Celebrating the Great Victory of the Liberation of Jinan[1]

(September 30, 1948)

Starting from September 16, the People's Liberation Army launched an offensive against Jinan, the capital of Shandong Province. By the 24th, in merely eight days, it liberated the city of Jinan, which the enemy had heavily fortified and defended with massive troops, completely annihilated over one hundred thousand enemy defenders, and won over Army Commander Wu Huawen, who led his troops in an uprising. This great victory not only stupefied the Kuomintang reactionaries and their American masters, but even the people throughout the country were astonished by its unexpected swiftness.

The great significance of the liberation of Jinan for the entire war situation is very clear. For more than a year after Chiang Kai-shek launched the nationwide civil war, he consistently made the East China battlefield his military focus, deploying the strength of several tens of reorganized brigades in this direction in a vain attempt to decide the outcome of the war here. When the main force of the East China People's Liberation Army gloriously fulfilled its task of annihilating large numbers of enemy troops on the battlefields of Central Jiangsu, Northern Jiangsu, Southern Shandong, and Central Shandong, and shifted to exterior line operations in July last year, the enemy once created great havoc in Shandong for a time and did their utmost to boast of their so-called "strategic victory." The enemy once cut through the Qingdao-Jinan Railway and the Tianjin-Pukou Railway south of Jinan; on this basis, the enemy even dreamed of cutting through the entire Tianjin-Pukou line to link up their Central China and North China. But even at that time, we pointed out that this was not a victory of the offensive, but rather a failure of the offensive; it was the moment when the enemy was reduced from an all-out offensive to a partial

[1] This is an editorial by the Xinhua News Agency. After being revised by Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, this editorial was finally revised and finalized by Mao Zedong. The title was changed by Mao Zedong; the original title was "Celebrating the Liberation of Jinan." The text printed in Song typeface in the article consists of words added and rewritten by Mao Zedong.

offensive, and then shifted from a partial offensive to an all-out defensive, and the enemy's strategic schemes were impossible to realize. Sure enough, after the People's Liberation Army switched to the offensive on other battlefields, it likewise shifted from defense to offense without exception in East China. The East China People's Liberation Army, which had once lost almost all its county towns, through the victory on the Jiao River last October, the victory on the eastern section of the Qingdao-Jinan Railway in November, the victory at Laiyang in December, the victory on the western section of the Qingdao-Jinan Railway in March this year, the victory on the middle section of the Qingdao-Jinan Railway in April, the victories along the Tianjin-Pukou Railway line from May to July, and finally this victory at Jinan, brought about a complete transformation of the entire war situation in Shandong in less than a year. Now, except for a few strongholds like Qingdao, Yantai, and Heze, Shandong has been entirely liberated, and the enemy's war plans in Shandong have been shattered. The capture of Jinan, the enemy's most powerful stronghold in Shandong, has given the East China People's Liberation Army greater freedom than ever before. Under these circumstances, not only are the remaining enemy forces in Shandong in imminent danger, but the enemy forces throughout East China and the Central Plains will also suffer even heavier blows; the complete liberation of East China and the Central Plains has drawn even closer; and the clamor long raised by the Chinese and foreign reactionaries about so-called "consolidating North China, securing Central China," and even about "clearing out the area south of the Yellow River" within a few months, has become a universal laughingstock.

Jinan is one of the isolated strongholds long stubbornly defended by the Kuomintang. In the same situation as Jinan, for the time being, are cities like Changchun, Shenyang, Jinzhou, Chengde, Baoding, Taiyuan, Anyang, Nanyang, and Yulin. What lessons should the people and the Kuomintang troops in these cities draw from the liberation of Jinan? Although Jinan had one hundred thousand Kuomintang defending troops, although they had American equipment, permanent multi-layered fortifications, materials prepared for long-term stubborn defense, air support and coordination supplied by the United States, and large reinforcements promised by Chiang Kai-shek massed near Xuzhou, and were commanded by the Kuomintang's famous general Wang Yaowu, under the offensive of the People's Liberation Army, their entire army was completely destroyed in just eight days. This proves that the powerful offensive capability of the People's Liberation Army is already irresistible to the Kuomintang troops, and no Kuomintang city can withstand the attacks of the People's Liberation Army. Then, disregarding the life and death of the people, why does the Kuomintang insist on stubbornly defending many isolated cities today? Is it not waiting for destruction? When the Kuomintang defends a city, they force the citizens to endure all kinds of extortion, bear all kinds of hard labor, and even force them to freeze or starve to death in large numbers; when the Kuomintang fails, they immediately subject the citizens to indiscriminate bombing. Is this not deliberately treating the common people as enemies? And the vast numbers of officers and soldiers of the Kuomintang troops can only serve as baffling sacrificial victims. Since it is clearly impossible to hold, why must orders be given to defend to the death? Since clearly no reinforcements are dispatched, why must orders be given to defend to the death and await reinforcements? Is this not deliberately deceiving people into throwing away their lives? A part of the Kuomintang troops defending Jinan understood this point—namely, Army Commander Wu Huawen and his subordinates. They avoided the fate of meaningless sacrifice and gained the understanding and welcome of the people, who gave them the opportunity to serve the people in the future. But another part did not figure this out, and they either became captives or futilely lost their lives. These are two opposite paths, two opposite outcomes. This is worth pondering and choosing by the vast numbers of officers and soldiers of the Kuomintang troops. The battle of Jinan is over, and battles for other besieged cities are coming one after another. Here, we wish to earnestly advise all enlightened personages in the Kuomintang troops in these cities: You should not throw away your lives in vain! Even more, you should not force many innocent compatriots to throw away their lives in vain together with you! The path you should take is the path of Division Commander Pan Shuoduan in Southern Liaoning, Division Commander Wang Jiashan at Yingkou, and Army Commander Wu Huawen in Jinan. In this way, not only can our motherland and compatriots suffer fewer losses, enabling the People's War of Liberation to achieve nationwide victory sooner, but you yourselves will also gain an opportunity to atone for past crimes by meritorious service, remold yourselves anew, and serve the people.