Prepare to Fundamentally Overthrow the Kuomintang in About Five Years[1]

(September 7, 1948)

Lin, Luo, Liu:

Your telegram of the 6th at 13:00 hours has been received. We are very pleased and gratified that you agree with the views we put forward in our telegram of the 5th. We are preparing to fundamentally overthrow the Kuomintang in about five years (counting from July 1946), and this is achievable. So long as we can annihilate about one hundred brigades of the Kuomintang regular forces each year, and about five hundred brigades over five years, this objective can be attained. In the past two years our army annihilated a total of one hundred and ninety-one brigades of the enemy’s regular forces, averaging ninety-five and a half brigades per year, or slightly fewer than eight brigades per month. In the coming three years, we require our army to annihilate over three hundred brigades of the enemy’s regular forces. From July this year to June next year, we hope to annihilate about one hundred and fifteen brigades of the enemy’s regular forces. This number is to be allocated among the various field armies and army corps[2]. The East China Field Army is required to undertake the annihilation of about forty brigades (including the seven brigades they annihilated in July) and to capture Jinan and a number of large, medium, and small cities in northern Jiangsu, eastern Henan, and northern Anhui. The Central Plains Field Army is required to undertake the annihilation of about fourteen brigades (including the two brigades annihilated in July) and to capture a number of cities in the three provinces of Hubei, Henan, and Anhui. The Northwest Field Army is required to undertake the annihilation of about twelve brigades (including the one and a half brigades annihilated in August). The Xu Xiangqian and Zhou Shidi Army Corps in northern China are required to annihilate about fourteen brigades of Yan Xishan’s forces (including the eight brigades annihilated in July) and to capture Taiyuan. You are required, in coordination with the two army corps of Luo Ruiqing and Yang Chengwu, to undertake the annihilation of about thirty-five brigades of the armies of Wei Lihuang and Fu Zuoyi (including the one brigade annihilated by Yang Chengwu in July) and to capture all cities along the Beining, Pingsui, Pingcheng, and Pingbao lines except for the three points of Beiping, Tianjin, and Shenyang. To achieve this objective, appropriate campaign disposition and command, and appropriate regulation of combat and rest, are the decisive keys. If you can, within the two months of September and October or in a slightly longer period, annihilate the enemy along the line from Jinzhou to Tangshan and capture the points of Jinzhou, Yuguan, and Tangshan, you can achieve the goal of annihilating about eighteen enemy brigades. In order to annihilate these enemies, you should now prepare to deploy your main force on this line, disregarding the two enemy forces at Changchun and Shenyang, and prepare to annihilate the enemy that may come from Changchun and Shenyang to reinforce Jinzhou when you attack Jinzhou. Because the enemy at the three points of Jinzhou, Yuguan, and Tangshan and their vicinity are isolated from each other, victory in attacking and annihilating them is relatively certain and reliable, and there is also relatively good hope of attacking Jinzhou and striking the reinforcements. If you position your main force in Xinmin and areas to its north, preparing to strike the enemy coming out of Changchun and Shenyang, then that enemy, being too greatly threatened by you, may not dare to come out. On the one hand, the enemy at Changchun and Shenyang may not come out; on the other hand, the enemy at the points of Jinzhou, Yuguan, Tangshan, and their vicinity (eighteen brigades), because the forces you send there are too small, may contract to the two points of Jinzhou and Tangshan, becoming not very easy to fight yet impossible to avoid fighting, costing time and effort, and thus you may fall into a passive position. It is more appropriate to disregard the two enemy forces at Changchun and Shenyang and concentrate solely on the one front of Jinzhou, Yuguan, and Tangshan. Furthermore, in the ten months from September this year to June next year, you must prepare to conduct three major campaigns, each estimated to take about two months, totaling about six months, with the remaining four months serving as rest periods. If, during your campaign at Jinzhou, Yuguan, and Tangshan (the first major campaign), the enemy at Changchun and Shenyang pour out in full force to reinforce Jinzhou (because your main force is not located at Xinmin but near Jinzhou, Wei Lihuang would then dare to come to reinforce), then you can, without leaving the Jinzhou-Yuguan-Tangshan line, continuously and on a large scale annihilate the reinforcing enemy, striving to annihilate Wei Lihuang’s entire army on the spot. This is the most ideal situation. In this regard, you should pay attention to: (1) Establish the determination to capture the three points of Jinzhou, Yuguan, and Tangshan and fully control that line. (2) Establish the determination to fight a great battle of annihilation on a scale you have never fought before, that is, dare to engage Wei Lihuang’s entire army when it comes to reinforce. (3) To adapt to the above two determinations, reconsider the operational plan and arrange for the entire army’s military supplies (grain, ammunition, new recruits, etc.) and handle matters concerning prisoners of war. The above views are for your consideration; reply by telegram.

Central Military Commission

Shenyu

Manuscript of "The Operational Policy for the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign" drafted by Mao Zedong.

Archival photograph

On September 12, 1948, the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign began. The photograph shows Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou directing the attack on Jinzhou.

Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou directing operations at the Jinzhou front line.

Schematic diagram of the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign.

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China on the operational policy for the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign, addressed to Lin Biao, Commander and Political Commissar of the Northeast Field Army, Luo Ronghuan, Deputy Political Commissar, and Liu Yalou, Chief of Staff.

[2] On November 1, 1948, the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, based on the decisions of the September meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, reorganized the forces of the former major strategic areas into three categories: field forces, local forces, and guerrilla forces. The field forces were organized into field armies. Below the field army were army corps, below the corps were armies (i.e., the former columns), below the armies were divisions, and below the divisions were regiments. Each field army, based on its geographical area, was designated as the Northwest Field Army, the Central Plains Field Army, the East China Field Army, and the Northeast Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The number of corps, armies, and divisions under each field army was determined according to the specific circumstances of each major strategic area. Later, the Northwest Field Army was renamed the First Field Army, commanding 2 army corps; the Central Plains Field Army was renamed the Second Field Army, commanding 3 army corps; the East China Field Army was renamed the Third Field Army, commanding 4 army corps; the Northeast Field Army was renamed the Fourth Field Army, commanding 4 army corps. The 3 army corps under the North China Military Region were directly subordinate to the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.