March 20, 1948

[This inner-Party circular was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China. Subsequently, the Central Committee
moved from the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region to the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei
Liberated Area by way of the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area and in May 1948
reached Hsipaipo Village, Pingshan County, in western Hopei Province.]


1. In recent months the Central Committee has concentrated on solving,
in the new conditions, problems concerning specific policies and tactics
for land reform, industry and commerce, the united front, Party consolidation
and the work in the new Liberated Areas; it has also combated Right and "Left"
deviations within the Party, mainly "Left" deviations. The history of our
Party shows that Right deviations are likely to occur in periods when our
Party has formed a united front with the Kuomintang and that "Left" deviations
are likely to occur in periods when our Party has broken with the Kuomintang.
At present the "Left" deviations consist chiefly in encroaching on the interests
of the middle peasants and the national bourgeoisie; laying one-sided stress
in the labour movement on the immediate interests of the workers; making
no distinctions in the treatment of landlords and rich peasants; making no
distinctions in the treatment of big, middle and small landlords, or of landlords
who are local tyrants and those who are not; not leaving the landlords the
necessary means of livelihood as required by the principle of equal distribution;
overstepping certain demarcation lines of policy in the struggle to suppress
counter-revolution; not wanting political parties which represent the national
bourgeoisie; not wanting the enlightened gentry; neglecting the tactical
importance of narrowing the scope of attack in the new Liberated Areas (that
is, neglecting to neutralize the rich peasants and small landlords); and
lacking the patience to work step by step. During the past two years or so,
these "Left" deviations have occurred to a greater or lesser extent in all
the Liberated Areas and in some cases have developed into serious adventurist
tendencies. Fortunately, they are not very difficult to correct; in the main
they have been corrected in the past few months, or are being corrected now.
But leaders at all levels must make strenuous efforts before deviations of
this kind can be thoroughly corrected. The Right deviations consist chiefly
in overestimating the strength of the enemy, being afraid of large-scale
U.S. aid to Chiang Kai-shek, being somewhat weary of the long war, having
certain doubts about the strength of the world democratic forces, not daring
to arouse the masses fully in order to abolish feudalism, and being indifferent
to impurities in the Party's class composition and style of work. Such Right
deviations, however, are not the main ones at present; they too are not difficult
to correct. In recent months our Party has made achievements in the war,
in land reform, in Party consolidation, in ideological education in the army,
in building new Liberated Areas and in winning over the democratic parties;
and it has emphatically corrected, or is correcting, deviations that occurred
in these fields of work. This will enable the entire revolutionary movement
in China to advance along the path of sound development. Only when all the
policies and tactics of the Party are on the correct path will it be possible
for the Chinese revolution to win victory. Policy and tactics are the life
of the Party; leading comrades at all levels must give them full attention
and must never on any account be negligent.

2. Certain democratic personages, who had believed that a so-called "third
road"[1] was still possible and had placed themselves
midway between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party because of certain
illusions about the United States and Chiang Kai-shek and because of their
scepticism as to whether our Party and the people had the strength to defeat
all enemies at home and abroad, found themselves in a passive position in
the face of the sudden Kuomintang offensive; eventually, in January 1948,
they accepted our Party's slogans and declared themselves against Chiang
Kai-shek and the United States and for unity with the Communist Party and
the Soviet Union.[2] We should pursue a policy
of uniting with these persons, while suitably criticizing their erroneous
views. In the future, when the Central People's Government is formed, it
will be necessary and beneficial to invite some of them to take part in the
work of the government. It is characteristic of these persons that they have
always been unwilling to have contact with the working people, are accustomed
to life in the big cities and hesitate to come to the Liberated Areas. Even
so, the social base they represent, the national bourgeoisie, has its importance
and should not be ignored. Therefore it is necessary to win them over. Our
estimate is that, after we achieve bigger victories and capture a number
of cities like Shenyang, Peiping and Tientsin and after it becomes perfectly
obvious that the Communist Party will win and that the Kuomintang will lose,
these persons may be willing to come to the Liberated Areas to work with
us if they are invited to take part in the Central People's Government.

