**Report (September 8)** — There are eight issues to be addressed at this meeting.


First, on the assessment of the international situation.


1. The international situation was assessed at the December meeting last year. At that time, opinions within the Party were not unanimous, and even within the Central Committee there were differences. Two views were put forward: one was either peace or war; the other was that there was a danger of war but that war was unlikely to break out. The danger of war was common ground, but the choice between peace or war was not. The former view held that the strength of the world's people was still insufficient to prevent war. The latter view held that the Soviet Union and the people of the world could mobilize forces to prevent war, that the reactionaries in the US and Britain were also not yet ready for war, and that we could buy time to prevent it; therefore, we had the task of mobilizing the forces of the world's people to stop it. After the Second World War, unlike after the First World War, the possibility of preventing war is greater. The Second World War defeated the fascists in Germany and Japan, and it will not be easy to prop them up again. The reactionaries in the US and Britain are indeed preparing for war, and the danger of war truly exists. But the world's democratic forces, headed by the Soviet Union and still continuing to develop, have already surpassed the reactionary forces (Molotov and Zhdanov have both said this, though some comrades in our Party, especially the middle elements, still do not see it clearly); therefore, the danger of war must and certainly can be overcome, provided that we work hard. If we can gain ten to fifteen years, war will certainly be preventable. We should not frame the question as either compromise or rupture; we should frame it as either a later compromise or an earlier one. On the issue of compromise, what we recently spoke of concerning the Berlin problem was compromise, but not the idea that compromise is possible on all issues—for instance, it would be impossible to pass a resolution abolishing colonies—but rather that compromise is possible on a number of issues. This compromise refers to international issues, not domestic ones; not on all issues, but on a number of them, including important ones. In 1947, the Soviet Union, the US, Britain, and other countries concluded peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland. As for the peace treaties with Germany, Austria, and Japan, although they are very difficult to conclude, they will eventually be concluded. There is potential for the development of trade between Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, but such potential between the US and the Soviet Union may be smaller. The Soviet Union compromises with the US, Britain, and France on democratic principles; let us also make a compromise with the Kuomintang—this is what the middle elements think. I believe we cannot put it this way. The Soviet Union's policy is non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the Atlantic Charter also recognizes the right of the people of every country to choose their own political system. The Chinese people do not choose Chiang Kai-shek's system. The struggle waged by the Soviet Union and all democratic forces against the reactionary forces, and compromise on democratic principles, is the result of that struggle. Must the peoples of all countries compromise with the domestic reactionaries? We cannot put it this way. Of course, if we could force Chiang Kai-shek to do as we say—dissolve fascist organizations, get rid of local tyrants and evil gentry, and allow us to organize our army and carry out land reform—what would be wrong with that? But Chiang Kai-shek is a reactionary, and he does not agree. Since ancient times, reactionaries have had two principles toward democratic forces: destroy them completely if possible; if they cannot be destroyed for the time being, leave them to be destroyed later. Britain is now first eliminating the Communist Party within the government, but dealing with the Communist Party in society more gradually. We should adopt the same two principles toward the reactionaries. Today, we are implementing the first one. The above are the three points of assessment from the December meeting last year. World peace, and the Soviet Union not fighting a war, is of immense benefit to the people of the world. Yet Chiang Kai-shek hopes to fight a third world war, and some people within our Party also think there will be one. If the people of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries can engage in peaceful production for ten to fifteen years, allowing the Soviet Union to raise its productive forces to an annual output of 60 million tons of steel, others will not dare even to look. Three years have already passed; only twelve years remain. That is how the international environment stands.


Second, regarding our strategic policy. Our strategic policy is to overthrow the Kuomintang. The strategic tasks are to push the army forward, expand production by an inch, strengthen discipline, transition from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare, build an army of five million, annihilate five hundred brigades of the enemy's regular forces, and fundamentally overthrow the Kuomintang within about five years. As the army advances, production must expand by an inch; otherwise, there will be nothing to eat. Discipline must also be strengthened, and the methods of warfare must gradually be regularized. This is the policy. The methods of warfare must gradually transition from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare. We have derived benefit from guerrilla warfare. We had the lesson of premature regularization in the past. Over these two years, in concentrating our operations, we have become regularized on this one point, but we have not yet been regularized on all other points. We are still in a period of transition now; we cannot fully accomplish it in the third year either; if we do not capture Beiping and Tianjin, we still cannot fully accomplish it. Without rails, locomotives, and automobiles, modern regular warfare cannot be organized; for example, regularization in the Northeast has been handled relatively well. Currently, the numbering of our army units is the First Column, Second Column, Third Column... and each of the five regions uses the same designations, which causes difficulties when they come together. Even if the designations were unified, the numbers of personnel, organizational structures, and supply standards are not uniform. Therefore, a planned move toward regularization is absolutely necessary; delaying it would be a mistake, just as premature regularization was a mistake. To achieve unity and regularization, there is much work to be done now. Comrade Enlai is drafting a document on this, but it is not yet ready. Building an army of five million is aimed at completely overthrowing the Kuomintang and mopping up every corner. To fundamentally overthrow the Kuomintang, a period of about five years will suffice, and a military force of four million will be enough. In the third year, the number of troops will not be increased. Currently, we have an army of 2.8 million, plus 1.4 million in other people's armed forces, totaling 4.2 million. Units that are below strength must be brought up to complement, for example, columns with only over ten thousand men must be replenished to twenty thousand. In the fourth and fifth years, they must still be expanded, and they can be expanded after reaching the south. The five million includes all of these. Annihilate five hundred brigades of the enemy's regular forces. In the first year, ninety-seven brigades were destroyed; in the second year, ninety-two; in two years, nearly two hundred brigades of regular forces have been destroyed. The reasons the second year saw fewer were: 1. The enemy changed the organization of each brigade from a two-regiment system to a three-regiment system. 2. In the Northeast and with Su Yu, one less battle was fought. 3. Liu and Deng weakened after entering the Dabie Mountains. 4. The main force of the Hua Ye External Line Corps, during the months of July, August, and September last year in Shandong, moved through water and fields as they came, and lacked the mettle for fighting major battles. Therefore, the number of enemy forces destroyed was not large. In the first half of this year, Chen and Su did not fight for five months, and the Northeast did not fight for half a year, yet we still annihilated ninety-two enemy brigades, totaling 1.5 million men; it can be seen that the Kuomintang army is not difficult to destroy. The benefit of the second year was the capture of Linfen; Xu and Tan's Corps became a combat-effective corps; Xu's Corps was strengthened; Chen and Su's situation changed; Liu and Deng have begun to grow strong; although the Northeast fought one less battle, it is now mightily strong. There are still four months left this year, and it is possible to eliminate another thirty-six brigades. Capture Jinan and Taiyuan; let Liu and Deng take Nanyang; if Peng can capture one brigade a month, that will be excellent. Henceforth, the conditions will be even better; in the third, fourth, and fifth years, annihilating another three hundred brigades of the enemy's regular forces gives no reason to say it is impossible. The Kuomintang currently has 284 brigades: some are newly formed, some are hollow, some are strong, and some are weak. Destroying five hundred brigades generally means destroying them twice. Fundamentally overthrowing the Kuomintang does not mean every single corner has been mopped up. For instance, before the capture of Jinan and Taiyuan, can we say that Chiang Kai-shek was fundamentally overthrown in Shandong, and Yan Xishan was fundamentally overthrown in Shanxi? We can say so, but that does not mean total overthrow. Striving to fundamentally overthrow the Kuomintang in about five years is also consistent with publicly proclaiming nationwide victory in at least five or six years. As for capturing cities and expanding the population and area of the liberated zones, we have traditionally not mentioned these, because once the enemy is eliminated, the cities come, the liberated zones expand, and the population increases. In the past two years, by annihilating two hundred enemy brigades, we gained cities such as Siping, Jilin, Yuncheng, Linfen, Yan'an, Weixian, and Luoyang.


