Telegram to Comrade Deng Xiaoping on
the Tactical Problems in Work in the Newly
Liberated Areas1
(May 24, 1948)
According to the results of Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], Li [Xiannian], and Bo [Yibo]
coming here for discussions, we think that it is necessary to consider the tactical
problems in work2 in the Newly Liberated Areas. In these areas we must make full
use of the experience gained during the period of the War of Resistance Against
Japan; for a considerable period after their liberation we should apply the social
policy of reducing rent and interest and properly adjusting the supplies of seed
and food grains and the financial policy of reasonable distribution of burdens; we
should aim our devastating blows3 only at the important counterrevolutionaries
who side politically with the Guomindang and stubbornly oppose our army,4 just
as we only arrested the traitors5 during the period of the War of Resistance, and we
should not apply6 the social reform policy of distributing movable property and
land. The reason is that only a few bolder elements would welcome the premature
distribution of movable property and the basic masses would not get anything and
would therefore be dissatisfied. Moreover, hasty dispersal of social wealth is to
the disadvantage of the army. Premature distribution of land would prematurely
place the entire burden of military requirements on the peasants instead of on
the landlords and the rich peasants. In the area of social reform, it is better not to
distribute movable property and land but instead to reduce rent and interest universally so that the peasants will receive tangible benefits, and in financial policy we should effect a reasonable distribution of burdens so that the landlords and rich
peasants will pay more. In this way, social wealth will not be dispersed and public
order will be comparatively stable, and this will help us concentrate all our forces
on destroying the Guomindang forces.7 After one, two, or even three years, when
the Guomindang forces8 have been wiped out in the extensive base areas, when
conditions have become stable, when the masses have awakened and organized
themselves, and when the war has moved far away, we can enter the stage of land
reform—the distribution of movable property and land, as has been done in North
China. We believe that the stage of rent and interest reduction cannot be skipped
in any region,9 and we would be making mistakes if we were to skip it. The above
tactics must also be carried out in those parts of the large Liberated Areas in
North, Northeast, and Northwest China that border on enemy territory. In addition, the slogan of “open the granaries to relieve the poor” is also detrimental to
the army. It can only be implemented temporarily in and around the large cities
that are preparing to withdraw, and it should not be widely applied.

---

Notes

Our source for this text is Policy Research Office of the CPC Central Committee, ed.,
1948 nian yilai de zhengce huibian (Huazhong Bureau of the CPC Central Committee,
October 1949), pp. 317–18. A revised version appears in Xuanji (1960), pp. 1327–28. Text
in italics reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised 1960 version. For
more details, see “Note on Sources and Conventions.”
1.  Telegram to Comrade Deng Xiaoping on the Tactical Problems in Work in the Newly
Liberated Areas → Tactical Problems of Rural Work in the Newly Liberated Areas

--- Notes

# Telegram to Comrade Deng Xiaoping on the Tactical Problems in Work in the Newly Liberated Areas
# Date: 1948-05-24
# Source: en:MRP


2.  work → rural work

3.  devastating blows → main blows

4.  our army, → our Party and our army,

5.  arrested the traitors → arrested the traitors and confiscated their property

6.  apply → immediately apply
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-119

7.  Guomindang forces. → Guomindang reactionaries.

8.  Guomindang forces → Guomindang reactionaries

9.  any region, → any Newly Liberated Area,