A Certain Unit of the Xu-Tan Corps Should Still Draw the Enemy to Reinforce Yanzhou[1]

(June 27, 1948)

Xu and Tan, and inform Su, Chen, and Zhang[2], the East China Bureau, and the Central Plains Bureau:

Your telegram of 26th at 19:30 hours[3] is noted. We are not clear about the situation of the 73rd Division at Hancang[4], the distance from Hancang to Jinan, and whether there is certainty in our attacking Hancang while also striking Jinan’s reinforcing troops. If you deem it certain, then naturally attacking Hancang would be advantageous, and you may make deliberate dispositions to ensure victory. However, the 7th Column and the Central Shandong forces should, for the time being, still draw the 25th Division and the 83rd Division to reinforce Yanzhou. Do not lift the siege until these two divisions arrive near Yanzhou, so as to facilitate the operations of Su, Chen, and Zhang. It must also be estimated that if our attack on Hancang does not succeed, after these two divisions reach Yanzhou, one division or one brigade may join the defense of Yanzhou city. Chiang Kai-shek would then believe that both Jinan and Yanzhou can be secured, and when the Bian-Xu line[5] becomes critical, he would send the main force of these two divisions back to reinforce the Bian-Xu line, thereby increasing the pressure on Su’s forces. Therefore, among the three plans you proposed, only adopt the first plan when it is estimated that there is definite certainty in attacking Hancang while also striking Jinan’s reinforcements, as it would be the most advantageous; otherwise, the second or third plan should be adopted.

The Military Commission

27th, 03:30 hours

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[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, addressed to Xu Shiyou, commander of the Shandong Corps of the East China Field Army, and Tan Zhenlin, its political commissar.

[2] Su, Chen, and Zhang refer to Su Yu, Chen Shiju, and Zhang Zhen, who at the time were respectively the acting commander and acting political commissar, the chief of staff, and the deputy chief of staff of the East China Field Army.

[3] This refers to the telegram sent by Xu Shiyou, Tan Zhenlin, and Liu Shaoqing to the Central Military Commission and others at 19:30 hours on June 26, 1948. The telegram proposed three plans for the next phase of operations in the central section of the Tianjin-Pukou Railway campaign: 1) Use one unit to encircle and annihilate the enemy’s 73rd Division at Hancang, drawing the enemy’s 25th and 83rd Divisions north to reinforce Jinan, while one unit cuts the railway from Tai’an and Dawenkou to attack Jinan from both sides. 2) Assemble one unit in the Tai’an-Dawenkou area and another in Sishui, wait for the enemy to restore the central section of the Tianjin-Pukou Railway, then seek to encircle and destroy a part of it, striking the reinforcing troops. 3) Assemble three columns in the area east of Qufu and Zouxian to monitor the enemy and, when opportune, annihilate a part of the enemy.

[4] Hancang is a village name, located in Licheng District, Jinan City, Shandong Province.

[5] The Bian-Xu line refers to the railway from Kaifeng to Xuzhou, a section of the Longhai Railway.