Be Sure to Seize the Enemy Forces That May Be Transferred in Large Numbers from the Northeast[1]

(August 12, 1948)

Lin, Luo, Liu:

Your telegram of 11:00 on the 11th[2] has been noted. Regarding the possibility of the enemy withdrawing from the Northeast to Central China, we informed you of this when you had not yet concluded your winter operations, in the hope that you would be sure to seize these enemy forces. If the enemy transfers large numbers from the Northeast to Central China, it will be extremely detrimental to operations in Central China. Concerning the need for your large army to make advance preparations for grain supplies before moving south, we also instructed you two months ago to make diligent preparations. In the past two months, you have not mentioned a single word about whether you have carried out this instruction of ours. Now, judging from your telegram, it seems that no such preparatory work has been undertaken at all in the past two months, so that the troops now have no grain and cannot advance. And the reason you have been unable to decide on a date for setting out, as stated in your several telegrams over the past few days, has been placed entirely on the enemy situation, and furthermore, on whether Yang Chengwu can set out earlier. In your telegram of 19:00 on the 6th, although you did mention the grain problem, you said, "If Yang Chengwu’s unit can set out earlier, then our time of setting out can also be earlier." In your telegram of 17:00 on the 8th, you made no mention at all of the grain problem, but spoke of the seriousness of the enemy situation and concluded that "the timing of the Northeast main force’s action can only be determined by the timing of Yang Chengwu’s unit’s action." After we pointed out to you that you should not regard the enemy situation on the southern front as excessively serious, and especially should not take the actions of Yang Chengwu’s unit as the standard for your own actions, and at the same time had already set the time for Yang Chengwu’s action, you then said (less than three days apart) that you "absolutely will not take the timing of Yang Chengwu’s unit’s action as the standard," and reverted to the grain problem. For yourselves, you must give thorough consideration to every aspect—enemy situation, grain, rain gear; for Yang Chengwu’s unit, it seems that nothing is a problem. May we ask: if your own movement is indefinitely delayed, while you order that unit to go out alone and prematurely, with Fu Zuoyi having very few concerns on the eastern front, he will use full force to reinforce Suiyuan, drive Yang Chengwu away, and then return to the eastern side to deal with Yang and Luo[1] and with you, just as in April this year—what benefit would that bring to the war situation? Your taking such a careless attitude toward Yang Chengwu’s unit is very wrong. Judging from your recent telegrams, your assessment of the enemy situation on the Beiping-Liaoning line also appears to be very careless. In order to urge you to act with prudence, we specifically point out the above. If you disagree with these points, we hope you will present your rebuttal.

Military Commission
06:00, 12th day of the 8th month

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and addressed to Lin Biao, Commander and concurrently Political Commissar of the Northeast Field Army, Luo Ronghuan, Deputy Political Commissar, and Liu Yalou, Chief of Staff.

[2] Refers to the telegram sent by Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee at 11:00 on August 11, 1948. The telegram stated: "1. News we received a few days ago said that the 94th Army had been added to Jinzhou, and the 8th Army had already returned to the area north of Tangshan. But recently we have also received news that the 54th Army in Jinzhou is to be dispatched to Shandong. Yesterday, a United Press broadcast said that Fan Hanjie’s forces would reinforce Central China. It is also reported that the enemy in Shenyang declared martial law on July 29, and there is news that the enemy’s 4th Division in Chengde is to move to Gubeikou. Judging from the above circumstances, the enemy is about to undertake new movements, but the specific situation and intentions are unclear and are still under reconnaissance. If the enemy is not opening up the Shenyang-Jinzhou railway, then it is also possible that they will transfer troops from the vicinity of Jinzhou to reinforce Central China. 2. The Northeast main force has not engaged in combat for several months. The officers and soldiers are all urgently demanding to fight, and the troops can be deployed at any time. However, in the present area, there is no opportunity for battle to be sought. Moving south is impossible because the problem of grain supplies for the large army cannot be resolved. Transporting grain to Rehe involves very long routes, and railways and motor roads must be used. But this year’s rainfall has been the heaviest in thirty years, with many sections of railways and motor roads washed out, and the rain has become even heavier in recent days. It was originally estimated that the railways, motor roads, and bridges could be repaired around August 15, but judging from the current rainfall, there is still no certainty whether they can be completed on schedule. We are now only waiting for the grain transport routes north and south of Zhengjiatun to be repaired and for the rain to ease somewhat (since the entire army has no rain gear), and then we can set out at any time. We absolutely will not take the timing of Yang Chengwu’s unit’s action as the standard. However, at present, the time of setting out still cannot be determined."

[1] Yang and Luo refer to Yang Dezhi and Luo Ruiqing, who were then respectively Commander and Political Commissar of the Second Corps of the North China Military Region.