The Lin-Luo-Liu Unit Should Make All Preparations for the Southward Advance[1]

(July 22, 1948)

To Lin, Luo, and Liu, and inform the Northeast Bureau:

Your two telegrams of July 20 and 22 are both noted.[2] The southward operations enjoy various favorable conditions. The further our army advances into the enemy’s rear, the more it will compel the enemy’s strongholds isolated and suspended on our flanks and rear to be weakened or evacuated. This truth has already been proven by the entire southern front operations and also by your own operations. Attacking Changchun,

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[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, addressed to Lin Biao, Commander and concurrently Political Commissar of the Northeast Field Army; Luo Ronghuan, Deputy Political Commissar; and Liu Yalou, Chief of Staff.

[2] Refers to the two telegrams sent by Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou to the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee on July 20 and 22, 1948. The earlier telegram stated: “Recently, the Standing Committee of the Northeast Bureau re-discussed the issue of operations. All agree that our army should still proceed with the southward operations, and it is inadvisable to attack Changchun reluctantly and passively. We propose that the main force of the Northeast wait until around the autumn harvest in Rehe and after the end of the rainy season in the Northeast, that is, wait another month until mid-August, and then our army will commence the southward operations with the maximum main force. First, by means of swift raids, we will separately encircle and annihilate the enemy forces at Yixian, Jinxi, Xingcheng, Suizhong, and Shanhaiguan, and then rapidly engage in battles to capture Chengde and strike at enemy reinforcements. The greatest difficulty for our army in the southward advance is the supply of grain, but this can be resolved. For operations along the Beiping-Suiyuan Railway, preparations must be made by the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei side.” The later telegram stated: “If the enemy in North China is indeed weak, then our army’s southward advance in coordination with the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei forces offers a significant possibility of completely annihilating the enemy and capturing Tianjin and Beiping; at the same time, it will inevitably cause the enemy at Changchun and Shenyang to withdraw, thereby achieving the possibility of liberating the Northeast. If the Central Committee agrees to the proposal in the July 20 telegram, before our southward advance is exposed, please try to dispatch troops to besiege Datong, dispersing Fu Zuoyi’s forces toward the Datong area, so that our army can destroy the enemy piecemeal. We are confident of annihilating any defending enemy force of 50,000 or fewer; for a defending force of 100,000, as long as there is no major threat of reinforcement, we also have considerable confidence in annihilating it. Therefore, if one or two of Fu Zuoyi’s armies can be diverted westward, we have the confidence to annihilate all enemy forces in Beiping, Tianjin, Zhangjiakou, Baoding, Tangshan, and Datong.”

The Lin-Luo-Liu Unit Should Make All Preparations for the Southward Advance

since there is no certainty, it is of course possible and proper to halt this plan and switch to the plan of advancing southward earlier. During the period when you were preparing to attack Changchun, we informed you not to describe the difficult conditions of the southward advance in too many or too absolute terms, lest you mentally restrict yourselves and lose the initiative. Now you have shifted your attention to the southward operations, studying the enemy situation, terrain, grain, and other conditions in the south, and have discerned various favorable conditions. This is very good and very necessary. Moreover, these conditions should be fully explained to all commanders and fighters of the entire army, first of all to the cadres, in order to encourage and fortify their will and determination to advance southward. But at the same time, it is necessary to explain the various difficult situations that will be encountered and are bound to be encountered, such as grain difficulties, the people’s welcome possibly not being as warm as that of the people in the areas where you are now stationed, the stubborn resistance of certain enemies, and operations not going smoothly at certain times, etc., so that they may have mental preparation in advance in these respects and study methods to overcome each difficulty. Among these difficulties that are bound to be encountered, especially the difficulty of grain conditions, your senior leadership must estimate them with particular seriousness. Now there is less than a month until mid-August. Your work on political mobilization and grain preparation, etc., must be intensified. Otherwise, fighting cannot yet begin in August on the Beiping-Liaoning, Beiping-Chengde, and Beiping-Zhangjiakou lines.[1] Regarding the specific operational plan, we hope you will consider it in detail, draft a comprehensive plan, and report by telegram. It seems appropriate for your command organs to move south ahead of schedule and meet with Cheng Zihua and Luo Ruiqing[2] and others. The Northeast Bureau should quickly strengthen work in the Hebei-Chahar-Rehe-Liaoning region, especially work in finance, economics, and grain, as there exist quite serious contradictions in this region in these respects.

The Central Military Commission

Yanghai

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[1] Beiping-Liaoning refers to the Beiping-Liaoning Railway, the railway from Beiping (present-day Beijing) to Shenyang, now a section of the Beijing-Harbin line. Beiping-Chengde refers to the Beiping-Chengde Railway, the railway from Beiping to Chengde, now the Beijing-Chengde line. Beiping-Zhangjiakou refers to the Beiping-Zhangjiakou Railway, the railway from Beiping to Zhangjiakou, now a section of the Beijing-Baotou line.

[2] Cheng Zihua was then Commander of the Hebei-Chahar-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region. Luo Ruiqing was then Director of the Political Department of the North China Military Region and concurrently First Political Commissar of the Second Army Group.