Third, regarding the establishment of a people's democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat and based on the worker-peasant alliance, to overthrow the reactionary dictatorship of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. The class nature of our political power is this: a people's democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat, based on the worker-peasant alliance, but not consisting solely of workers and peasants, and including members of the bourgeois democracy as participants. The formulation of this issue has a historical process of development within our Party. During the Great Revolution period, we proposed the "United Front," and the right-wing theory at that time was that political power should belong to the Kuomintang, and that we would carry out revolution later. Later, when we engaged in the Agrarian Revolution, the Sixth Party Congress stipulated a worker-peasant democratic dictatorship, failing to anticipate that bourgeois democratic elements could still cooperate with the proletariat under imperialist oppression. Cooperation occurred later because of the Japanese invasion, and now because of the American invasion; we have again returned to the correct period of the Great Revolution. Now it is not cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, but in principle, it is still "Kuomintang-Communist cooperation." Now, we are not cooperating with Chiang Kai-shek, but with Feng Yuxiang, Li Jishen, the Democratic League, students in Beiping and Tianjin, and with bourgeois elements who have split off from Chiang Kai-shek. The advocacy of the "middle path" and the "third side" is not workable, but we want to cooperate with those who hold such views. Ours is a people's democratic dictatorship; all levels of government should include the word "people's," and all organs of political power should include the word "people's"—for example, courts should be called people's courts, the army called the People's Liberation Army—to show that they are different from Chiang Kai-shek's regime. We have a broad united front; the task of our political power is to overthrow imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. To overthrow them, we must overthrow their state and establish the state of the people's democratic dictatorship. The state of the people's democratic dictatorship is represented by the government produced by the people's representative assembly. The issue of a central government was merely conceived of at the December meeting; at this meeting it must be placed on the agenda for discussion. Once Shijiazhuang was opened up, both the Jin-Cha-Ji and Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu border areas demanded unification. Taiyuan not yet being captured, there are still some differing views on the unification of Jin-Sui and North China. Once the Beiping-Suiyuan railway is opened up, the Northeast will again raise the issue of unification. People's thinking changes along with material changes; the opening up of Shijiazhuang was a material change. Regarding the issue of establishing a system of people's representative assemblies at all levels based on democratic centralism—should the system of our political power adopt a parliamentary system or democratic centralism? In the past, we called it the Soviet Congress system; a Soviet is a representative assembly, but we called it both "Soviet" and "Congress," thus "Soviet Congress" became "Congress Congress." That was mechanically copying a foreign term. Now we shall use the term "People's Representative Assembly." We adopt democratic centralism, not the bourgeois parliamentary system. The parliamentary system was tried by Yuan Shikai and Cao Kun; it has already become discredited. Adopting democratic centralism in China is very suitable. We propose to convene a People's Congress. Even Sun Yat-sen's Will writes of convening a National Assembly; the Kuomintang recites the Will day after day, so they cannot oppose it. Foreign bourgeois elements also cannot oppose it; Chiang Kai-shek convened two "National Assemblies," and they did not oppose those. Germany and North Korea have also done it this way. I think we can decide this way; there is no need to engage in bourgeois parliamentary systems or the separation of powers, etc. The Political Consultative Conference should hold a meeting in the second half of this year or the first half of next year, and preparations should begin now.

In the fourth year of the war, a central government is to be established.

What name should this government take? Whether it is called the Provisional Central Government or the Chinese People's Liberation Committee, its nature will be that of a provisional central government.

The exact name will be decided when the time comes.

Fourth, on the unification of finances and economics.

There is no need to elaborate much on this issue.

The Finance and Economics Committee of the North China People's Government shall unify the possible and necessary construction work and administrative work in economics, finance, trade, banking, transportation, and military industry across the three regions of North China, East China, and the Northwest.

Not everything needs to be unified—only what is both possible and necessary shall be unified. What is possible but unnecessary shall not be unified, and what is necessary but impossible shall also temporarily not be unified.

For example, agriculture and small handicrafts will not be unified for the time being, but banking work and currency issuance must be unified first.

In terms of administrative unification, the North China Finance and Economics Committee shall issue orders, and the Party, government, and military in the three regions must ensure the execution of the unified orders of the North China Finance and Economics Committee.

Fifth, develop inner-Party democracy, train cadres, raise theoretical levels, and prepare the cadres needed for all areas of work after occupying the entire country.

The way to achieve inner-Party democracy is to implement the system of Party congresses and representative conferences.

There is democracy within our Party, but it is still insufficient or lacking, and now it must be increased.

The method is to use Party congresses and representative conferences in place of cadre meetings.

The advantage of cadre meetings is that they are quick, convenient, and relatively easy to convene. Representative conferences should retain the advantages of cadre meetings and not become overly complicated.

In training cadres, we must train not only those within the Party but also those outside it.

The rotational training of village cadres in Central Hebei is a method for training grassroots cadres on a large scale.

The government must run schools, including universities and specialized schools, to train large numbers of various cadres.

Training cadres for all areas of work across the country is a major issue.

