Preparations for the Huai-Hai Campaign1
(September 28, 1948)
It has been confirmed that Huang [Baitao]’s army corps2 has been called back to
Xin’an town. Your first and most important battle in the Huai-Hai Campaign is
to pin down the army groups of Qiu [Qingquan] and Li [Mi],3 and to annihilate
Huang’s army corps. Since the area of Xin’an town4 is very close to Xuzhou, the
army corps of Qiu and Li can come to the rescue very rapidly. The scope of this
campaign will thus exceed that of the Ji’nan Campaign, and it may be greater than
that of the Suiqi Campaign.5 You must therefore not begin action until you have
allowed sufficient time for the army units that attacked Ji’nan to rest and receive
reinforcements and to thoroughly prepare for all the battle needs of the entire
army, including all rear services. The time required for the campaign, including
battles with Huang’s army corps and battles at Donghai and the two Huais,6 will
be from one to one-and-a-half months, and rest and reorganization after the campaign will require another month. Accordingly, you must prepare enough rations,
forage, and daily necessities to last for two to two-and-a-half months. This time,
the Ji’nan Campaign took only ten days, and it will likely take about twenty days
for rest and reorganization afterwards; we estimate that the Huai-Hai Campaign
will take one-and-a-half months, making about two-and-a-half months in all. This
was the duration originally estimated for the worst-case scenario in preparing to
Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 26–27, where it is
1.  This is the first part of a telegram that Mao Zedong drafted on behalf of the Central
Military Commission to the political commissar of the East China Military Region, Rao
Shushi, acting commander and acting political commissar of the East China Field Army Su
Yu, and deputy political commissar of the East China Field Army Tan Zhenlin, and for the
information of the commander of the Central Plains Field Army, Liu Bocheng, first deputy
commander of the Central Plains Field Army Chen Yi, and the East China Bureau of the
Central Committee.
2.  Huang Baitao was commander of the Guomindang’s Seventh Army Group.
3.  Qiu Qingquan was deputy commander the Guomindang’s Second Army Group, and
Li Mi (1902–1973, native of Yunnan) was commander of the Guomindang’s Thirteenth
Army Group.
4.  Xin’an town is now the county seat of Xinyi county, Jiangsu.
5.  The reference is to the campaign fought in the area of Sui county and Qi county during the Communist attack on Kaifeng in June and July 1948.
6.  The reference is to the two localities of Huaiyin and Huaiyang.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-152

deal with the assault on Ji’nan and the possibility of reinforcements. If, within
this time limit, you can win a victory in both of these great campaigns, the Ji’nan
Campaign (already secured), and the Huai-Hai Campaign, it will be extremely
worthwhile. It seems better to delay the Qufu Conference, which will be attended
by all cadres of the rank of division commander and above, for a few days to
allow all the columns and divisions of the units that attacked Ji’nan to reorganize before the conference. You should rapidly reinforce the Ninth and Thirteenth
columns, which had the greatest number of casualties. It is necessary, if possible,
to transfer some locally organized units into these two columns, especially into
the Seventy-third and 109th regiments. These two columns should be placed as
reserve forces during the first stage of the Huai-Hai Campaign. Of the more than
60,000 captives, over one-half should be sent as reinforcements to those columns
with the greatest shortfalls. Out of consideration for the rest and reinforcement of
the units that attacked Ji’nan, the launch of the Huai-Hai Campaign should probably be delayed until around October 20th.

reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.