At Present We Must Fight Battles We Are Sure of Winning[1]

(June 22, 1948)

Liu, Deng, Chen, Deng, and Su, Chen, Tang[2]:

Your telegram of the twentieth[3], your telegram of the twenty-first (si hour)[4], and your two telegrams of the twenty-first (hai hour)[5] are all noted. (1) Congratulations on the great victory in capturing Kaifeng. (2) If the enemy’s 122nd Brigade, 125th Brigade, 16th Communications Headquarters, and armored units moving east from Zhengzhou to reinforce Kaifeng can be wiped out by Su, Chen, and Tang west of Kaifeng, the enemy forces in Zhengzhou will be reduced, and if it is estimated that there is a sure chance of capturing

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and addressed to Commander Liu Bocheng, Political Commissar Deng Xiaoping, First Deputy Commander Chen Yi, and Deputy Political Commissar Deng Zihui of the Central Plains Field Army.

[2] Su, Chen, and Tang refer to Su Yu, Chen Shiju, and Tang Liang, who were then Acting Commander and Acting Political Commissar, Chief of Staff, and Director of the Political Department, respectively, of the East China Field Army.

[3] This refers to the telegram sent by Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, and Deng Xiaoping to the Military Commission of the Central Committee on June 20, 1948. The telegram proposed that after the capture of Kaifeng, the Central Plains Field Army should attack Zhengzhou, drawing the enemy Zhang Zhen Group northward for reinforcement and Qiu Qingquan’s and Shen Chengnian’s forces westward for reinforcement, seeking an opportunity to isolate and destroy one of these forces, with the main emphasis on striking Zhang Zhen.

[4] This refers to the telegram sent by Su Yu, Chen Shiju, Tang Liang, and Zhang Zhen to Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, Deng Zihui, and the Military Commission of the Central Committee at the si hour (9–11 a.m.) on June 21, 1948. The telegram agreed with the idea of attacking Zhengzhou and held that striking the eastern reinforcement force, Qiu Qingquan’s group, would be more advantageous than striking the southern reinforcement force, Zhang Zhen’s group.

[5] This refers to the telegram sent by Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, and Deng Zihui to the Military Commission of the Central Committee at the hai hour (9–11 p.m.) on June 21, 1948, and the telegram sent by Su Yu, Chen Shiju, and Tang Liang to the Military Commission of the Central Committee and others at the same time. The former telegram stated: “If we carry out the plan of attacking Zhengzhou and striking the reinforcements, since the enemy can concentrate more than six divisions on each route, the situation may become deadlocked. We suggest a short period of rest and consolidation, after which we can either carry out the original plan or, depending on changes in the situation, disperse the enemy and seek new opportunities to destroy them.” The latter telegram reported on the fighting in the capture of Kaifeng.

At Present We Must Fight Battles We Are Sure of Winning

Zhengzhou in about a week, then we agree that Chen Xie[1] should lead the 4th, 9th, and 1st Columns to attack Zhengzhou, that Chen Xilian[2] should lead the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Columns plus Song Shilun’s[3] forces to block Zhang and Hu[4], and that Su, Chen, and Tang should use their entire strength to block Qiu and Shen[5], with the main emphasis on attacking Zhengzhou, not on striking the reinforcements. If the 122nd Brigade, 125th Brigade, and other units are not wiped out but pull back to Zhengzhou, and there is no sure chance of capturing Zhengzhou, then the plan to attack Zhengzhou should be abandoned in accordance with the telegram of the twenty-first (hai hour) from Liu, Deng, Chen, and Deng. (3) At present, neither the subjective nor the objective conditions are ripe for fighting a very large-scale campaign of annihilation, so such campaigns must be avoided. Henceforth, your two large groupings should either operate separately, each time destroying no more than one reorganized division at a time, or operate in a concentrated manner, destroying no more than two reorganized divisions at a time. At present, we must fight battles we are sure of winning; even destroying one enemy brigade is good enough, like the battles in the Western Henan campaign.[6] (4) It is advantageous for Xu and Tan[7] to attack Yanzhou and Jining[8] and for Wei and Ji[9] to attack the scattered enemy forces along the eastern section of the Longhai Railway. In particular, the capture of Yanzhou and Jining and the destruction of the Reorganized

[1] Chen Xie refers to Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi, who were then Commander and Political Commissar, respectively, of the 4th Column of the Central Plains Field Army.

[2] Chen Xilian was then Commander of the 3rd Column of the Central Plains Field Army.

[3] Song Shilun was then Commander of the 10th Column of the East China Field Army.

[4] Zhang and Hu refer to Zhang Zhen and Hu Lian, who were then Commander of the Kuomintang’s 5th Pacification Zone and Commander of the Reorganized 18th Army, respectively.

[5] Qiu and Shen refer to Qiu Qingquan and Shen Chengnian, who were then Commander of the Kuomintang’s Reorganized 5th Army and Commander of the Reorganized 75th Division, respectively.

[6] This refers to the Western Henan campaign conducted from May 2 to 17, 1948, by units of the Central Plains and East China Field Armies and the Tongbai Military District in the area west of Nanyang, Henan Province. In this campaign, the method of long-distance raids and sudden encirclement was used to attack and destroy relatively scattered and weak enemy units of brigade size or smaller. Over 21,000 enemy troops were wiped out and 9 county towns were recovered.

[7] Xu and Tan refer to Xu Shiyou and Tan Zhenlin, who were then Commander and Political Commissar, respectively, of the Shandong Army Group of the East China Field Army.

[8] Yan-Ji refers to Yanzhou and Jining in Shandong Province.

[9] Wei and Ji refer to Wei Guoqing and Ji Luo (Ji Pengfei), who were then Commander and Deputy Political Commissar, respectively, of the Northern Jiangsu Army Group of the East China Field Army.

12th Division, plus the capture of Tengxian, Lincheng, Zaozhuang, and Yixian,[1] will enable Xu and Tan to move out to the eastern section of the Longhai Railway. This will have tremendous strategic significance for the overall situation, and therefore the plan to attack Yanzhou and Jining should not be changed.

[1] Teng refers to Tengxian County, Shandong. Lin refers to Lincheng, present-day Xuecheng, Zaozhuang Municipality, Shandong. Zao refers to present-day Zaozhuang Municipality, Shandong. Yi refers to Yixian County, an old county name, present-day Yicheng, Zaozhuang Municipality, Shandong.

Military Commission
You hour, the twenty-second