To send troops into Sichuan, Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi, we will immediately need twenty to thirty thousand cadres.

Therefore, we must devise a plan.

We must admit that the theoretical level of our Party is still low and must be raised a step further.

For such a large Party, many basic theoretical issues are either not understood or not firmly grasped. For example, the classification of classes has revealed how low our Party's theoretical level is.

Within the Party, there are many new intellectuals and worker-peasant cadres who are ignorant of many basic viewpoints and unable to explain many problems.

There are millions of students and professors nationwide, as well as many theater troupes. If you cannot present a convincing argument, you will simply have to listen to them.

We must raise our theoretical level and also popularize it.

Members of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau should regard this as a political task and pay attention to this issue. Otherwise, we will not be able to persuade those comrades who have made mistakes. For instance, there was an alternate member of the Central Committee who, upon witnessing beatings and killings during the land reform, disapproved but could not articulate a reasoned argument—he lacked that compelling spirit.

It would be unrealistic to require everyone to read the complete selected works of Marx and Lenin. We can select some. Otherwise, with so many books, reading them would also be difficult.

The East China Bureau printed five volumes and reportedly some people are reading them.

If five volumes are not enough, we can select ten, including the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*, *Foundations of Leninism*, and *Imperialism*, among others.

Some of Leontief's *Political Economy* can also be selected.

The Propaganda Department can study this and see what books are suitable. If five volumes are not enough, make it ten, but not too many—too many will not work.

Sixth, on learning industry and doing business.

The whole Party must raise this task, write articles, and conduct propaganda, advocating the study of industry and business throughout the Party.

We already have cities and vast areas; this task must be resolved.

Seventh, on strengthening discipline and overcoming indiscipline and anarchic conditions.

Many points have been discussed above, but this point is still necessary. Without it, the implementation of all those other points will not proceed smoothly.

Indiscipline and anarchic conditions within the Party have now reached an intolerable level.

From central Party organs and central representative organs down to various localities, only good news is reported and not bad news, superiors are deceived but not subordinates, and information is suppressed.

Villages have the power to execute people.

A low-level functionary can bring about the death of the director (a capitalist) of a large factory. "Nine considerations" have turned into nine instances of inconsideration, lifting a rock only to drop it on one's own feet.

Some people, because they have not received land, are crying out in hunger.

These conditions must be changed.

Comrades at the center must devote all efforts to this matter. Within the third year of the war, we must overcome anarchic and undisciplined conditions within the entire Party and army.

Eighth, on "new capitalism" and "agrarian socialism."

The nature of our political power has already been discussed earlier: it is a people's democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat and based on the worker-peasant alliance.

What about our socio-economy? Some call it "new capitalism."

I think this term is inappropriate because it fails to explain that the decisive factor in our socio-economy is the state-run economy and the publicly operated economy. This state is led by the proletariat, so these economies are all of a socialist nature.

Rural individual economy plus urban private economy are large in quantity but do not play a decisive role.

Our state-run economy and publicly operated economy, though smaller in quantity, play the decisive role.

It is better to call our socio-economy the "New Democratic economy."

We oppose agrarian socialism, which refers to pursuing some kind of socialism divorced from industry and relying solely on agriculture. This destroys production, hinders the development of production, and is reactionary.

But this must not lead to misunderstandings.

In the future, within the socialist system, agriculture must also undergo socialization.

The resolutions of the Sixth National Congress contain some errors but are fundamentally correct.

Based on its analysis of the situation at that time, it put forward the Ten Major Programs of the Chinese Revolution. Basically, what we are doing today has not yet surpassed these programs.

We are currently implementing the first point, and also the second point, though there may be strategic considerations. As for the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth points, we remain essentially within these ten points today.

For example, our basic taxation principle remains the unified progressive tax.

However, these ten points did not include the confiscation of bureaucratic capital or the alliance with the petty and middle bourgeoisie.

At that time, regarding the Chinese bourgeoisie, this program fundamentally excluded it from political power while leaving it untouched economically.

Now our political power is based on the worker-peasant alliance, but we can also include representatives of the bourgeoisie—bourgeois democratic elements and intellectuals—to participate (this point is moderated compared to the Ten Major Programs). Economically, we are confiscating bureaucratic capital (this point is more radical compared to the Ten Major Programs).

This is where we differ from the resolutions of the Sixth National Congress.

The last two sections of *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party* deal with "prospects" and "dual nature." You can review them, as they relate to the issues we are studying.

Both the Sixth Congress and the Seventh Congress recognized that capitalism must undergo a period of development after the victory of the democratic revolution, because this is unavoidable.

Capitalism in our country is far too scarce; its development is necessary.

But when discussing socialist factors, only the political conditions were mentioned, without mentioning the confiscation of bureaucratic capital.

Many classes are led by the proletariat, and this is what constitutes a socialist factor.

Now the possibility of socialism has become a reality among a population of 160 million, that is, socialist factors already exist.

Twenty years have passed since the Sixth Congress.

Over these twenty years, especially during the eight years of the War of Resistance, bureaucratic capital expanded enormously.

In my report of December 25 last year, I spoke about confiscating bureaucratic capital and placing it under the ownership of the New Democratic state. In New China, the economic structure will consist, first, of the state-run economy; second, the agricultural economy, progressing from individual to collective; and third, the private economy, with the state-run economy as the leading component.

Now, if we do not mention the state-run economy, we cannot solve the problem.

The resolutions of the Sixth Congress did not stipulate the confiscation of bureaucratic capital, yet later even small capital was confiscated. That was a violation of the Sixth Congress resolutions.

During the War of Resistance, the approach to capitalist economic issues fully conformed to the Sixth Congress resolutions.

During the period of the Civil War, the "leftist" errors effectively negated the relevant urban policies of the Sixth Congress.

When writing *On New Democracy*, the distinction between national capital and bureaucratic capital was not yet clear in our minds.

Large industry, large banks, and large commerce—regardless of whether they were bureaucratic capital—were to be confiscated for a certain period after the national victory. This is a principle of the New Democratic economy.

And once confiscated, they become part of the socialist sector.

The capital of our state bank is of a socialist nature.

After the agrarian revolution, the cooperatives established by peasants depend on under whose leadership they are: under bourgeois leadership, they are capitalist; under proletarian leadership, they are socialist.

Of course, the rural cooperatives we have today are organized by individual peasants on the basis of private property. They are not fully socialist, but they possess a socialist character and are advancing toward socialism.