3. We do not contemplate setting up the Central People's Government this
year, because the time is not yet ripe. After the bogus National Assembly
elects Chiang Kai-shek president[3] later in the
year and he is even more thoroughly discredited, after we score bigger victories
and expand our territories, preferably after the capture of one or two of
the country's largest cities, and after northeastern China, northern China,
Shantung, northern Kiangsu, Honan, Hupeh and Anhwei are all linked together
in one contiguous area, it will be entirely necessary to establish the Central
People's Government. The time will probably be in 1949. At present, we are
merging the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei area, the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan area
and the Pohai area in Shantung under the direction of a single Party committee
(the Northern China Bureau), a single government and a single military
command[4] (the inclusion of the Pohai area may
be delayed for a while). These three areas comprise the broad expanse north
of the Lunghai Railway, west of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and the Pohai
Gulf, east of the Tatung-Puchow Railway and south of the Peiping-Suiyuan
Railway. They are already linked together in one contiguous area with a total
population of fifty million, and their merger will probably be completed
soon. This will enable us to give strong support to the war on the southern
front and transfer large numbers of cadres to the new Liberated Areas. The
leading centre of the merged area will be at
Shihchiachuang.[5] The Central Committee is also
preparing to move to northern China, and its Working Committee will merge
with it.

4. Our troops on the southern front have all had rest and consolidation from
December to February; these troops comprise the 9 brigades of the Shantung
Army, 7 brigades of the Northern Kiangsu Army, 21 brigades of the army in
the area between the Yellow and Huai Rivers, 10 brigades of the army in the
Honan-Hupeh-Shensi area, 19 brigades of the army in the area between the
Yangtse, Huai and Han Rivers, 12 brigades of the army in northwestern China
and 12 brigades of the army in southern Shansi and northern Honan. The only
exception was the main force of the army under Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping
in the area between the Yangtse, Huai and Han Rivers, which had had no rest
and consolidation because Pai Chunghsi concentrated his troops to attack
the Tapieh Mountains;[6] it was not until the end
of February that this force was able to send some of its units north of the
Huai River for rest and consolidation. That was our first period of rest
and consolidation on a large scale in the past twenty months of fighting.
During that period the methods we adopted were: pouring out grievances by
the masses (the wrongs done to the labouring people by the old society and
by the reactionaries), the three check-ups (on class origin, performance
of duty and will to fight) and mass training (officers teaching soldiers,
soldiers teaching officers and soldiers teaching each other). By these methods
we developed high revolutionary enthusiasm among the commanders and fighters
of the whole army; reformed or weeded out the landlords, rich peasants and
bad elements found in some army units; heightened discipline; clearly explained
various policies in the land reform and the policies concerning industry
and commerce and the intellectuals; developed the democratic style of work
in the army; and raised the level of our military technique and tactics.
As a result, our army has greatly enhanced its combat effectiveness. Except
for that part of the army under Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping, which is
still having rest and consolidation, all our armies in succession have started
new military operations since late February or early March and in two weeks
have wiped out 9 enemy brigades. Of our troops on the northern front, comprising
the 46 brigades of the army in the Northeast, 18 brigades of the army in
the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei area and 2 brigades of the army in the Shansi-Suiyuan
area, the greater part fought through the winter, while a part was having
rest and consolidation. Taking advantage of the freezing of the Liaoho River,
our army in the Northeast fought for three months, wiped out 8 brigades and
won over 1 brigade, occupied Changwu, Faku, Hsinlitun, Liaoyang, Anshan,
Yingkow and Szepingkai, and recaptured Kirin. This army has now begun its
rest and consolidation. Afterwards, it is to attack either Changchun or the
enemy along the Peiping-Liaoning Railway. The army in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei
area has had more than a month of rest and consolidation and is moving towards
the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway. The army in the Shansi-Suiyuan area is comparatively
small, and its main task is to tie down Yen Hsi-shan's troops. To sum up,
we now have two fronts, the northern and the southern, with 10 armies, large
and small, comprising 50 columns of regular troops (each equivalent to a
Kuomintang reorganized division), or 156 brigades (each equivalent to a
Kuomintang reorganized brigade), each brigade (3 regiments) averaging about
8,000 men -- making a total of more than 1,322,000 men. In addition, there
are more than 1,168,000 irregulars (of whom 800,000 are combat troops), including
regional formations, regional troops, guerrilla detachments, rear-area military
organizations and military academies. Our entire army thus totals more than
2,491,000 men. But before July 1946 we had only 28 columns of regular troops,
or 118 brigades, each brigade (3 regiments) averaging less than 5,000 men
-- a total of 612,000 with the addition of more than 665,000 irregulars,
the grand total was 1,278,000. It can be seen that our army has grown. The
number of brigades has not increased much, but the number of men in each
brigade has increased very much. After twenty months of war, our combat
effectiveness has also increased greatly.

