Halt the Plan to Attack Changchun and Get
Ready to Head South for Battle
 (July 22, 1948, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.)
To Lin [Biao], Luo [Ronghuan], and Liu [Yalou],1 and for the information of the
East China Bureau:
We received your two telegrams of July 20th and 22nd.2 There are various benefits to heading south for battle. The farther our army advances behind the enemy,
the more we can push the enemy into isolation among our footholds until it is
forcefully reduced, or it must retreat. This has been proven by the battles on the
entire southern front and by your own battles as well. Since we have no assurance
of succeeding in our attack on Changchun, of course you can and should halt this
plan and quickly change it into heading south for battle. While you were preparing to attack Changchun, we told you not to exaggerate the difficulties involved
in going south for battle, since this would constrict you psychologically and cause
you to lose the initiative.3 Now you have shifted your attention to the prospect of
heading south for battle, and you have studied the enemy’s situation, the topography, and the provisions in the south and you have seen various advantages. This is
very good and very necessary. Moreover, you should explain these advantages to
the leaders of your entire army, first telling the cadres to encourage and strengthen
their will and determination to march south. At the same time, however, you must
explain the various difficulties that you might and will certainly encounter, such
as the difficulty of procuring food supplies, that the people may not welcome you
as warmly as where you are now, that portions of the enemy forces may strongly
Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 111–13, where it is reproduced
from Mao’s handwritten manuscript.
resist, that the fighting may sometimes be difficult, and so on, so they will be psychologically prepared for such things in advance and so they can figure out ways
to overcome various problems. In particular, you, the upper-level leaders, must
seriously appraise the inevitable difficulties, especially that of procuring food supplies. There is less than one month left from now until the middle of August, and
you must hurry along with tasks such as political mobilization and preparing food
supplies. Otherwise, you will not be able to launch battles in August along the
Beining-Pingcheng-Pingzhang line. As for a concrete battle plan, we expect you
to consider things even more carefully and to devise an overall strategy and report
it to us via telegram. It might be better if your headquarters first moves south to
join up with Cheng Zihua, Luo Ruiqing,4 and the others. The Northeast Bureau
should rapidly strengthen its work in the Hebei-Chahar-Rehe-Liaoning border
area, where there are rather serious contradictions, especially regarding finance
and food supplies.
The Military Commission

--- Notes

1.  Lin Biao was commander and political commissar of the Northeast Field Army, and
Luo Ronghuan was deputy political commissar and Liu Yalou was chief-of-staff of the
Northeast Field Army.

2.  The July 20th telegram from Lin Biao et al. stated that after discussion, the Northeast
Bureau Standing Committee felt it better to head south rather than to attack Changchun.
It asked that appropriate arrangements for provisions be made. The July 22nd telegram
stated that sending troops south to assist the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Field Army was likely
to annihilate the enemy forces and capture Tianjin and Beiping, while possibly also causing
the enemy forces to withdraw from Changchun and Shenyang and liberating the Northeast.

3.  See “You May First Attack Changchun, but Do Not Place Undue Emphasis on the
Difficulties of Marching South,” April 22, 1948, in this volume.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-136


4.  Cheng Zihua was commander of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region. Luo
Ruiqing was political commissar of the North China Military Region and first political
commissar of its Second Corps.