Cooperatives differ from state-run enterprises. State-run enterprises are completely socialist in nature and carry no capitalist character.

Cooperatives organized by institutional production entities have a somewhat stronger socialist character than cooperatives run by private citizens.

We should speak of this socialist nature, but the national economy as a whole remains a New Democratic economy, that is, an economic system under the leadership of the socialist economy.

China, as a country, should eventually have fifty to a hundred million industrial workers.

If we already had five to eight million industrial workers with us, things would be much easier.

Conclusions (September 13)
I don't have much more to say.

We haven't held a meeting like this in three years.

The Seventh Congress addressed all the problems that existed before it. Without that review and summation, the great progress made after Japan's surrender would not have been possible.

Our Party is now in a different situation compared to the anti-Japanese period.

Back then, before 1940, things were very awkward. In military affairs and in policies—such as mass movements and rent and interest reduction—there was inconsistency in many places. Neither of the Party's first two historical periods had been summarized.

The Seventh Congress made the summary, and this laid the foundation for the victories in the three years of the Liberation War since the victory in the War of Resistance.

In the first year of this period, there was no large-scale fighting. By that time, many issues of principle had been settled. For example, there was no more debate over the policy of uniting with and struggling against the Kuomintang, which was why the Political Consultative Conference went well. The issue of military strategy was completely unified. Rent and interest reduction had long been in place; afterward, when land reform was initiated, an order was issued and it was done.

The discussions at this meeting were more extensive than those at the February conference last year in Yan'an, and this is related to the success and victory of our policies.

At this meeting, everything has been discussed, and even the issue of future prospects has been addressed.

Regarding the issue of how many years it will take to achieve victory, in the past what was discussed was only the possibility. Analyses of developmental prospects were just talked about and were not formally brought before the conference. Even if discussed, there were no conclusions.

At the Xiaohe Conference in July last year, when we summarized the military achievements of the previous year, the development of the situation could be seen.

Now the war has gone on for over two years, the situation is clearer, and we can now offer a more definitive opinion.

At this meeting, we spoke somewhat less about the international and domestic situations, though some points were touched upon.

The domestic and international situation, and the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves, is very favorable for us.

We have always said the situation is excellent. The Seventh Congress also said so, but at that time many issues were still matters of estimation—it was a "good" seen under the conditions of that time, and some estimates later changed.

For example, it was said that solidarity among Britain, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union was decided, but now they are not united.

The Crimea Conference once stated that the victory of the anti-fascist war had opened up a path to democracy and prospects for unity. But now this has not been proven; on the contrary, relations have become more and more strained.

The forces of world revolution exceed the forces of counterrevolution. This was stated by Zhdanov at the conference of the nine-country Communist Information Bureau, was also stated by Molotov, and has been reiterated by Stalin several times.

Our current assessment remains the one made at the conference of the nine-country Information Bureau.

The war plan of the reactionaries can be thwarted.


The danger of war is very serious, but it won't break out immediately—there is a process from the danger of war to its outbreak.


In short, the international situation is favorable to us, and domestically, our revolutionary forces have grown stronger while Chiang Kai-shek's forces have diminished.


Regarding our tasks, the opinions at this meeting are unanimous and have even been further elaborated, which is very good.


Many opinions are planning-oriented, such as the plan for army building, the establishment of the New Democratic Youth League, and meetings like the Women's Representatives Conference, the Youth Representatives Conference, and the Political Work Conference—all of these can be convened.


We must put forward the slogan of opposing waste, not limited to grain, but including human resources and material resources, such as securing prisoners of war, establishing permanent stretcher teams, and managing shells and military supplies.


In the same combat operations, some units broke through with only twelve casualties, while others suffered over sixty casualties and still could not break through.


The same applies to prisoners of war—some were won over and put to use, while others were simply released or dispersed; some units achieved a success rate of over ninety percent, while others achieved less than half.


All captured goods must be turned over to the public, and waste must be overcome—this slogan has rich content.


Only by combining the opposition to waste with the development of production can we achieve victory and realize the goals of expanding the army to five million and overthrowing the Kuomintang in about five years.


We must strengthen international ties, for example, in the areas of youth and women. My report did not mention this, but Comrade Deng Yingchao addressed it in her report on women's work.


Over the past two years, we have engaged in extensive international activities in the movements of women, youth, and workers.


This was unprecedented in the past, and such activities will increase further in the future.


After we announce the establishment of the central government, the international people's democratic forces headed by the Soviet Union will cooperate with us.


Also, our contacts with other fraternal parties must increase.


Our Party's prestige internationally is quite high—this is a major event.


As for the issue of education, it deserves attention.


In the third or fourth year, it will likely be necessary to convene an education conference.


Also, strengthening the work of the Xinhua News Agency is necessary. Newspapers are highly responsive and powerful, so they must be managed well.


In the past, the Central Committee and the Central Bureaus did not pay close enough attention to newspapers. Now, Comrade Shaoqi reviews the major drafts of the Xinhua News Agency, or sometimes Comrade Enlai or Comrade Bishi reviews them.


Is this an exercise of dictatorship?

You're doing a good job of exercising dictatorship like this!

It would be good to continue this for three to five months.


Reviewing major drafts is beneficial—it allows us to learn, diligently make corrections, have Comrades look over the general direction, and then pass it on to others.


I've heard that the newspapers in the North China Bureau follow the same approach as Comrade Bo Yibo.


"Fundamentally overthrow the Kuomintang in about five years or so"—here we have "about," "or so," and "fundamentally."


These qualifiers cannot be removed; not a single one can be left out.


As for publicly promoting the idea of "fundamentally overthrowing the Kuomintang in about five years or so," while this has its benefits, I do not oppose it in principle. However, we must consider how to present it and in what manner.


I am currently inclined to emphasize the difficulties, similar to the phrasing used in the "August 1" editorial, which can help make people more composed and diligent.


Internally—first among cadres, and then among soldiers—it can be stated, and it can also be stated in local areas.


But when stating it, it must be clarified clearly, with "about," "five years or so," and "fundamentally," so that no mistakes are made.


We must also anticipate that even if it is explained clearly, once it spreads, it will immediately be simplified as "victory in five years."


"Build an army of five million," "wipe out five hundred brigades of the enemy's regular forces," and "fundamentally overthrow the Kuomintang in about five years or so"—these phrases are concise and clear, suitable as slogans.


The role of a slogan is that it is easy to articulate and easy to spread.


Stalin spoke very well in *On China*, where he pointed out at that time the need to criticize the Kuomintang within the united front.