5. From July 1946 to the summer of 1947, the regular army of the Kuomintang
was composed of 93 divisions with 248 brigades; now it has designations for
104 divisions with 279 brigades. Its dispositions are as follows. On the
northern front there are 29 divisions with 93 brigades, totalling about 550,000
men (13 divisions with 45 brigades under Wei Li-huang in Shenyang, 11 divisions
with 33 brigades under Fu Tso-yi in Peiping, 5 divisions with 15 brigades
under Yen Hsi-shan in Taiyuan). On the southern front there are 66 divisions
with 158 brigades, totalling about 1,060,000 men (38 divisions with 86 brigades
under Ku Chu-tung in Chengchow, 14 divisions with 33 brigades under Pai Chung-hsi
in Kiukiang, and 14 divisions with 39 brigades under Hu Tsung-nan in Sian).
On the second line there are 9 divisions with 28 brigades, totalling about
196,000 men (4 divisions with 8 brigades in the northwestern area, i.e.,
the region west of Lanchow; 4 divisions with 10 brigades in the southwestern
area, i.e., Szechuan, Sikang, Yunnan and Kweichow Provinces; 8 brigades
in the southeastern area, i.e., the provinces south of the Yangtse
River; and 1 division with 2 brigades in Taiwan). The reason the number of
unit designations of the Kuomintang regular army has increased is that after
large numbers of its troops had been wiped out by our army and after they
had turned from the strategic offensive to the strategic defensive, the
Kuomintang felt its shortage of troops acutely and therefore upgraded or
reorganized many local armed units and puppet troops into its regular army.
Thus, on the northern front, 3 divisions with 14 brigades were added to Wei
Li-huang's command and 2 divisions with 6 brigades to Fu Tso-yi's command;
on the southern front, 6 divisions with 9 brigades were added to Ku Chu-tung's
command and 2 brigades to Hu Tsung-nan's. The total increase was 11 divisions,
or 31 brigades. As a result, the Kuomintang army now has 104 divisions instead
of 93, and 279 brigades instead of 248. But, in the first place, the 6 divisions
with 29 brigades which we wiped out in recent months (up to March 20) now
exist only in name; there has been no time to rebuild or replenish them,
and probably some can never be rebuilt or replenished. So, in fact, the
Kuomintang army now has only 98 divisions with 250 brigades, an increase
of only 5 divisional designations and 2 actual brigades since last summer.
In the second place, of the 250 brigades which actually exist, only 118 have
not received crushing blows from our army. All the remaining 132 brigades
have been wiped out by our army once, twice or even thrice and then been
replenished; or they have received one, two or even three crushing blows
from our army (in the case of a brigade, to wipe it out means to destroy
it completely or destroy the greater part, while to deal it a crushing blow
means to destroy one or more of its regiments but not its main strength);
and their morale and combat effectiveness are very low. Of the 118 brigades
which have not yet received crushing blows, some are composed of recruits
being trained at the second line and some are local armed units and puppet
troops which have been upgraded or reorganized; their combat effectiveness
is very low. In the third place, the Kuomintang armed forces have declined
in numbers also. Before July 1946 they had 2,000,000 regulars, 738,000
irregulars, 367,000 men in the special arms, 190,000 men in the navy and
air force and 1,010,000 men in rear-service establishments and military academies
-- a total of 4,305,000. In February 1948 they had 1,810,000 regulars, 560,000
irregulars, 280,000 men in the special arms, 190,000 men in the navy and
air force and 810,000 men in rear-service establishments and military academies
-- a total of 3,650,000. That means a decrease of 655,000 men. In the nineteen
months from July 1946 to January 1948, our army wiped out altogether 1,977,000
Kuomintang troops (the statistics for February and the first half of March
have not been compiled, but the number is roughly 180,000). In other words,
the Kuomintang has lost not only the more than 1,000,000 men it recruited
in the course of the war but also a large number of its original troops.
Under these circumstances, the Kuomintang has adopted a policy opposite to
ours, a policy not of bringing its brigades to full strength but of cutting
down the number of men in each brigade and increasing the number of brigade
designations. While in 1946 the average strength of a Kuomintang brigade
was approximately 8,000 men, at present it is only about 6,500. From now
on, the area taken by our army will daily expand, and the Kuomintang's sources
of troops and food supplies will daily contract; we estimate that by next
spring, after another full year's fighting, our army and the Kuomintang army
will be roughly equal in numbers. Our policy is to go ahead steadily and
strike sure blows, not to seek quick results; all we are trying to do is
to wipe out, on the average, about 8 brigades of the Kuomintang regular army
each month, or about 100 brigades a year. Actually, since last autumn this
number has been exceeded, and from now on it can be still further exceeded.
It should be possible to wipe out the entire Kuomintang army in about five
years (counting from July 1946).[7]

