Is It Possible to Take Changchun in Two
Months?
(June 1, 1948, 7:00 A.M.)
To Lin [Biao], Luo [Ruiqing], and Liu [Yalou]:1
Please respond to the following questions:
	 1.	 Have the columns that you are using in Changchun already attacked with all
their strength?
	 2.	 How many casualties has our army suffered in the past eight days of fighting?
	 3.	 Have you taken all the peripheral defenses surrounding Changchun?
	 4.	 Have you established contact with the Sixtieth Army? What is its combat
strength?
	 5.	 Have the troops changed their tactics for taking a stronghold from the old
method of large-group assaults to the new method of small-unit attacks?
	 6.	 In the eight days of battle, have you already adopted the blast tunnel method?
	 7.	 Have you carried out military democracy: that is, to have the officers and soldiers of each company hold meetings on the battlefield when they encounter
difficulties in order to study methods for overpowering enemy formations
(everyone thinking of ways to do so)?
	 8.	 Have you now stopped your assault, or are you still engaged in it?
	 9.	 Where is your headquarters located? Have you held meetings for column
and division cadres to thoroughly discuss their experiences? Do you have
representatives carrying out command duties on the front lines?
	10.	 What is the response from Shenyang? Have they prepared for their intended
reinforcements?
Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 472–73, where it is
	11.	 In the Linfen Campaign2 under the command of Comrade Xu Xiangqian,3 we
used nine brigades (only two of which had experience in attacking cities) to
attack two regular brigades and other miscellaneous enemy troops totaling
about 20,000 men, and finally overcame them after seventy-two days and
suffering 15,000 casualties. The experience that our nine brigades (about
70,000 men) gained in besieging cities constitutes a very meaningful victory.
Linfen’s position was very solid, and the enemy was deeply entrenched, so
both sides primarily used tunnel warfare for both attack and defense. Our
army mostly used tunnels to attack, and the enemy also mostly used tunnels
to destroy our tunnels. Both sides constantly summarized their experiences,
and our army finally won the battle by using tunnels beneath tunnels. If our
army is not concerned about casualties, do you think it will be possible to
take Changchun in two months? And what will the situation be like?
The Military Commission
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Lin Biao was commander and military commissioner of the Northeast Field Army, Luo
Ronghuan was deputy political commissar, and Liu Yalou was chief-of-staff of the Northeast Field Army.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-123

2.  The troops of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Military Region
attacked the city of Linfen in Shanxi from March 7 to May 17, 1948. Using blast tunnels
as a primary tactic, they annihilated more than 25,000 troops and captured the deputy
commander of the Guomindang’s Sixth Army Group, Liang Peihuang (1890–1968, born in
Guangshan, Henan), and they eliminated the enemy’s final stronghold in southern Shanxi
and linked the two Liberated Areas of Taiyue and Lüliang.

3.  Xu Xiangqian was first deputy commander of the North China Military Region as
well as commander and political commissar of its First Corps. In the Linfen Campaign, he
was first deputy commander of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army.