Some Tentative Ideas on Attacking Ji’nan
and Fighting the Reinforcements
 (August 12, 1948, 7:00 P.M.)
To Su [Yu], Chen [Shiju], Tang [Liang], and Zhang [Zhen], and to Xu [Shiyou],
Wang [Jian’an], and Tan [Zhenlin], the East China Bureau, and the Central Plains
Bureau:1
We received your telegram of the 10th sent at 4 A.M.2 We are just now in the
process of considering the three plans you put forward. We will give you a formal
response when you have discussed the matter with Xu Shiyou, Wang Jian’an, and
Tan Zhenlin, and we will put forward more concrete suggestions. Now we only
offer some preliminary thoughts for your reference for further discussion.
	 1.	 Three possible results of the September battle can be anticipated. The first is
that we fight a major battle of annihilation. That is, as you said, that we attack
and take Ji’nan and also wipe out most of the reinforcements, consisting of
the Fifth Army and other units. The second is that we win a big but not a very
major battle of annihilation. That is, we take Ji’nan and also wipe out some
but not most of the reinforcements. The third is that we neither take Ji’nan nor effectively attack the reinforcements, leading to a deadlock, so we can
only seek another opportunity to fight.
	 2.	 The aim of your third plan is to achieve the first result. Its weakness is that
if you only occupy the airport with two columns but do not actually attack
Ji’nan and amass eleven columns to defeat the reinforcements, the enemy
reinforcements will undoubtedly assemble carefully and advance slowly
and will not actually intervene. The reason that Qiu [Qingquan] and Ou
[Shounian]’s3 forces reinforced Kaifeng was that we were actually attacking
Kaifeng. The reason it took the enemy ten days to reach Kaifeng is that the
enemy knew that we were blocking but not attacking the reinforcements.
This time, if your plan is not to actually attack Ji’nan but to mainly focus
on fighting the reinforcements, the reinforcements will inevitably adopt
(having no other choice) the method of assembling carefully and advancing
slowly when the forces of Ou [Shounian] are annihilated and those of Qiu
[Qingquan] and Huang [Baitao]4 are heavily defeated. Then our armies will
have to change their plan mid-stream and focus on attacking Ji’nan. There
is nothing terribly wrong with changing plans mid-stream, but we will lose
time and allow the enemy to advance a certain distance, which might affect
the battle situation.
	 3.	 We can carry out your second plan under one condition. That is, if all the
forces of Xu [Shiyou] and Tan [Zhenlin] but no others (or with one or two
other divisions, at most one column) can take part in the battle, our inclination at present is to attack the city and the reinforcements at the same time.
We will split the task among different troops acting in concert. Our goal will
be to occupy Ji’nan and annihilate part of the reinforcements, making use of
your second plan to achieve the second result specified above. We feel this
is safer and has more chance of success because in this battle Ou Shounian’s
main force has been annihilated; Qiu Qingquan and Huang Baitao’s forces
have been heavily defeated; and the Twenty-fifth Division has retreated.
Although the Eighth and Sixty-fourth divisions have just arrived, they can at
most compensate for the annihilation of Ou Shounian’s main force and the
retreat of the Twenty-fifth Division. If you amass six or seven columns, you
can not only block the reinforcements in a suitable spot but also annihilate
a portion of them. This will at least ensure that an attack on Ji’nan can be made. This is the plan we have devised to divide the tasks of attacking the
city and the reinforcements.
	 4.	 Whether you carry out the second or the third plan, in terms of deployment
the three columns led by Ye Fei5 should complete training in the latter part of
this month and advance northward to the areas of Jia[xiang] and Ju[ye]. The
columns that are already in the north, and the Third Column, which is just
now advancing, should be in Yan[zhou] and Ji[ning] or south of them at the
appropriate time. That is, except for the five brigades of Wei [Guoqing] and
Ji [Luo],6 which can decide provisionally where to be stationed during the
battle (it seems they should attack the Xu[zhou]-Beng[bu] railway), all the
regular forces should be stationed in front of the enemy. They should first
block the enemy and then try to annihilate a portion of its forces. Do not try,
however, to have Ye Fei’s three columns follow Qiu [Qingquan] and Huang
[Baitao] and attack them from both sides. If you want to defeat the reinforcements, Qiu [Qingquan] and Huang [Baitao] will not split their forces in two
and allow you to attack part of them. At that time, it will be quite possible for
the enemy to deploy some troops west of the canal (for example, in Jinxiang)
to block our forces and then have the main forces move forward to reinforce
Ji’nan along the [Tian]jin-Pu[kou] railway. Or, conversely, they might have
one unit assault us along the [Tian]jin-Pu[kou] railway and have the main
force advance northward west of the canal to reinforce Ji’nan. Our armies
must therefore be stationed on both sides of the canal in advance. We must
also build some defense works to transfer forces either way across the canal
to block and destroy the reinforcements at any time.
	 5.	 Food supplies are a major problem. When you go to Yan[zhou] and Ji[ning]
for a meeting, the East China Bureau and the Hebei-Shandong-Henan
Liberated Area should assign certain cadres to be responsible for gathering
provisions and other problems.
The Military Commission

---

Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 566–69, where it is
reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Su
Yu was acting commander and acting political commissar of the East China Field Army.
Chen Shiju was chief-of-staff, Tang Liang was political commissar, and Zhang Zhen (张震)
was deputy chief-of-staff of the East China Field Army. Xu Shiyou was commander of the
East China Field Army’s Shandong Corps, Wang Jian’an was deputy commander of the East
China Field Army, and Tan Zhenlin was political commissar of the East China Field Army.

2.  The telegram from Su Yu et al. proposed three scenarios for mobilizing the East
China Field Army after it completed its rest and reorganization during the rainy season:
First, amass the entire force and send it to fight in the Yu-Wan-Su (Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu)
Military Region, cut off the Xuzhou-Bengbu railway, isolate Xuzhou, and emphasize
attacking the enemy reinforcements; second, amass the main forces to capture Ji’nan, and
only use such forces that are necessary to block the possible enemy reinforcements to the
north; third, capture Ji’nan and attack the reinforcements at the same time, in two phases.
The first phase would use two columns to seize Ji’nan airport, while eleven columns would
attack the enemy reinforcements. The second phase would use a portion of their forces to
block reinforcements and then send the main forces to attack Ji’nan. Su Yu et al. preferred
the third plan.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-139

3.  Qiu Qingquan was commander of the Guomindang army’s Reorganized Fifth Army.
Ou Shounian was formerly deputy commander of the Guomindang army’s Sixth Pacification Zone, and he led an army group composed of the Reorganized Seventy-fifth and Seventy-first divisions and the Newly Organized Twenty-first Brigade until he was captured
during the Eastern Henan Campaign of July 1948.

4.  Huang Baitao (1900–1948, born in Tianjin) was commander of the Guomindang
army’s Seventh Army.

5.  Ye Fei was commander of the First Column of the East China Field Army.

6.  Wei Guoqing and Ji Luo (Ji Pengfei) were commander and deputy political commissar, respectively, of the East China Field Army’s Northern Jiangsu Corps.