At present the Beiping–Liaoning Line is just right for fighting; the troops should move swiftly[1]

(August 9, 1948)

Lin, Luo, Liu, and inform Yang, Luo, Geng[2]:

Your telegram of the 9th at 17:00 hours[3] received. (1) Yang Chengwu’s force[4] has been confirmed to set out on the 21st from east of Laiyuan, taking a twenty-day march (arriving around September 10) to the vicinity of Guisui[5] and Jining, and then commence the attack. (2) Fu Zuoyi’s[6] own three armies (35th Army, Temporary 3rd Army, Temporary 4th Army) and various independent divisions are all positioned along the Beiping–Suiyuan Line[7] and near Beiping; they have not gone east and can reinforce

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, addressed to Lin Biao, commander and concurrently political commissar of the Northeast Field Army, Luo Ronghuan, deputy political commissar, and Liu Yalou, chief of staff.

[2] Yang, Luo, Geng refers to Yang Dezhi, Luo Ruiqing, and Geng Biao, who at the time were respectively commander, political commissar, and chief of staff of the 2nd Corps of the North China Military Region.

[3] Refers to the telegram sent by Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou to the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee at 17:00 hours on August 8, 1948. The telegram stated: Fu Zuoyi’s main force has currently been shifted to the Jinzhou–Tangshan line, which is precisely convenient for our Yang Chengwu force to strike westward. Therefore, it would be even better if our Yang Chengwu force could set out and advance westward within the next few days; otherwise, the earlier the departure the better. In order to enable Yang Chengwu’s force to exploit the weakness and capture Guisui and Jining, it has been decided to order our 11th Column, currently southwest of Shanhaiguan, to exert maximum pressure on the Shanhaiguan–Tangshan line so as to draw in Fu Zuoyi’s main force. The timing of the Northeast main force’s movement must depend on the timing of Yang Chengwu’s force’s movement, and therefore cannot yet be concretely determined at present.

[4] Yang Chengwu’s force refers to the 3rd Corps of the North China Military Region, with Corps Commander Yang Chengwu.

[5] Guisui, old city name, now Hohhot, Inner Mongolia.

[6] Fu Zuoyi, at the time served as Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang’s North China “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters.

[7] The Beiping–Suiyuan Line refers to the railway from Beiping (now Beijing) to Baotou in Suiyuan (now part of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region), i.e., the present Beijing–Baotou Line.

At present the Beiping–Liaoning Line is just right for fighting; the troops should move swiftly

Guisui at any time. Our troops are marching on foot, while the enemy travels by vehicle or airlift; during the twenty days our troops are marching, they may be detected by the enemy, allowing enemy reinforcements to arrive before us or slightly later. Therefore, Yang, Luo, and Geng must coordinate operations toward the Beiping–Gubeikou and Beiping–Zhangjiakou lines[1] and must open fire several days in advance, only thus can they ensure Yang Chengwu’s capture of Guisui and Jining. (3) The 92nd Army, 94th Army, 16th Army, and other units you mentioned are Chiang Kai-shek’s troops placed under Fu Zuoyi’s command, not Fu Zuoyi’s own. The central task of these units is to defend the Beiping–Shanhaiguan[2], Beiping–Gubeikou, Beiping–Zhangjiakou, and Beiping–Baoding[3] lines. As long as Yang, Luo, and Geng move toward the Beiping–Gubeikou and Beiping–Zhangjiakou lines, all except the 92nd Army will rapidly shrink back. The 94th Army, 16th Army, and other units are all dealing with Yang, Luo, and Geng, and are extremely far from the Jinzhou–Shanhaiguan line[4]; they will absolutely not hinder your attack on the Jinzhou–Shanhaiguan line. There is no news of the 94th Army going to Jinzhou; the two divisions (brigades) of the 8th Army under Wang Boxun[5] went from Qinhuangdao via Shanghai to Bengbu, and there is no news of them returning to the Beiping–Liaoning Line[6]. Only the 92nd Army has indeed reached the Luanxian area; if you pin down this army with a part of your force, it will absolutely not hinder your attack on Jinzhou–Shanhaiguan. You must not be deceived by the enemy’s camouflage; you should swiftly decide and begin to move. At present the Beiping–Liaoning Line is just right for fighting. Your assertion that your movement depends on Yang Chengwu’s movement is an incorrect formulation.

Central Military Commission

23:00 hours, the 9th

[1] Beiping–Gubeikou refers to the Beiping–Gubeikou Railway, i.e., the railway from Beiping (now Beijing) to Gubeikou, a section of the present Beijing–Tongliao Line. Beiping–Zhangjiakou refers to the Beiping–Zhangjiakou Railway, i.e., the railway from Beiping to Zhangjiakou, a section of the present Beijing–Baotou Line.

[2] Beiping–Shanhaiguan refers to the Beiping–Shanhaiguan Railway, i.e., the railway from Beiping (now Beijing) to Shanhaiguan, a section of the present Beijing–Harbin Line.

[3] Beiping–Baoding refers to the Beiping–Baoding Railway, i.e., the railway from Beiping (now Beijing) to Baoding, a section of the present Beijing–Guangzhou Line.

[4] Jinzhou–Shanhaiguan Line refers to the railway from Jinzhou to Shanhaiguan, i.e., a section of the present Beijing–Harbin Line.

[5] Wang Boxun, at the time served as commander of the Kuomintang’s 39th Army.

[6] Beiping–Liaoning Line refers to the railway from Beiping (now Beijing) to Shenyang, i.e., a section of the present Beijing–Harbin Line.