We say "both unite and struggle," which conveys the same meaning. When formulated as a slogan, it becomes easy to articulate and easy to spread.


This meeting has fully assessed the difficulties and the possibilities of overcoming them.


Our Party has encountered two major difficulties, caused by two major mistakes: the failure of 1927 and the Long March of 1935.


The difficulties we face later are different from those two and are comparatively easier to overcome.


What major difficulties might we encounter in the future? For instance, if our estimate is wrong, if due to poor work and insufficient strength we fail to prevent war, and a world war breaks out—and breaks out rapidly—that would be a difficulty.


If a world war does not break out, it will certainly be far more advantageous for the Chinese revolution.


If the Soviet Union avoids war and builds up its strength, we may receive international assistance.


With the help of the world's democratic forces, this would be of great significance.


But if we underestimate the situation and a world war comes, what then? We would still have to fight.


If it rains, or if a woman insists on marrying, what can you do? If a world war comes, it will be a major difficulty on a global scale, and it will also be a major difficulty for us.


However, the Chinese people, especially the Communists, after years of war, are not afraid of this.


If we are mentally prepared, we will be in a better position.


Another example: a severe drought strikes.


At the Seventh Congress, we discussed this possibility—it is very likely to occur, and if it does, it will indeed be a major difficulty that we must overcome.


In the past, the Taihang, Shandong, and Jin-Sui regions all had experience in dealing with famines.


If a severe drought occurs, there is no other way but to mobilize the entire Party and organize manpower to overcome it.


Another example: the war drags on, command errors occur, military operations do not go smoothly, and we are unable to cross the Yangtze River next year—then we will have to fight north of the Yangtze.


Eighty percent of Chiang Kai-shek's forces are concentrated in this region. If we destroy his forces, it will be tantamount to overthrowing the Kuomintang.


The so-called Chiang regime is essentially his army.


If Li Zongren establishes a government and creates complications, that would also be a difficulty.


But as Comrade Enlai has said, we can handle it.


We must not completely reject negotiations—we must consider the issue of the people's consciousness.


At that time, there may be two scenarios: either rejecting peace talks or engaging in them.


But now we must expose the peace talk scams that the Kuomintang may attempt.


If the masses are conscious and want to continue the fight, recognizing that peace talks would allow the enemy to rest and then resume fighting—which is more taxing—then we will fight.


If the masses lack this consciousness and desire peace, then we will engage in talks—negotiating on one hand and fighting on the other—and educate the masses during the negotiations, explaining to them the true nature of peace talks, so that in reality, the fight continues and they are not deceived by the enemy.


In short, at that time, we will act according to the consciousness of the people, both inside and outside the Party. But under no circumstances should the door to peace talks be shut entirely.


Neither inside nor outside the Party should we make this mistake.


There are also the difficulties caused by U.S. imperialism's support for Chiang Kai-shek. These difficulties, too, we can overcome.


Analyzing the issues of New Democracy and socialism, Comrade Shaoqi's outline is specific and excellent, and his discussion of the transition between the two stages is also very good. When comrades return to the Central Bureaus, they can propagate this point.


Within a New Democratic society, there are socialist elements—in political, economic, and cultural spheres—and these elements play a leading role, though the society as a whole is New Democratic.


This idea was written into the "February 7" editorial.


Now let us clearly state one point: after the completion of the bourgeois democratic revolution, the principal internal contradiction in China will be that between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, while externally, it will be the contradiction with imperialism.


Secondly, internally, there are also ethnic contradictions—such as those between the Han and the minorities in Tibet, Xinjiang, and other regions, as well as with the Hui people. Within a particular ethnic group, there may also be contradictions.


These can be resolved using the methods of the Soviet Union.


Furthermore, there are contradictions between workers and peasants, but these are not antagonistic. They can be resolved within the worker-peasant alliance through means such as providing machinery, organizing cooperatives, and participating in state management.


We must consolidate the proletariat's leadership over the peasants. Distributing land to the peasants merely establishes leadership—this alone is not sufficient.


True leadership means making the led believe that in the future, during economic construction, they will be given machinery and organized into cooperatives, so that the peasants become prosperous and united.


Once they are convinced, leadership is consolidated; otherwise, leadership may be lost.


Comrade Shaoqi addressed this issue.


Regarding the preparations for completing the transition from New Democracy to socialism, the Soviet Union will assist us, first and foremost by helping us develop our economy.


To achieve economic independence, our country will need another ten to twenty years.


We must work hard to develop the economy, transitioning from a New Democratic economy to a socialist one.


These viewpoints can be publicized.


As for the analysis of economic sectors, further consideration is needed. Comrade Shaoqi will first examine this and draft a document for use at the Second Plenary Session.


Regarding the key points I have mentioned, along with issues concerning youth, women, and political work, a concise resolution must be formulated.


In addition, decisions have already been drafted on some specific issues.


The meeting has essentially approved them, and they will be forwarded after the Secretariat makes some revisions, so as to achieve consensus.


The good suggestions put forward by comrades will be implemented one by one later, so I will not elaborate further here.


This meeting has lasted six days—a bit long, and it could have been shortened somewhat.


Some comrades spoke briefly, making their points memorable; others spoke at length, which instead caused their points to be forgotten.


We might also adopt the method of "regulating capital" when conducting meetings.


Based on the recorded transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives, this is printed.


Note 1 refers to the Central Committee meeting held in Yangjiagou, Mizhi County, northern Shaanxi, from December 25 to 28, 1947.


At this meeting, Mao Zedong's "Some Estimates on the Current International Situation," written in April 1946, was distributed, and the document was discussed and approved.


Note 2: Molotov (1890–1986) was then Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.


Zhdanov (1896–1948) served as Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) from 1944, overseeing ideological work.


Note 3: In June 1948, the United States, Britain, and France unilaterally implemented currency reform in their occupied zones of western Germany (the Western zones) and West Berlin, severing economic ties between the Western zones and the Soviet zone.


Subsequently, the Soviet Union announced a currency reform in its zone and imposed a blockade on West Berlin. The United States, Britain, and France retaliated with a counter-blockade on the Soviet zone and prohibited Western countries from importing goods from Eastern European nations.


To resolve the resulting Berlin Crisis, multiple negotiations were held among the U.S., Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.


Note 4 refers to the joint declaration signed at the conclusion of the Atlantic Conference between the United States and Britain in August 1941.


The declaration stated that the two countries sought no territorial or other expansion, respected the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government, endorsed the destruction of Nazi tyranny, and called for the disarmament of aggressor nations.


