Concentrate the Maximum Forces to Block and Attack Reinforcements

(28 August 1948)

Comrade Su Yu:

Your telegram of the morning of the 27th [2] has been noted. This campaign is of immense consequence. In light of the situation on both the enemy’s side and ours, your concerns are well-founded. The campaign plan should take as its fundamental point of departure the ability to cope with the worst-case scenario, namely the third scenario mentioned in our telegram of 0300 hours on the 26th [3], and should not take the first or second scenarios as its fundamental point of departure. The time required to capture Jinan cannot be fixed in advance to only one estimate; rather, three estimates should be set in advance, namely twenty days, one month, and two months. Among these three timeframes, we should of course strive for the first, and failing that, the second; but before the campaign is launched, this remains only an ideal, and whether it can be realized

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to Su Yu, Acting Commander and Acting Political Commissar of the East China Field Army.

[2] Refers to Su Yu’s telegram to the Military Commission of the Central Committee on the morning of 27 August 1948. The telegram stated: Regarding the capture of Jinan, it was originally proposed to proceed in two stages. In the first stage, apart from committing sufficient forces to capture the airfield and draw in enemy reinforcements (approximately 2 to 3 columns) on the Jinan front, all remaining forces should be used to attack the reinforcements, with the aim of annihilating 6 brigades of the reinforcing enemy in the first stage, thereby compelling the other routes of the reinforcing enemy to refrain from advancing fiercely. Then, in the second stage of the campaign, concentrate the main forces (the entire Eastern Army Group and 3 to 4 columns of the Western Army Group) to capture Jinan, leaving only a portion of the forces to block reinforcements; only in this way can we secure the time needed to attack Jinan and ensure that there are no problems in attacking the reinforcements. Upon receiving the Military Commission’s order of 0300 hours on the 26th, we support the operational principles set forth in the Military Commission’s telegram, launching a determined assault and striving with all efforts for the first prospect while avoiding the third. However, in view of the changes in the enemy’s and our own situations and the immense bearing this campaign has on the military and political situation, we ask whether we may, based on the principle of steady fighting, adopt the aforementioned two-stage operational plan, though we shall exert every effort with the sole aim of swiftly capturing Jinan.

[3] That is, "In the Jinan Operation, Prepare to Defeat the Enemy Under the Most Difficult Circumstances."

will depend on the enemy’s defensive capability as it unfolds during the course of the attack. It may be possible to capture the city in about twenty days; in that case, our corps blocking reinforcements can be confident of holding back the reinforcing enemy (including annihilating a portion of them). Or it may take about a month to capture the city; in that case, we must annihilate several brigades of the reinforcing enemy—though not necessarily six brigades, annihilating three or four is absolutely necessary, otherwise we will be unable to block the reinforcing enemy, and our assault on Jinan will certainly fail just when success is within reach. But the most critical situation is that Jinan cannot be captured even in about a month, and we must annihilate the reinforcing enemy in large numbers—for instance, six brigades, eight brigades, or even more—fundamentally halting the advance of the reinforcing enemy and securing all the time needed for the siege, for example, a month and a half, two months, or even longer (the assault on Linfen once took seventy-two days) before the city can be taken. Your fundamental point of departure should be placed on this kind of situation. We are not asking you to concentrate the maximum forces and assault Jinan recklessly regardless of all else; such a disposition would be extremely dangerous. What we are asking of you is to use a portion of your forces to genuinely attack Jinan (not a feint, nor merely to occupy the airfield), while concentrating the maximum forces on blocking and attacking the reinforcements. Whether Jinan is captured depends on time, and gaining time depends on whether the reinforcements can be blocked and attacked. Therefore, in our telegram of 1200 hours on the 12th, we instructed you to use only the Eastern Army Group to attack the city, supplemented at most by an additional division or a column, and to use all remaining forces with full strength to block and attack reinforcements. In our telegram of 0300 hours on the 26th, we instructed you not only to set aside strong reserve forces for blocking and attacking reinforcements but also to do likewise on the front attacking the city, so that at the necessary moment you can concentrate full strength to first annihilate the reinforcing enemy, for if Jinan is not genuinely attacked, the reinforcing enemy will surely not come. If too large a force is used for the siege, then there will be insufficient strength to attack the reinforcements. Under these circumstances, we agree with your opinion: in the first stage, commit sufficient forces to capture the airfield and draw in enemy reinforcements (two to three columns) to the siege, and use all remaining forces to attack the reinforcements. Depending on how the situation develops, if the reinforcing enemy advances slowly, the siege progresses smoothly, and conditions for an internal response exist, then you may consider increasing the forces for the siege, capturing the city first and attacking the reinforcements afterward; if the reinforcing enemy advances rapidly, then you should use full strength to attack the reinforcements first and capture the city afterward.

Military Commission

Chou hour, 28th