Ask Lin, Luo, and Liu to Answer the Three Questions Raised by Commander-in-Chief Zhu[1]

(June 3, 1948)

Lin, Luo, Liu[1]:

Your telegram of 20:00 on the 1st[2] and the relayed opinions of the Li and Huang columns[3] are both noted. Please provide answers to the following items among the points raised by Commander-in-Chief Zhu: (1) Whether it is possible to use two or three columns plus several independent divisions to assault the city, while deploying seven to eight columns to prepare to strike reinforcements. (2) Whether two methods of attack are possible: A. If a forceful assault is possible, then adopt the forceful assault method; B. If a forceful assault is not possible, then after capturing half or one-third of the city, switch to a prolonged siege by constructing strong fortifications, using a portion of the force to besiege the enemy, while the main force rests, recovers, and awaits opportunities. (3) Whether your ammunition supply can withstand one major expenditure of this scale.

Military Commission

Noon, 3 June

--- Notes

[1] This refers to the three questions concerning the opinions on attacking Changchun contained in Zhu De’s telegram to Mao Zedong dated June 3, 1948. The telegram stated: “I have read the telegrams from the Li and Huang Columns. The conditions for still being able to capture Changchun are numerous. 1. The enemy’s regular forces number less than 60,000, with other police, gendarmes, and self-defense volunteer troops totaling 28,000. Among the regular forces, only two divisions are relatively strong. Among the volunteer troops, politically they are desperate; militarily, they are a motley crew and relatively inferior. Although battle supervision is strict, it becomes ineffective once disorder sets in during combat. 2. Enemy reinforcements are far away, allowing our army to strike the reinforcements; that is, encircling the city and striking the reinforcements would also be advantageous. 3. The enemy holds an isolated city, relying solely on aircraft for the resupply of food, ammunition, and personnel, making it unsustainable over time. 4. Our army has superior troop strength, convenient rear supply lines, troops with a fair amount of technical training, considerable experience in attacking fortified positions, and a fair amount of material resources. If we currently have over 200,000 main rounds for mountain and field artillery and above, plus heavy and light mortar shells, 300,000 jin of explosives, and 2 million hand grenades, a breakthrough would be possible. We should also be prepared for casualties exceeding 30,000. 5. Attacking fortified positions means a forceful assault. The number of troops attacking the city need not be large; two columns plus several independent divisions capable of attacking and guarding against enemy counterattacks would suffice. The remainder can be used to strike reinforcement forces. The method of attack should prioritize tunneling, using technical means, explosives, hand grenades, and point-blank firing, with various types of artillery playing the main role. Match fortifications with fortifications, consolidating step by step, completing fortifications before advancing further. Once the attack reaches deep into the enemy positions and splits or disorganizes them, the enemy’s tenacity will diminish, and surrender becomes possible. 6. The Li Column has attacked Siping before and has experience, but upon encountering stubborn enemy resistance, it tends to overestimate the difficulties. The difference between Changchun and Siping is that the enemy’s morale is not as high as before, and their quality is also inferior. The Huang Column estimates that a breakthrough is possible, but the cost in losses would be high. 7. A city attack must first be planned. Gather all kinds of specialized artillery and engineering talents, organize command posts, and must employ urban assault tactics. Advance step by step in a practical and realistic manner, with an attitude of learning, and absolutely avoid impatience. Prepare to take the city in two or three months; even that would be considered fast. As long as the city has an earthen foundation and no city walls, it is possible to breach. 8. Another method of attack is prolonged siege. Within a defined perimeter, besiege them completely, causing hardship in food and ammunition, and when morale wavers, then attack. 9. Of these two urban assault tactics, forceful assault and prolonged siege, if material resources are sufficient, the first can be adopted. Over time, the second also emerges. If material resources are modest, and attacking one city depletes all the shells and explosives, making timely resupply difficult, then it is better to fight field battles. Whether to attack Changchun depends on the scale of material resources available.”


[1] Lin, Luo, and Liu refers to Lin Biao, Commander and concurrently Political Commissar of the Northeast Field Army; Luo Ronghuan, Deputy Political Commissar; and Liu Yalou, Chief of Staff.


[2] Refers to the telegram sent by Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee at 20:00 on June 1, 1948. The telegram stated: “The Northeast Field Army has twelve columns, old and new. Currently, one column is in Rehe, and the rest are in the Northeast. If we attack Changchun this time, we plan to commit eight columns, old and new, directly to the city assault, with two columns blocking reinforcements. The ratio of our assaulting troops to the defending troops would be less than three to one, but even at a ratio of three to one, our force to strike reinforcements would be absolutely inferior. Therefore, if we attack the city, we cannot simultaneously strike reinforcements. If the enemy does not send reinforcements, our army will have to contest every building during the city assault, and consumption will inevitably be great. Whether we can sustain the consumption to the very end and achieve a resolution of the battle is not yet certain. It is possible that by the final stage of the battle, the numbers in the companies will be too few, lacking the strength to continue the attack, leading to a stalemate. Should enemy reinforcements arrive at that time, they might link up with the defenders.” “At present, we do not yet have a sufficiently specific understanding of the topographical conditions of Changchun, and we do not know whether the terrain will be advantageous to us; this can only be determined after on-the-ground reconnaissance. Therefore, we do not yet have a finalized definitive assessment of this battle situation. We propose to first conduct terrain reconnaissance, and then consider other conditions to arrive at a more confident opinion.”


[3] The Li and Huang columns refer to the 1st Column and 6th Column of the Northeast Field Army, whose commanders were Li Tianyou and Huang Yongsheng, respectively.