It refers to the "Regulations on Unifying the Organization of the Entire Army and Unit Designations" drafted by Zhou Enlai for the Central Military Commission (November 1, 1948).


Note 6: At the time, it was estimated that starting from July 1946, it would take about five years to fundamentally overthrow the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang.


In the end, this timeline was greatly shortened.


Note 7: Su Yu then served as Acting Commander and Acting Political Commissar of the East China Field Army.


Previously, he had been appointed Deputy Commander of the East China Field Army and concurrently Commander and Political Commissar of the First Corps, tasked with preparations for the planned Yangtze River crossing operations.


Note 8 refers to the Central Plains Field Army, with Liu Bocheng as Commander and Deng Xiaoping as Political Commissar.


Note 9 refers to the East China Field Army, with Chen Yi as Commander and concurrently Political Commissar, and Su Yu as Acting Commander and Acting Political Commissar.

10 Xu refers to Xu Xiangqian, who at the time served as commander and political commissar of the First Corps of the North China Military Region.

11 Xu and Tan refer to Xu Shiyou and Tan Zhenlin, who at the time served respectively as commander and political commissar of the Shandong Corps of the East China Field Army.

12 Refers to the Northwest Field Army, with Peng Dehuai as its commander and political commissar.

13 Yan Xishan (1883–1960), a native of Hebian Village, Wutai, Shanxi (now part of Dingxiang). At the time, he served as director of the Taiyuan Pacification Office of the Nationalist Army.

14 Feng Yuxiang, in 1948, served as a standing committee member of the Central Executive Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party and chairman of its Central Political Committee. (See note 4 on page 117 of this volume.) Li Jishen, at the time, served as chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party.

15 The “middle road,” also known as the so-called third path. In the early stages of the People’s War of Liberation, some democrats, aside from the dictatorship of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie under the Nationalist Party and the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the Chinese Communist Party, fantasized about finding an alternative so-called third path, which in reality was a path of bourgeois dictatorship modeled after the British and American systems. The “third aspect” refers to a segment of the upper petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie intellectuals who advocated for this third path.

16 Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), a native of Xiangcheng, Henan, was a leader of the Beiyang warlords. In the late Qing Dynasty, he served as governor of Shandong, governor-general of Zhili and minister of Beiyang, and minister of the Imperial Cabinet. After the Xinhai Revolution, with the support of imperialist powers such as Britain, the United States, and Japan, he usurped the position of provisional president of the Republic of China in 1912 and organized the first Beiyang warlord government representing the interests of the big landlord and big comprador classes. In 1913, he used military force to coerce Congress into electing him president, then dissolved Congress and established puppet bodies such as the “Political Conference” and the “Constitutional Conference.” In December 1915, he restored the monarchy. In March 1916, amid nationwide opposition, he was forced to abolish the monarchy. Cao Kun (1862–1938), a native of Tianjin, was one of the leaders of the Zhili clique of the Beiyang warlords. After Yuan Shikai seized power in 1912, he held positions including commander of the Third Division of the Beiyang Army, military governor of Zhili, and inspector-general of Zhili, Shandong, and Henan. After the First Zhili-Fengtian War in 1922, with the support of British and American imperialism, he took control of the Beijing government. In October of the following year, he bribed members of Congress to become president.

17 Imperialism, namely Lenin’s work Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism.

18 Leontiev (1901–1974), a Soviet economist and corresponding member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. His book Political Economy was one of his early works, published in 1935.

19 In 1946, during the discussions on drafting the “Directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Land Question” (i.e., the “May Fourth Directive”), some liberated areas, in response to the “leftist” errors emerging in land reform in certain locales, proposed the need for a series of policy accommodations. These were nine in number, namely: safeguarding the interests of the middle peasants and distributing to them the fruits of the struggle; protecting the self-cultivated portion of rich peasants’ land; giving special consideration to “landlords who were military or revolutionary cadre dependents” (family members of anti-Japanese soldiers or cadres who were of landlord status), allowing them to retain more land and preserving their dignity politically; giving consideration to small and medium landlords, letting them retain more land; giving consideration to enlightened gentry (in the same manner as “landlords who were military or revolutionary cadre dependents”); giving consideration to individuals of poor backgrounds who had been used by traitors and local tyrants; protecting industrial and commercial enterprises operated by landlords and rich peasants—except those owned by major traitors and evil gentry, which were subject to confiscation by governments at or above the administrative office level, all others were to remain untouched; accommodating all intellectuals who could be united—allocating slightly more land to those from landlord families and a larger share of the fruits of the struggle to those from working people’s families; and providing a livelihood for landlord elements—even local bullies, evil gentry, and big landlords, except those lawfully executed, were to be given land and food, while efforts were to be made to win over fugitive landlords and encourage their return home, granting them a means of living. These accommodations were then referred to as the “nine accommodations.”

20 The Ten-Point Political Program adopted at the Sixth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in Moscow from June 18 to July 11, 1928, was as follows: 1. Overthrow imperialist rule; 2. Confiscate foreign capitalist enterprises and banks; 3. Unify China and recognize the right to national self-determination; 4. Overthrow the warlord Nationalist government; 5. Establish a government of councils (soviets) of workers, peasants, and soldiers; 6. Implement the eight-hour workday, increase wages, provide unemployment relief and social insurance, etc.; 7. Confiscate all land of the landlord class and distribute land to the tiller; 8. Improve the livelihood of soldiers, grant them land and jobs; 9. Abolish all government, warlord, and local taxes and levies, and implement a unified progressive tax; 10. Unite with the world proletariat and the Soviet Union.

21 Refers to sections 6 (“The Future of the Chinese Revolution”) and 7 (“The Dual Tasks of the Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party”) of Chapter 2 of The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party (Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. II, People’s Publishing House, 1991 edition, pp. 649–652).

22 The Seventh Congress refers to the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in Yan’an from April 23 to June 11, 1945.

23 Refers to Mao Zedong’s written report “The Present Situation and Our Tasks,” delivered at the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party meeting held on December 25, 1947, in Yangjiagou, Mizhi County, northern Shaanxi.

24 Refers to the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held in Yan’an on February 1, 1947. This meeting approved the directive on the current situation and tasks drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Committee, namely the article “Welcome the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution,” in Volume IV of Selected Works of Mao Zedong.

