Agree to Liu, Chen, and Deng’s Disposition for Attacking Xiong Shouchun[1]

(September 2, 1948)

Liu, Chen, and Deng, and inform Su, Tan, and Chen[2]:

After our telegram of Dong-Chou[3] was sent, we received your telegram of Dong-Hai[4]. We agree to your disposition for attacking Xiong Shouchun[5]. If this battle can be won, it will be a great help to Su, Tan, and Chen. As for the method of fighting, it is best to use the main force to seize the opportunity without delay to encircle and annihilate Xiong Shouchun. As for the 11th Division and the Nanyang sector, use secondary forces to pin them down. Pay attention to maintaining secrecy and concealment during the preparation time and the time of advance; otherwise, the enemy will be alarmed and flee, and the objective will not be achieved. There are three possible outcomes of this battle: (1) All or the greater part of Xiong Shouchun’s three brigades are wiped out, thereby drawing the 3rd Division and 11th Division to the north, and the 28th Division, 48th Division, and other units to the south, to concentrate in the Queshan area to confront us. (2) If the fighting does not go well and only a part of Xiong Shouchun is wiped out (for example, one brigade), the result will still draw the 3rd Division, 11th Division, or additionally the 28th Division to concentrate in the Xinyang-Queshan[6] area,

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, addressed to Liu Bocheng, Commander of the Central Plains Field Army; Chen Yi, First Deputy Commander; and Deng Zihui, Deputy Political Commissar.

[2] Su, Tan, and Chen refer to Su Yu, Tan Zhenlin, and Chen Shiju, who at the time served respectively as Acting Commander and Acting Political Commissar, Deputy Political Commissar, and Chief of Staff of the East China Field Army.

[3] Refers to the telegram sent by the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee to Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, and Deng Zihui on September 2, 1948. The telegram instructed Liu, Chen, and Deng to meticulously organize the campaign to annihilate the Kuomintang army unit under Xiong Shouchun, and stated that if the task of annihilating the enemy could be completed around September 15, it would be of immense help to the East China Field Army’s operations.

[4] Refers to the telegram sent by Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, and Deng Zihui at the hour of Hai on September 1, 1948, to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, concerning preparations to attack and annihilate either Xiong Shouchun’s unit between Biyang and Tanghe or a part of the 11th Division in the Chunshui area.

[5] Xiong Shouchun, at the time Commander of the Reorganized 10th Division of the Kuomintang Army.

[6] Xin-Que refers to Xinyang and Queshan in Henan Province.

but it will not attract more enemy forces. (3) If secrecy is compromised beforehand and the enemy is alarmed and flees, or if the fighting goes very poorly and a stalemate develops, so that not even a part of the enemy can be wiped out, the result will only be to draw the 11th Division, or additionally the 3rd Division, to move slightly southward, with no change in the overall situation. Regardless of the outcome of this battle, you must all be prepared at that time to swiftly move the main force columns to the vicinity of Xuchang-Luohe[1] to await orders, ready to advance into eastern Henan should a difficult situation arise for Su, Tan, and Chen. This would, first, make Liu Zhi[2] feel threatened; second, prevent Sun Yuanliang[3] and Liu Ruming[4] from daring to move east to reinforce; and third (this is the main point), draw the 3rd Division, 11th Division, 10th Division, 85th Division, and other units into motion and annihilate a part of them. The time when a possible difficult situation may arise for Su, Tan, and Chen is approximately in October. At that time, you must meticulously plan methods of coordination to assist them. Therefore, during the two months of September and October, or perhaps even the first half of November, the various columns directly under your command must be prepared for continuous movement and continuous combat. This point must be clearly explained in advance to the cadres of all columns, so that they are fully mentally prepared. The use and stockpiling of ammunition, food, medicine, and other supplies must all correspond to this requirement.

Military Commission

Dong-Shen

[1] Xu-Luo refers to Xuchang and Luohe in Henan Province.

[2] Liu Zhi, at the time Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang Army’s Xuzhou “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters.

[3] Sun Yuanliang, at the time Commander of the 16th Corps of the Kuomintang Army.

[4] Liu Ruming, at the time Commander of the 4th Pacification Zone of the Kuomintang Army.