It Is Advisable To Carry Out the Plan of Attacking Jinan and Ambushing Reinforcements as Originally Planned[1]

(September 13, 1948)

Comrade Su Yu, and inform Comrades Xu, Tan, and Wang,[2] the East China Bureau, and the Central Plains Bureau:

I have received your telegram of zhenyou.[3] We are using one army corps to attack the enemy on the outskirts of the southeastern suburbs of Xuzhou, and at the same time dispatching several units to launch disruptive attacks on the Xuhai, Xubeng, and Shanglan[4] railways, creating the impression of an assault on Xuzhou, in order to tie down the enemy in Xuzhou

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to Su Yu, acting commander and acting political commissar of the East China Field Army. “Attacking Jinan and ambushing reinforcements” refers to the operational method adopted by the East China Field Army in the Jinan Campaign in September 1948. Jinan was the junction of the Tianjin-Pukou and Qingdao-Jinan railways and a strategic location connecting the East China and North China regions. The Kuomintang had over 100,000 troops from the 2nd Pacification Zone defending Jinan. At the same time, it planned to deploy three main army corps, approximately 170,000 troops, stationed in the Xuzhou area, ready to move north to reinforce Jinan at any time. In order to use the majority of its forces to annihilate the reinforcing enemy and ensure the capture of Jinan, the East China Field Army formed an assault group with seven columns, approximately 140,000 troops, tasked with capturing Jinan; and an ambush group with eight columns, approximately 180,000 troops, ready at all times to block and annihilate the enemy forces moving north along the Tianjin-Pukou Railway to reinforce Jinan. On the evening of September 16, 1948, the East China Field Army launched an attack on the enemy defending Jinan. After eight days and nights of continuous assault, by September 24, it had completely annihilated the defending enemy, totaling over 100,000 troops (including over 20,000 who revolted), and captured alive Wang Yaowu, commander of the Kuomintang’s 2nd Pacification Zone. Because the East China Field Army’s ambush forces were powerful and Jinan was captured swiftly, the enemy in Xuzhou did not dare to move north in large numbers to reinforce Jinan.

[2] Xu, Tan, and Wang refer to Xu Shiyou, Tan Zhenlin, and Wang Jian’an, who were then respectively commander, political commissar, and deputy commander of the Shandong Army Corps of the East China Field Army.

[3] This refers to the telegram sent by Su Yu at you hour on September 11, 1948, to Xu Shiyou, Tan Zhenlin, and Wang Jian’an, with a copy to the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and others.

[4] Xuhai refers to the Xuhai Railway, i.e., the railway from Xuzhou to Haizhou (now part of Lianyungang City, Jiangsu Province), a section of the Longhai Line. Xubeng refers to the Xubeng Railway, i.e., the railway from Xuzhou to Bengbu, a section of today’s Beijing-Shanghai Line. Shanglan refers to the Shanglan Railway, i.e., the railway from Shangqiu to Lanfeng (now merged into Lankao County, Henan Province), a section of the Longhai Line.

It Is Advisable To Carry Out the Plan of Attacking Jinan and Ambushing Reinforcements as Originally Planned

so that it dares not move north to reinforce Jinan. Because Liu Zhi[1] has three strong army corps stationed separately at Shangqiu, Xin’an, and Bengbu, which can be concentrated near Xuzhou at any time, besides being able to counterattack our dispersed units, he still has sufficient forces (over ten brigades) to form a group to move north to reinforce Jinan. At that time, our dispersed units would inevitably be forced to be redeployed back, our troops would be exhausted and placed in a passive position, and I fear it would be difficult to achieve the objective of ambushing the reinforcements. Therefore, Plan B is not suitable for adoption. Plans A and C are two methods of ambushing reinforcements that follow the original operational plan, and these can be chosen temporarily based on the enemy’s reinforcement situation. Therefore, as long as you are still confident of capturing the airfield and annihilating a portion of the enemy on the outskirts of Jinan City after the 83rd Division is added to Jinan, it is still advisable for you to launch the attack on Jinan according to the original plan and prepare to ambush reinforcements between Xuzhou and Jinan. As long as you can annihilate about two enemy brigades at the airfield and its vicinity, it will be as if the enemy in Jinan City has not been reinforced. Unless you have already completely lost confidence in capturing the airfield and annihilating about two enemy brigades on the outskirts of Jinan City, then you would simply have to abandon the plan to attack Jinan entirely and make other plans. But even if that is the case, it would not hurt to try attacking once or twice. If the trial attacks prove ineffective, it would not cause us great loss.

Military Commission

yuanchou

[1] Liu Zhi was then commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang’s Xuzhou “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters.