The Liu-Deng Army Prepares to Move to Southwestern Henan and the Han River Basin[1]

(April 16, 1948)

Liu, Deng, and inform Chen, Su, Chen, Tang, and Chen Geng[2]:

Your Mao Yuan telegram[3] noted. (1) Please order the 1st and 11th Columns, which have moved into Taikang, Zhecheng, and areas to their north, to annihilate scattered enemy forces along the Longhai Railway’s Zhengzhou-Xuzhou section[1] and in the regions to its north and south. (2) The 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Columns under your direct command, as well as the columns of Chen Shiju and Chen Geng, are to receive, west of the Pinghan Railway[2], the supplementary personnel and materiel transported from north of the Yellow River. After replenishment is complete, prepare for new operations. (3) The direction of the new operations shall be southwestern Henan, western Hubei, northwestern Hubei, and the entire Han River basin, to annihilate scattered enemy forces and draw enemy troops from east of the Pinghan Railway to its west, thereby facilitating Su Yu’s operations. Do not attempt to engage in battle near the Pinghan line against enemy forces concentrated in several divisions. Instead, keep well away from concentrated enemy forces and move to areas where scattered enemy forces can be attacked. The strength of our army sent to southwestern Henan and the Han River basin should also not be too great. Our opinion: A. Send the Song Column[3] back to the Zhengzhou-Xuzhou line area to join forces with the 1st and 11th Columns, forming one army corps to undertake combat tasks in that area. B. After replenishing new recruits, ammunition, and summer clothing, have Chen Shiju’s and Chen Geng’s 3rd, 4th, and 8th Columns, totaling ten to eleven brigades, move southwest at an early date, first seize the four counties of western Wan[4], and then advance to the Han River. They say that region lacks grain, but we believe that after seizing the four counties of western Wan and the vast towns and villages of the Han River area, it may be possible to solve the grain problem. C. Your directly subordinate 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Columns shall remain in their present areas for rest and reorganization, positioned centrally to coordinate the operations of the two army corps in the Zhengzhou-Xuzhou line area and the Han River area. In the first step, prepare to assist Chen Tang and Chen Geng in their movement southwest; in the second step, prepare to move to the area between the Sha River and the Huai River. (4) Whether the above opinions are appropriate, awaiting your reply. We have arrived at Fuping and will join the Central Working Committee in a few days.

Military Commission

Mao Xi

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[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, addressed to Liu Bocheng, Commander, and Deng Xiaoping, Political Commissar, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army.

[2] Chen and Su refer to Chen Yi and Su Yu, then respectively Commander and Political Commissar, and Deputy Commander, of the East China Field Army. Chen and Tang refer to Chen Shiju and Tang Liang, then respectively Chief of Staff and Director of the Political Department of the East China Field Army. Chen Geng was then Secretary of the Front Committee of the Chen-Xie Group of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army.

[3] Refers to the April 13, 1948 telegram from Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping to the Central Working Committee of the CPC Central Committee, forwarded to the Central Military Commission and others. The telegram stated: A. When we attacked Fuyang on March 29, Chiang drew 20 brigades from surrounding areas, intending to converge and strike us in the water-net region of Shenqiu and Linquan. With the aim of breaking up the enemy’s disposition and awaiting an opportunity to strike Zhang Zhen, on April 3 we shifted the 1st Column northwest and the 11th Column north, and shifted the 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 10th Columns west, seizing the opportunity to raid Shangcai, Runan, Zhumadian, Queshan, and other places to open up battlefields, while the Chen-Xie and Chen-Tang armies raided Luoyang and towns to its east, Luohe and towns to its north, each coordinating with the other. B. The enemy’s characteristic is, when we attack a central stronghold, to concentrate maximum forces from the periphery toward the center. If we strike enemy forces on the periphery, the enemy adopts close coordination. In directions where it is particularly easy for us to attack and annihilate them, the enemy relies on water barriers, strong fortifications, dense and steady concentration, waiting until their neighboring units can strike our flank and rear before moving out. Secondly, due to high concentration, they only hold strategic points, abandoning strongholds on secondary lines. If difficult to hold, they retreat to Zhengzhou, abandoning all strongholds in the two railway zones southwest of Zhengzhou to avoid annihilation. C. Of our Dabie Mountains forces, only the 2nd Column has rested for just two weeks; the 3rd and 6th Columns have had no rest and reorganization for two months and are extremely fatigued. We intend to gain time for a short period of rest and reorganization, and will maneuver separately after ascertaining the enemy’s new intentions.

[1] The Zhengzhou-Xuzhou section refers to the railway from Zhengzhou to Xuzhou, i.e., a section of the Longhai Line.

[2] The Pinghan Railway refers to the railway from Beiping (now Beijing) to Hankou, i.e., a section of today’s Beijing-Guangzhou Line.

[3] The Song Column refers to the 10th Column of the East China Field Army, whose commander was Song Shilun.

[4] Wan is the ancient name for Nanyang, Henan. The four counties of western Wan refer to Dengxian, Zhenping, Neixiang, and Xichuan in Henan.