︹︺２Lin, Luo, and Liu: (1) We generally concur with your third plan, as conveyed in your telegram of 7:30 p.m. on the 5th—namely, to capture Changchun within three to four months while simultaneously aiming to annihilate any enemy reinforcements; thereafter, once the autumn harvest is complete, proceed to attack Chengde or some other target.
(2) Whether Changchun can be captured depends on: (a) time; (b) the method of assault; and (c) our capacity and means to defeat reinforcing enemy forces. In your plan, the time issue has been resolved: instead of the originally proposed half month, you now propose three to four months. With such an extended timeframe, our troops will have undergone further training and become more effective, and we can also employ new methods for the siege.
(3) Regarding the method of assault, we believe that only by combining tunnel warfare with conventional ground operations can casualties be minimized and victory secured. If we rely solely on direct ground attacks, casualties will inevitably be very high, and even then, victory cannot be guaranteed.
(4) Concerning the annihilation of enemy reinforcements, we hold that, given the presence of sizable enemy forces in Shenyang and Jinzhou—and the certainty that they will reinforce Changchun (you should base your operational plan on this assumption)—even with three to four months at our disposal to employ a combined tunnel-and-ground approach, success in capturing Changchun remains uncertain. It is imperative that, alongside our siege preparations, we also ensure, through both troop deployment and operational tactics, that we can not only block but also destroy enemy reinforcements. Only then can we reliably secure victory at Changchun.


We recommend that you deploy no fewer than five corps (preferably six) along the routes between Shenyang and Changchun that enemy reinforcements are certain to traverse, establishing robust defensive positions (making use of and repairing existing fortifications constructed by the enemy at Changtu, Siping, and Gongzhuling). These forces should first engage in long-range delaying actions to wear down and disrupt the enemy advance, with the objective of either destroying a portion or a substantial part of the reinforcing column. Only by achieving this can the capture of Changchun be assured.


We consider the adoption of a combined tunnel-and-ground operational strategy over a period of three to four months to be the primary condition for securing victory at Changchun, while the ability to block and destroy enemy reinforcements constitutes the secondary condition. Neither condition can be dispensed with.


(5) This plan does carry the risk of overly splitting our forces. However, since our army will employ a combined tunnel-and-ground approach—launching multiple tunnel penetrations beneath the enemy stronghold while simultaneously advancing across the surface behind progressively strengthened field fortifications—the enemy’s counterattacks (which will undoubtedly occur repeatedly and with desperate intensity, necessitating the gradual construction of strongholds as we advance) will serve only to deplete their own resources without dislodging us. Consequently, we can conserve our manpower; approximately four or five corps, together with seven independent divisions, should suffice for the siege operation.


During the execution of the campaign, as the balance of advantage shifts between the garrison and the reinforcements—from unfavorable to favorable for us—you may adjust the allocation of forces between the siege and the interdiction of reinforcements as needed. At certain junctures, priority should be given to neutralizing the reinforcements (this is of paramount importance); at others, the focus should shift to the assault itself.


(6) It is essential that you cut off the enemy’s ground-based supply lines for food. You must accomplish this. That said, the enemy may still receive supplies by air, and the food stockpiled within the city might last longer than three months. Therefore, your primary emphasis should remain on refining the siege tactics and on properly equipping and positioning your forces to counter and destroy any reinforcements. In short, even if the enemy’s food reserves could sustain them for five or six months and if powerful enemy units are poised to come to their aid from outside, we still possess the means to capture Changchun within three to four months.


(7) The successful capture of Changchun will pave the way for subsequent campaigns to systematically seize major cities as we move southward. Each of these urban conquests will benefit from the experience gained during the Changchun operation. We hope you will meticulously organize this campaign, anticipate the various difficulties that may arise, and continuously draw lessons from each phase until complete victory is achieved.


(8) During the three- to four-month period dedicated to the assault on Changchun, you must concurrently complete all preparatory work for the logistical transportation of essential supplies—including food, ammunition, uniforms, and new recruits—necessary for the next stage of operations either in the Chengde–Zhangjiakou–Datong area or in the Eastern Hebei–Jinzhou region.


(9) The command posts of your headquarters and of each corps must be fortified with sturdy, reliable air-raid shelters.


Issued by the Central Military Commission at 3:00 p.m. on the 7th, based on Mao Zedong’s handwritten draft.


Note: ① The plan for attacking Changchun outlined in this document was ultimately not implemented due to subsequent reconsiderations (see pages 111–112 of this volume, “Cease the Plan to Attack Changchun and Prepare for the Southern Advance”). On October 19, 1948, Changchun was peacefully liberated during the Liaoshen Campaign.


② Lin, Luo, and Liu refer to Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou, who at the time served respectively as Commander and Political Commissar, Deputy Political Commissar, and Chief of Staff of the Northeast Field Army.


③ Refers to the telegram sent by Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou to the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee at 7:30 p.m. on June 5, 1948. The telegram presented three options for the Northeast Field Army’s course of action: First, launch an immediate, formal assault on Changchun, though confidence is low and the prospects for success are slim. Second, encircle Changchun with a small force, cutting off its food supply, while the main body of the army operates along the Beining Railway line, in Rehe, and in Eastern Hebei. However, such a southern advance carries significant risks: it may yield no results anywhere, or prove difficult due to concentrated enemy defenses; moreover, securing adequate supplies would be extremely challenging. Meanwhile, the Changchun garrison might take advantage of the situation to withdraw back to Shenyang, leaving both fronts without decisive outcomes. Third, conduct a prolonged siege of Changchun over two to four months, engaging and defeating any enemy reinforcements that attempt to break the encirclement, before finally launching the final assault. The telegram concludes that adopting the third option would be preferable at present.