25 Refers to the enlarged meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held in Xiaohe Village, Jingbian County, northern Shaanxi, from July 21 to 23, 1947. This meeting reviewed the achievements of the People’s Liberation Army in the first year following the outbreak of full-scale civil war, focusing discussion mainly on military plans and local work.

26 The Crimea Conference, also known as the Yalta Conference. From February 4 to 11, 1945, the heads of state of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain met in Yalta on the Crimean Peninsula of the Soviet Union to coordinate military plans for the final defeat of Germany and to discuss post-war arrangements for Europe and issues related to the war against Japan. The conference issued a communiqué and protocols, and secretly signed the “Agreement Among the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain on Japan” (i.e., the Yalta Agreement). The conference communiqué stated that the three governments “will coordinate their policies” to assist the liberated peoples of Europe “in solving their pressing political and economic problems by democratic means”; “united in peace as in war,” the three powers were determined “to preserve and strengthen in the coming period of peace the unity of purpose and action which the United Nations have achieved in war.”

27 Refers to the meeting of representatives of nine communist and workers’ parties—Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union, France, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Yugoslavia—held in Warsaw, Poland, in September 1947. The meeting decided to establish the Information Bureau of the Nine Communist and Workers’ Parties and adopted the “Declaration on the International Situation.”

28 Deng Yingchao (1904–1992), a native of Guangshan, Henan. At the time, she served as deputy secretary of the Women’s Committee of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

29 Bishi, namely Ren Bishi (1904–1950), a native of Xiangyin, Hunan. At the time, he served as secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and concurrently secretary-general of the Central Committee.

30 Yibo, namely Bo Yibo, who at the time served as second secretary of the North China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

31 Refers to the Xinhua News Agency editorial “A Summary of the People’s War of Liberation Over the Past Two Years and the Tasks for the Third Year,” published in the People’s Daily on August 1, 1948. The editorial stated: “The Chinese people must still be prepared to continue their arduous struggle for several more years, at the very least preparing to spend another three to four years in such arduous struggle, before they can finally liberate all of China and unify it on a democratic basis. In the course of the struggle, certain temporary and partial pauses and twists may still occur. Those who imagine that the Chinese revolution can be completely victorious in one or a few struggles, and who adopt an attitude of underestimating the enemy in specific struggles, or those who imagine that it will be entirely smooth sailing with no temporary or partial twists, and feel bewildered when such twists occur, are mistaken.”

32 Refers to the book Lenin and Stalin on China. The book includes Stalin’s speech “The Chinese Revolution and the Tasks of the Comintern,” delivered on May 24, 1927, which stated: “The policy of supporting Wuhan is at the same time a policy of unfolding the bourgeois-democratic revolution and achieving all the results arising therefrom. Hence the participation of the Communists in the Wuhan Nationalist Party and the Wuhan revolutionary government, a participation that does not exclude, but rather presupposes, the use of all means by the Communists to criticize the inconsistency and vacillation of their own allies within the Nationalist Party.”

33 Li Zongren, who at the time served as vice president of the Nationalist government.

34 Refers to Liu Shaoqi’s speech at the Political Bureau meeting of the Central Committee on September 13, 1948.

35 Refers to the Xinhua News Agency editorial commemorating the 25th anniversary of the “February 7” incident, “Adhere to the Correct Line in the Workers’ Movement, Oppose ‘Leftist’ Adventurism.” This editorial was reviewed and revised by Mao Zedong, with the revised portions...
Refers to the “Regulations on the Unification of the Organization of the Whole Army and the Designations of Units” (November 1, 1948), drafted by Zhou Enlai for the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party.

1. It was estimated at the time that, starting from July 1946, it would take about five years to fundamentally overthrow the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang. Later this timetable was considerably shortened.

2. Su Yu was then serving as Acting Commander and Acting Political Commissar of the Eastern China Field Army. Earlier, he had been appointed Deputy Commander of the Eastern China Field Army as well as Commander and Political Commissar of the 1st Army Group to prepare for the projected operations to cross the Yangtse River.

3. This refers to the Central Plains Field Army with Liu Bocheng as Commander and Deng Xiaoping as Political Commissar.

4. This refers to the Eastern China Field Army with Chen Yi as Commander and Political Commissar and Su Yu as Acting Commander and Acting Political Commissar.

5. Xu, i.e., Xu Xiangqian, then Commander and Political Commissar of the 1st Army Group of the North China Military Area.

6. Xu and Tan, i.e., Xu Shiyou, Commander, and Tan Zhenlin, Political Commissar, of the Shandong Army Group of the Eastern China Field Army.

7. This refers to the Northwest Field Army with Peng Dehuai as Commander and Political Commissar.

8. Yan Xishan (1883-1960), a native of Hebian Village, Wutai County (now part of Dingxiang), Shanxi Province, was then Director of the Taiyuan Pacification Headquarters of the Kuomintang army.

9. Feng Yuxiang in 1948 was a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang and Chairman of the Committee’s Central Political Council. See “Note 4”, p. 117 of this volume. Li Jishen was then Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang.

10. The “middle road”, i.e., the so-called “third road”. During the early days of the People’s War of Liberation, some democratic personages, fancying that, in addition to the dictatorship of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie of the Kuomintang and the people’s democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, they could find a so-called third road, which was in fact the road of a bourgeois dictatorship of the British or American type. The “third force” comprised some of the intellectuals belonging to the upper petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie who were in favour of the third road.

11. Yuan Shikai (1859-1916) was a native of Xiangcheng, Henan Province, and leader of the Northern warlords. In the last years of the Qing Dynasty he served as Governor of Shandong, Governor-General of Zhili and Minister of the Northern Seas, and Premier of the Cabinet. After the Revolution of 1911, he usurped the office of Provisional President of the Republic of China with the support of British, U.S. and Japanese imperialism in 1912 and organized the first government of the Northern warlords, which represented the big landlord and big comprador classes. In 1913 he forced the Parliament to elect him President by military threat and then had it dissolved; he then formed the “Political Conference” and later the “Constitutional Conference”, both under his thumb. In December 1915 he restored the monarchy. In March 1916 he was forced to abolish it because of nationwide opposition. Cao Kun (1862-1938), a native of Tianjin, was one of the leaders of the Zhili (now Hebei) clique of the Northern warlords. After Yuan Shikai usurped state power in 1912, Cao Kun served as Commander of the 3rd Division of the Northern Army, Military Governor of Zhili, and Commissioner for Zhili, Shandong and Henan. After the first war between the Zhili and Fengtian cliques in 1922, he controlled the Beijing government with the backing of British and U.S. imperialism. In October 1923 he made himself President by bribing members of Parliament.

