You May First Attack Changchun, But Do
Not Place Undue Emphasis on the Difficulties
of Marching South
 (April 22, 1948)
To Lin [Biao], Luo [Ronghuan], Gao [Gang], Chen [Yun], Li [Fuchun], Liu
[Yalou], and Tan [Zheng]:1
We received your telegram of the 18th.2
	 1.	 We approve of your idea to first attack Changchun.
	 2.	 We can order Yang [Dezhi], Luo [Ruiqing], and Yang [Chengwu]3 (who are
just now in the midst of discussions) to send three columns to the area east
of the Chengde-Beiping line, or perhaps to the area east of Chengde, for the
purpose of fighting in concert with you. We expect you to order that area to
prepare provisions and other aid sufficient for 80,000 people. These three
columns will possibly arrive before May 15th, or else between the 15th and
20th. You should not, however, depend primarily on the Yang-Luo-Yang
columns.
	 3.	 The reason we are approving that you first attack Changchun is that this
will be more beneficial than first attacking other places, and that it would
be particularly unfavorable to attack other places first or that there would be insurmountable obstacles to doing so. You have mentioned the difficulty of
attacking areas around Shenyang, Jinzhou, and the [Shanhai Pass]-Jin[zhou]
railway, as well as crossing the [Shanhai] Pass to fight. Some of these are
only imagined difficulties and are not necessarily real. Some are real difficulties that you will encounter in fighting in Changchun and in marching south,
especially if by any chance you are unable to take Changchun. Therefore,
you yourselves, especially when among the cadres, should say only that it is
more beneficial to first attack Changchun under present conditions, and you
should not emphasize the difficulty of going south to fight in order to avoid a
passive mentality among yourselves and other cadres.
Mao Zedong

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Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 455–56, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Lin Biao was commander and political commissar of the Northeast Field Army. Luo
Ronghuan, Gao Gang, Chen Yun, and Li Fuchun were the army’s deputy political commissars, and Liu Yalou and Tan Zheng were its chief-of-staff and director of its Political
Department, respectively.

2.  The telegram from Lin Biao et al. stated that after the training in the Northeast, they
planned to amass nine columns to attack Changchun and block enemy reinforcements in
mid- to late May, and they hoped to capture Changchun within half a month. They felt that
attacking Changchun was the only good method at the time, compared with the difficulties
of attacking Tieling, Fushun, Benxi, Xinmin, Yi county, or Jinzhou, or advancing toward
the Jinzhou-Tangshan line, given the strength of the enemy forces that would be encountered and the lack of access to provisions, ammunition, and uniforms.

3.  Yang Dezhi, Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Chengwu were commander, first political commissar, and second political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-ChaharHebei) Field Army.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-112