Occupying Yi County, Jinzhou, and Jinxi Is
the Key to the War Situation in the Northeast
(September 29, 1948)
To Lin [Biao], Luo [Ronghuan] and Liu [Yalou]:1
We received the telegram you sent at 10:00 A.M. on the 28th.2 Your plan of
attacking Jinzhou first and then Jinxi is very good. Wei Lihuang3 went to Nanjing
for a conference with Chiang [Kaishek], Gu [Zhutong], and He [Yingqin],4 and
returned to Shenyang on the 27th. We have no doubt that they must have decided
to bring the enemy forces out of Changchun and reinforce the enemy in Jinzhou.
This is because if Wei does not bring the enemy forces out of Changchun, it will
be difficult to reinforce Jinzhou. However, we estimate that about ten days will
be required to pull the enemy forces out of Changchun, and another ten days will
be needed to reinforce Jinzhou. So you should take these issues of timing into
account when capturing the three areas of Yi county, Jinzhou, and Jinxi. You must
prepare to pursue and annihilate the enemy forces fleeing from Changchun. We
do not know, however, how large a fighting force you will use when the enemy
in Shenyang moves north to meet the enemy forces fleeing from Changchun, or
whether, after using this force, you will still have enough left to definitely wipe
out the enemy around the three areas of Yi county, Jinzhou, and Jinxi within
about twenty days. We believe you must place the emphasis of your fighting on
capturing these three areas, because this is the key to your whole war situation.
Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 28–30, where it
1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Lin Biao was commander of the Northeast Field Army. Luo Ronghuan was political commissar of the Northeast Field Army, and Liu Yalou was chief-of-staff of the Northeast Field
Army.
2.  The telegram from Lin Biao et al. reported the capture of Gaoqiao on the previous day. With Jinzhou and Jinxi cut off, they planned to capture Jinzhou next because
the enemy forces were weaker there than in Jinxi. They expected they would need several
days before attacking the enemy forces in Yi county. They had surrounded Xingcheng and
Suizhong and expected to capture them soon, and they would also pursue and attack enemy
troops that were planning to make a break from Changchun.
3.  Wei Lihuang was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s Northeast “Bandit Suppression” Headquarters.
4.  Gu Zhutong was chief-of-staff of the Guomindang army, and He Yingqin was Minister of Defense in the Nationalist government.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-153

If it is difficult to capture the three areas within roughly twenty days using all the
columns now in the Jinzhou area, then it would be appropriate to transfer a unit
from the columns now located west of Shenyang to strengthen your attack. In this
way, you can be assured of quickly capturing the three areas, or at least two of
the three. Of course, there is also the possibility that Wei Lihuang does not care
about Changchun and he will reinforce Jinzhou straightaway. Supposing that is
the case, it is even more important that you do your best to capture Jinzhou soon
after capturing Yi county. Otherwise, the enemy’s reinforcements will approach,
and as you assemble your full forces to attack the reinforcements, the enemy
forces in Jinzhou and Jinxi will be sure to amass in one spot and harass us from
the rear, which will also make it difficult for us to wipe out these enemies later. If
you manage to quickly capture the two areas of Yi county and Jinzhou, you will
be positioned to take the initiative. Otherwise, this could put you at the kind of
disadvantage that you have faced during the past half-year when you were stuck
between the enemy forces in Changchun and Shenyang and you had difficulties attacking either. You should allow for two possibilities when you attack the
enemy forces from Shenyang that arrive to reinforce Jinzhou: the possibility that
the attack will be easy and a victory possible, and the possibility that the attack
will be difficult and a victory impossible. Therefore, whether or not you are able
to gain the initiative during this campaign (of course, we have already held the
strategic advantage for some time) will depend on whether you can quickly capture the three areas, especially Jinzhou. There are only two scenarios under which
you could gain the advantage in this campaign without capturing Jinzhou: you
could do so by achieving a great victory when the Shenyang enemy forces move
north to meet the Changchun enemy forces, eliminating around 100,000 enemy
troops; or you could do so by winning a similarly major victory when the enemy
forces from Shenyang reinforce Jinzhou. But we cannot be sure this is possible.
We feel there will be greater certainty if we capture Jinzhou first, which will also
benefit the overall situation. We hope to hear your response regarding the above
matters. Furthermore, it has already been twenty-one days since our army set out
on the 9th, and we have yet to begin attacking Yi county; we are really moving
too slowly. This calls for self-criticism.
The Military Commission

reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.