The Xu-Tan Corps Should Capture Wenshang, Jining, Yanzhou, and the Other Seven Cities One by One[1]

(May 29, 1948)

To Su, with information to Xu and Tan, Liu and Deng, Chen and Deng,[2] and the East China Bureau:

Your telegram of the 28th at noon[3] has been received. (1) It is best for Xu and Tan to carry out the first plan in your telegram of the 28th, that is, first to occupy Tai’an, Sishui, Dawenkou,[4] and Qufu; second, to seize the opportunity to capture one of the three points—Wenshang, Jining, or Yanzhou—and seek to draw out enemy reinforcements from the other points and wipe them out, thereby capturing Wenshang, Jining, and Yanzhou one after another; third, to seize the opportunity to capture Zouxian, Tengxian, Lincheng, and Hanzhuang.[5] Carrying out this policy will be advantageous for supplying the Xu-Tan Corps, for cutting the Tianjin-Pukou Railway and isolating Jinan and Xuzhou,[6] for opening communications between central and southwestern Shandong, and for effectively coordinating with Su Yu’s operations. If the three points of Wenshang, Jining, and Yanzhou are difficult to attack, while Zouxian, Tengxian, Lincheng, and Hanzhuang are relatively easy, you may first attack Zouxian, Tengxian, Lincheng, and Hanzhuang and then attack Wenshang, Jining, and Yanzhou, or you may choose the easier ones among the seven points—Wenshang, Jining, Yanzhou, Zouxian, Tengxian, Lincheng, and Hanzhuang—to attack first and the more difficult ones later. In short, the task of Xu and Tan is to capture these seven points one by one and to be prepared to accomplish this task in four or five months. (2) The plan in your telegram of the 28th for the six columns under Su, Chen, and Tang[7] to concentrate on destroying the 5th Army is very good. (3) The operations of the Su-Chen-Tang Corps and the Xu-Tan Corps must each be planned independently; that is, the two corps should only coordinate strategically and should not attempt tactical coordination, so as to avoid hampering and depending on each other and losing the opportunity to make independent dispositions. This point is very important, and we hope you will take it into account beforehand.

The Military Commission

29 May

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[1] This was a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to Su Yu, acting commander and acting political commissar of the East China Field Army.

[2] Xu and Tan: Xu Shiyou and Tan Zhenlin, who were then commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shandong Corps of the East China Field Army. Liu and Deng: Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, who were then commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Central Plains Field Army. Chen and Deng: Chen Yi and Deng Zihui, who were then second secretary and third secretary, respectively, of the Central Plains Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

[3] This refers to the telegram sent at noon on May 28, 1948, by Chen Yi and Su Yu to Xu Shiyou, Tan Zhenlin, Chen Shiju, and Tang Liang, with a report to the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The telegram stated: After the 1st, 4th, and 6th Columns cross the Yellow River southward, in order to draw the enemy’s 5th Army back for reinforcement, the following dispositions are made: 1. Xu and Tan should take advantage of the enemy’s failure to contract its forces in time and wipe out the enemy garrison in Tai’an. When the enemy contracts its forces, they should use part of their troops to control the area of Tai’an, Sishui, Dawenkou, and Qufu, while the main force seizes the opportunity to capture Wenshang, Jining, or Yanzhou. After we control Caoxian, Dingtao, and Chengwu, we shall use part of our forces to besiege Jinxiang, while the main force awaits the opportunity to wipe out enemy reinforcements. 2. After Xu and Tan have gained control of Tai’an, Qufu, Sishui, Dawenkou, and other places, their main force should go straight down to Zouxian and Tengxian and capture Lincheng and Hanzhuang, thus approaching Xuzhou. After we have gained control of the Chengwu, Dingtao, and Caoxian area, we shall go straight toward Xuzhou and capture Fengxian and Yutai. By thus approaching Xuzhou along two routes, we shall draw the 5th Army out for reinforcement and wipe it out. 3. When the main force of the enemy’s 5th Army is massed west of Shangqiu, we are determined to advance and occupy Chengwu in four nights’ march. 4. No matter which plan Chen and Tang carry out, they should concentrate on keeping the 5th Army under surveillance. When this enemy force comes to the rescue, they should follow on its heels and, in co-ordination with our forces here, attack it from both sides and wipe it out on the move.

[4] Dawenkou, a town in the southern part of Tai’an city, Shandong Province.

[5] Zouxian and Tengxian are counties in Shandong Province. Lincheng is the present-day Xuecheng, Zaozhuang city, Shandong Province. Hanzhuang is a town in the southeastern part of Weishan County, Shandong Province.

[6] The Tianjin-Pukou Railway is now a section of the Beijing-Shanghai line. Jinan is in Shandong Province and Xuzhou in Jiangsu Province.

[7] Su: Su Yu. Chen and Tang: Chen Shiju and Tang Liang, who were then chief of staff and director of the Political Department, respectively, of the East China Field Army.