At Present It Is Advisable to Strike at Hu Zongnan in the Area North of the Wei River

(August 11, 1948)

Comrade Dehuai:

I am much gratified by the annihilation of the 36th Division. At present, if our army still has strength to spare and there is an opportunity to strike at the enemy’s 38th Division and other units, we may fight another battle after a few days’ rest. Otherwise, we should immediately withdraw our troops, rest and consolidate for a number of days, and then seek another opportunity to wipe out the enemy north of the Wei River. The area north of the Wei River is a grain-producing region. Extending from the Yellow River in the east to Chunhua and Yaoxian in the west, it has a rather broad front, and the enemy forces, being strung out in a single line, are vulnerable to our attacks and destruction one by one. If we concentrate on striking at Hu north of the Wei River, Ma’s troops in eastern Gansu may not necessarily come to his rescue; if we strike westward at Ma, Hu will certainly rush to Ma’s aid. Wiping out a few more of Hu’s units north of the Wei River will have the further great advantage of pinning down Hu’s troops in Shaanxi so that they cannot move into the Central Plains. Therefore, we think that for a rather long period at present it is advisable to strike at Hu north of the Wei River. When the area has been more or less cleared of the enemy, or when it has not been cleared but it is no longer to our advantage to fight there, we can then concentrate all our forces to strike at Ma. Please let me know whether this is feasible.

Mao Zedong

Weizhen

[1] Dehuai, i.e., Peng Dehuai, then commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army.
[2] Chunhua and Yaoxian, both in Shaanxi Province.
[3] Hu, i.e., Hu Zongnan, then director of the Xi’an Pacification Headquarters of the Kuomintang army.
[4] Ma, i.e., Ma Bufang, then deputy director of the Northwest Military and Political Headquarters of the Kuomintang army.