12. Imperialism, i.e., V. I. Lenin’s Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism.

13. A. Leontiev (1901-1974), Soviet economist and corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. His Political Economy was an earlier work, published in 1935.

14. In 1946, during the discussion and drafting of the “Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Land Question” (i.e., the “May 4th Directive”), some Liberated Areas, in view of the “Left” mistakes that had occurred in the land reform in certain places, proposed that certain allowances should be provided for in the policy. These allowances included nine points, namely, the interests of the middle peasants should be considered and they should be given something from the fruits of the struggle; the land tilled by the rich peasants themselves should be considered; the “military and anti-Japanese-cadre landlords” (landlords who had family members in the anti-Japanese armed forces or working as anti-Japanese cadres) should be considered by being allowed to keep more land, and consideration should be shown for their political standing; the small and middle landlords should be considered by being allowed to keep more land; the enlightened gentry should be considered in the same way as the “military and anti-Japanese-cadre landlords”; those among the poor who were made use of by the traitors and local bullies should be considered; industry and commerce run by the landlords and rich peasants should be considered – none of them was to be touched except those owned by arch traitors and major local bullies, which were to be confiscated by governments at or above the administrative prefecture level; all intellectuals who had any possibility of being won over should be considered – those whose families were landlords should be allowed to keep more land, while those whose families were working people should be given more fruits of the struggle; the landlords’ need to make a living should be considered, despotic gentry, local bullies and big landlords, except those who deserved the death penalty, should be allowed to keep some land and to have food, and those landlords who had fled should be induced to return and their need to make a living should be considered. These allowances were then called “nine points for consideration”.

15. The Ten Major Programs adopted by the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, held in Moscow from June 18 to July 11, 1928, were as follows: (1) Overthrow imperialist rule. (2) Confiscate foreign capitalist enterprises and banks. (3) Unify China and recognize the right of national self-determination. (4) Overthrow the government of the warlords and the Kuomintang. (5) Establish a government of workers’, peasants’ and soldiers’ representative councils (soviets). (6) Institute the eight-hour day, increase wages, and provide unemployment relief and social insurance. (7) Confiscate all the land of the landlord class, and let the land be tilled by the peasants. (8) Improve the living conditions of soldiers, and give them land and jobs. (9) Abolish all government, warlord and local taxes and levies, and institute a uniform progressive tax. (10) Unite with the proletariat of the world and with the Soviet Union.

16. This refers to Sections 6 and 7 of Chapter II, “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party”, entitled respectively “The Future of the Chinese Revolution” and “The Two-fold Task of the Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party” (Selected Works of Mao Tsetung, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1967, Vol. II, pp. 329-31).

17. The Seventh Congress was the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in Yan’an from April 23 to June 11, 1945.

18. This refers to the written report entitled “The Present Situation and Our Tasks”, presented by Comrade Mao Tsetung to the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held on December 25, 1947 at Yangjiagou, Mizhi County, northern Shaanxi.

19. This refers to the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in Yan’an on February 1, 1947. At the meeting the directive on the current situation and tasks was adopted. This directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tsetung for the Central Committee and was included in Selected Works of Mao Tsetung, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1969, Vol. IV, under the title “Greet the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution”.

20. This refers to the enlarged meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held at Xiaohe Village, Jingbian County, northern Shaanxi, July 21-23, 1947. This meeting summed up the achievements of the People’s Liberation Army in the first year after the outbreak of the all-out civil war and concentrated on the discussion of military plans and local work, etc.

21. The Crimea Conference, also known as the Yalta Conference. It was attended by the heads of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain in Yalta, in the Crimea, from February 4 to 11, 1945. The conference coordinated the military plans for the final defeat of Germany, and discussed the postwar settlement in Europe and the question of war against Japan. At the conference a communiqué and a protocol were signed, and the secret “Agreement of the Three Great Powers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom on the Question of Japan” (called the Yalta Agreement) was concluded. The communiqué stated that the three governments would “concert their policies” to assist the liberated European peoples “to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems” and that the three Powers were “united for peace as for war” and were determined “to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations”.

22. This refers to the meeting of representatives of the Communist and Workers’ Parties of nine countries – Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union, France, Czechoslovakia, Italy and Yugoslavia – held in Warsaw, Poland, in September 1947. The meeting decided to establish the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties of these nine countries and adopted the “Declaration on the International Situation”.

23. Deng Yingchao (1904-1992), a native of Guangshan, Henan Province, was then Deputy Secretary of the Women’s Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

24. Bishi, i.e., Ren Bishi (1904-1950), a native of Xiangyin, Hunan Province, was then a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Secretary-General of the Central Committee.

25. Yibo, i.e., Bo Yibo, then Second Secretary of the North China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

26. This refers to the Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), August 1, 1948, editorial “Summing Up the Two Years of the People’s War of Liberation and the Tasks for the Third Year”. The editorial said: “The Chinese people must also be prepared for several years of hard struggle, must be prepared to engage in such a bitter struggle for at least three or four years, in order to bring about the liberation of all China and to unify China on the basis of democracy. In the process of the struggle, certain temporary and partial intervals and zigzags may still occur. Those who believe that the Chinese revolution can attain complete victory in one or a few engagements and who adopt a contemptuous attitude towards the enemy in concrete struggles are mistaken; likewise, those who think that it will all be plain sailing without any temporary and partial zigzags and who are bewildered when such zigzags occur are also mistaken.”

27. This refers to the book Lenin and Stalin on China. It contains Stalin’s speech “The Chinese Revolution and the Tasks of the Communist International”, delivered on May 24, 1927, in which he said, “The policy of supporting Wuhan was at the same time a policy of developing the bourgeois-democratic revolution and obtaining all the results that flowed from it. Consequently, the Communists participated in the Wuhan Kuomintang and in the Wuhan revolutionary government, and this participation did not and does not preclude, but rather presupposes, the Communists’ criticism of the irresolution and vacillation of their allies inside the Kuomintang, making use of every means at their disposal.”

--- Notes

28. Li Zongren was then Vice-President of the Kuomintang government.

29. This refers to Comrade Liu Shaoqi’s speech at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on September 13, 1948.

30. This refers to the editorial published by the Xinhua News Agency in commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the “February 7” Strike, “Adhere to the Correct Line of the Workers’ Movement, Combat ‘Left’ Adventurism”, which was examined and revised by Comrade Mao Tsetung.