Objectives and Military Deployment for the
Battle of Ji’nan
(September 11, 1948, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.)
To Comrade [Xu] Shiyou, and for the information of Su [Yu], Tan [Zhenlin],
Chen [Shiju], the East China Bureau, and the Central Plains Bureau:1
We received your telegram of the 11th.2 We are greatly relieved that you have
arrived at the front. What you say about having a focal point for the use of our
forces is correct. The battle deployments this time have been established in accordance with the directives of the Military Commission; that is, their objectives and
methods should be related yet slightly different. The main objective of this battle
is to occupy Ji’nan, and the objective of annihilating part of the enemy reinforcements is only secondary. But as for the methods used, that is, with respect to
military deployment, we should definitely not use the majority of our forces to
attack Ji’nan. If we used the majority of our forces to attack Ji’nan and only a
minority to fight the reinforcements, we would not be able to block the reinforcements or destroy part of them because of their great numbers. Consequently, we
would lose the time needed to attack Ji’nan, and this would definitely lead to the
failure of our attack. We should therefore use the First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Eleventh, and other of Wei [Guoqing] and Ji [Luo]’s columns,3 for a total
of eight columns, to take on the task of attacking the enemy reinforcements. The
remaining columns will be responsible for attacking Ji’nan. This deployment is
subject to change under the following two conditions: (1) If the task to block and
defeat the reinforcements goes more smoothly than expected (that is, if we annihilate many enemies and block them successfully), but the attack against Ji’nan has not yet succeeded, we should transfer some troops from the armies fighting
the reinforcements to take part in the attack against the city. (2) If we have the city
firmly in hand, but we have not yet been able to finish the struggle for it, and if
the enemy reinforcements cannot rush in because they are blocked, then we could
also transfer some of our forces from fighting the reinforcements to take part in
attacking the city. Otherwise, we should be prepared to transfer troops in a manner opposite to that described above. That is, if it has been proven during the first
phase of the attack on Ji’nan that we will not be able to end the struggle quickly
and the enemy reinforcements have greatly advanced, then, since we cannot continue to attack the city without first destroying the reinforcements, we should
firmly transfer up to half of the troops (except for those occupying the airport and
other crucial areas) from the attack on Ji’nan to attack the enemy reinforcements.
You should also be psychologically prepared for this. As for deployment for the
attack on the city, it should be divided into two phases. During the first phase, you
should concentrate a superior force to occupy the western airport, and you should
not use the main force in the east. This point is very important, and the deployments should be swiftly made. Actions during the second phase will depend upon
how the battle develops. During this period, use the main body of troops in the
direction that is developing most favorably. If progress is most favorable in the
east, then use the main force there. The leadership of the entire attack on the city
is your responsibility. The leadership of all the armies is the responsibility of Su
Yu. The entire battle should be completed in approximately one month, but you
should be prepared to fight for two to three months. You should prepare to deal
with the most difficult circumstances and take this as the main point of departure for all your deployments and all your work. In about three days, Political
Commissar Rao [Shushi]4 will set off from where the Central Committee is and
return to Shandong. He will go first to Su [Yu] and then to you.
The Military Commission
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Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 151–52, where it is reproduced
from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript.

--- Notes

1.  Xu Shiyou was commander of the East China Field Army’s Shandong Corps. Su Yu
was acting commander and acting political commissar of the East China Field Army, and
Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar of the East China Field Army and Chen Shiju
was chief-of-staff of the East China Field Army.

2.  The telegram from Xu Shiyou stated that he expected to be able to take Ji’nan, but
he had not amassed his forces and he lacked a focal point. He hoped that other military
units could firmly obstruct enemy reinforcements for a long enough time to resolve the
situation in Ji’nan.

3.  Wei Guoqing and Ji Luo (Ji Pengfei) were commander and deputy political commissar, respectively, of the East China Field Army’s Northern Jiangsu Corps.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-147

4.  Rao Shushi was political commissar of the East China Military Region.