6. At present, there are two sectors on the southern and northern fronts
where the enemy still has a fairly large striking force and can wage offensive
campaigns, temporarily placing our troops there in a difficult position.
The first sector is in the Tapieh Mountains, where the enemy has approximately
14 brigades which can be used as a striking force. The second is north of
the Huai River, where the enemy has about 12 such brigades. In these two
sectors the Kuomintang troops still hold the initiative (they hold the initiative
in the sector north of the Huai River because we have moved 9 of our crack
brigades to the north of the Yellow River for rest and consolidation, in
preparation for use on other sectors). The enemy troops in all other theatres
of war are in a passive position and are taking a beating. The theatres of
war where the situation is particularly favourable to us are the Northeast,
Shantung, the Northwest, northern Kiangsu, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei area,
the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan area and the vast area west of the
Chengchow-Hankow Railway, north of the Yangtse and south of the Yellow River.

NOTES


1. See "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", Note 9, p.
176 of this volume.

2. In October 1947 the reactionary Kuomintang government
ordered the dissolution of the Democratic League. Under pressure from the
Kuomintang reactionaries, some wavering members of the Democratic League
dissolved it and ceased activities.

Other democratic parties, also being persecuted by the Kuomintang reactionaries,
were then unable to function openly in the Kuomintang areas. In January 1948
Shen Chun-ju and other leaders of the Democratic League at a meeting in Hongkong
decided to re-establish the League's leading body and resume the League's
activities. In the same month Li Chi-shen and other members of the democratic
wing of the Kuomintang established the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang
in Hongkong. Both these bodies agreed with the position of the Communist
Party of China about the current situation and issued declarations calling
for unity with the Communist Party and other democratic parties, the overthrow
of the Chiang Kai-shek dictatorship and opposition to U.S. armed intervention
in China's internal affairs. The wavering members of the Democratic League
also accepted these slogans at that time.

3. The Kuomintang reactionaries held a bogus "National
Assembly" in Nanking from March 29 to May 1, 1948, at which Chiang Kai-shek
and Li Tsung-jen were "elected" "president" and "vice-president".

4. In May 1948 the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Liberated Area and
the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Liberated Area were merged, and the Northern
China Joint Administrative Council and the Northern China Military Area were
established. In August of the same year the Northern China Joint Administrative
Council was renamed the Northern China People's Government.

5. Shihchiachuang in western Hopei Province was the first
major city in northern China liberated by the People's Liberation Army.

6. In December 1947 Pai Chung-hsi began attacking the Tapieh
mountain area with 33 brigades.

7. At that time the estimate was that the entire Kuomintang
army would be wiped out in about five years. The estimated time was later
reduced to about three and a half years. See "The Momentous Change in China's
Military Situation", pp. 287-88 of this volume.

Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project.