 1 artillery column and 1 tank battalion to surround and attack
Chinchow and 2 columns, placed in the Tashan-Kaochiao sector southwest of
Chinchow, along with 3 columns in the Heishan-Tahushan-Changwu sector to
intercept any reinforcements the enemy might send from Chinhsi and Hulutao
and from Shenyang to relieve Chinchow. The fighting in the Chinchow area
started on September 12. Just as our army was mopping up the enemy in the
outskirts of Chinchow after taking Ihsien, Chiang Kai-shek hurriedly flew
to the Northeast to take personal charge of the operations and urgently summoned
5 enemy divisions from the Northern China "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters
on the Peiping Liaoning Railway and 2 divisions from Shantung Province to
join the 4 divisions in Chinhsi; all these 11 divisions began a furious attack
on our positions at Tashan on October 10 but could not break through. Meanwhile,
the Kuomintang 9th Army under Liao Yao-hsiang, with 11 divisions and 3 cavalry
brigades, which had sallied out from Shenyang to rescue Chinchow, was intercepted
by our army northeast of Heishan and Tahushan. Our army began the assault
on Chinchow on October 14 and, after thirty-one hours of fierce fighting,
completely wiped out the defending enemy forces, capturing Fan Han-chieh,
Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Northeast "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters,
Lu Chun-chuan, Commander of the 6th Army, and more than 100,000 men under
their command. The liberation of Chinchow impelled part of the enemy forces
at Changchun to revolt against the Kuomintang and the rest to surrender.
The complete collapse of the Kuomintang troops in the Northeast then became
a foregone conclusion. But Chiang Kai-shek, still dreaming of recapturing
Chinchow and of reopening the line of communications between northeastern
and northern China, gave strict orders to the army under Liao Yao-hsiang
to continue its advance towards Chinchow. After taking Chinchow, the People's
Liberation Army immediately swung back to the northeast and closed in on
Liao's army from the north and south of Heishan and Tahushan. On October
26 the People's Liberation Army succeeded in surrounding the enemy in the
Heishan-Tahushan-Hsinmin sector and, after stiff fighting lasting two days
and one night, completely wiped them out, capturing army commander Liao
Yao-hsiang, corps commanders Li Tao, Pai Feng-wu and Cheng Ting-chi, and
more than 100,000 men. Our army vigorously followed up this victory and liberated
Shenyang and Yingkow on November 2, wiping out over 149,000 enemy troops.
The whole of the Northeast was thus liberated. A total of more than 470,000
enemy troops were wiped out in the campaign.

2. See "A Circular on the Situation", Note 7, p. 226 of
this volume.

3. On November 1, 1948, the Revolutionary Military Commission
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China classified all troops
in the big strategic areas into field, regional and guerrilla forces in
accordance with decisions made at the September meeting of the Political
Bureau of the Central Committee. The field forces were organized into field
armies. A field army was composed of armies, an army of corps (originally
called columns), a corps of divisions, and a division of regiments. In accordance
with their locations, the field armies were designated the Northwest Field
Army, Central Plains Field Army, Eastern China Field Army, Northeast field
Army and Northern China Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.
The number of armies, corps and divisions in each field army differed according
to the concrete conditions in each big strategic area. Later, the Northwest
Field Army was renamed the First Field Army, comprising 2 armies; the Central
Plains Field Army was renamed the Second Field Army, comprising 3 armies;
the Eastern China Field Army was renamed the Third Field Army, comprising
4 armies; and the Northeast Field Army was renamed the Fourth Field Army,
comprising 4 armies. The 3 armies making up the Northern China Field Army
were placed under the direct command of the General Headquarters of the Chinese
People's Liberation Army.

Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project.