Instructions on Sabotaging Railroads
(July 10, 1948)
To Liu [Bocheng], Chen [Yi], and Deng [Xiaoping], Su [Yu], Chen [Shiju], and
Tang [Liang], Xu [Shiyou] and Tan [Zhenlin], Wei [Guoqing] and Ji [Luo],1 the
East China Bureau, and Song Renqiong:2
On June 26th, Xu and Tan suggested, among other things, that we thoroughly
destroy the Longhai railway east of Zhengzhou and the [Tian]jin-Pu[kou] railway
south of Gunzhou or Teng county to make it impossible for the enemy to move
railcars for two or three months, but they felt that the main railroad bridges did
not need to be destroyed. We believe that, for the purpose of blocking the enemy’s
military transport:
	 1.	 You may completely destroy the [Bei]ping-Han[kou] railway south of
Xinyang, and the [Tian]jin-Pu[kou] railway south of Xuzhou, including the
main bridges along these sections.
	 2.	 Carry out destruction only as necessary along the Zheng[zhou]-Xin[yang]
section of the [Bei]ping-Han[kou] railway and along the Zheng[zhou]-
Xu[zhou] section of the Longhai railway. For example, you can carry out
relatively major sabotage of the section between Queshan and Xinyang and
of the section between Dangshan and Xuzhou, making these impassable.
You should not sabotage or should do only limited damage to other sections.
Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 510–11, where it is
	 3.	 You must strictly protect the Xuzhou-Haizhou3 section of the Longhai railway, and the Xuzhou-Ji’nan section of the [Tian]jin-Pu[kou] railway; you
may not damage these in any way.
	 4.	 In terms of sabotage methods, what the U.S.-Chiang side fears most, according to its reactions, is a zigzag method of destroying the roadbed. This
involves dividing a railroad into numerous small sections, and rather than
digging up the entire roadbed, destroying only one side of it. However, it
should not always be the same side of the roadbed that is destroyed; rather, a
different side should be dug up in each section. For instance, in the first section, the left side is dug up while the right side is left untouched, and in the
second section, the right side is dug up while the left side is left untouched.
The third, fifth, and seventh sections are dug up in the same way as the first
section, while the fourth, sixth, and eighth sections are dug up in the same
way as the second section. After the enemy has done repairs, the firmness of
the repaired parts is different from that of the remnants, which endangers the
movement of cars; the enemy therefore fears this technique the most. Have
you already adopted this method of sabotaging railroads? If not, we hope you
will make a point of adopting it.
The Military Commission
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Liu Bocheng was commander of the Central Plains Field Army. Chen Yi was first deputy
commander, and Deng Xiaoping was political commissar of the Central Plains Field Army.
Su Yu was the acting commander and acting political commissar of the East China Field
Army, Chen Shiju was chief-of-staff, and Tang Liang was director of the Political Department of the East China Field Army. Xu Shiyou and Tan Zhenlin were commander and
political commissar, respectively, of the Shandong Corps of the East China Field Army.
Wei Guoqing and Ji Luo (Ji Pengfei) were commander and deputy political commissar,
respectively, of the Northern Jiangsu Corps of the East China Field Army.

2.  Song Renqiong (1909–2005, native of Hunan) was secretary of the ShandongAnhui-Jiangsu Sub-bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-132

3.  Today’s Lianyungang, Jiangsu.