The Emphasis of Autumn Fighting in the
Northeast Should Be Placed on the Wei
Lihuang–Fan Hanjie System
(September 5, 1948)
To Lin [Biao], Luo [Ronghuan], and Liu [Yalou]:1
	 1.	 We agree with the arrangements described in the telegram sent at 19:00 on
the 3rd.2
	 2.	 The emphasis of your autumn fighting should be placed on the Wei Lihuang–
Fan Hanjie system;3 you should not think ahead to fighting the Chengde
Thirteenth Army commanded by Fu Zuoyi4 after you fight several divisions
under Fan Hanjie. According to your arrangements in the telegram sent at
19:00 on the 3rd, after you fight the enemy in the four locations of Yi county,
Gaoqiao, Xingcheng, and Suizhong, the two divisions in Jinxi, the two divisions in the Shanhai Pass and Qiantunwei,5 the five divisions in Jinzhou,
and the five divisions along the Jin-Yu railway6 (which are ostensibly under
Fu Zuoyi’s command but in reality seem to be under the command of Fan
Hanjie) will all be isolated from each other and easy to attack and annihilate.
When you attack and annihilate these enemies, Wei Lihuang will very likely
send reinforcements; you can attack and annihilate these reinforcements as they are moving and, in this way, launch large-scale fighting along the BeiNing railway.7 If you fight along this railway, the provision of supplies will
be relatively convenient. This method also breaks through the middle to isolate the enemy’s two flanks (Wei Lihuang and Fu Zuoyi) from one another.
Because of this, your main forces should not leave the Bei-Ning railway without good reason. Instead, think ahead to continuing attacks on points such as
Jinzhou, the Shanhai Pass, and Tangshan, and bringing the entire Bei-Ning
railway (except for the [Bei]ping-[Tian]jin segment) under our control—this
will give us more flexibility vis-à-vis the two flanks. Under the present conditions, with Yang Chengwu’s unit8 attacking Suiyuan,9 and Yang [Dezhi],
Luo [Ruiqing], and Geng [Biao]10 threatening the [Bei]ping-Zhang[jiakou]
railway, it is not possible for Fu Zuoyi to bring in more reinforcements along
the Bei-Ning railway, except for the five divisions in the Tangshan region.
At present, the main enemy with whom you still must deal is Wei Lihuang.
Because of this, it is correct for you to deploy seven columns as well as six
independent divisions to Xinmin and the Shen[yang]-Chang[chun] railway.
However, prior to your attack on Jinzhou, we do not dare draw a conclusion
as to whether the enemy forces in Changchun and Shenyang will dare to
act under the threat of your strong force. We fear they will not act until you
attack Jinzhou. The above is our estimation of the enemy’s situation and the
general plan for your action, and we hope you will consider these things in
advance. Specific judgments and decisions should be made after you have
fought several enemy units.
 The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 592–94, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.
# Source: en:MRP

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Lin Biao was commander of the Northeast Field Army. Luo Ronghuan was political commissar and Liu Yalou was chief-of-staff of the Northeast Field Army.

2.  The telegram from Lin Biao et al. stated their plans were based on expectations of
likely movements by enemy forces around the Beiping-Shenyang railway.

3.  Wei Lihuang was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s Northeast “Bandit
Suppression” Headquarters. Fan Hanjie (1894–1976, native of Guangdong) was deputy
commander-in-chief of the Northeast “Bandit Suppression” Headquarters and director of
the Jinzhou Command Post.

4.  Fu Zuoyi was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s North China “Bandit Suppression” Headquarters.

5.  Qiantunwei is a town located in southern Suizhong county, Liaoning Province.

6.  This railway ran from Tianjin to the Shanhai Pass as part of today’s Beijing-Harbin
railway.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-143

7.  Referring to the Beiping-Shenyang railway, part of today’s Beijing-Harbin railway.

8.  Yang Chengwu was commander of the Third Corps of the North China Military
Region.

9.  Suiyuan was a province covering the central part of today’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

10.  Yang Dezhi was commander of the Second Corps of the North China Military
Region, Luo Ruiqing was political commissar and Geng Biao was chief-of-staff of the
Second Corps of the North China Military Region.