Direction of Action After the Capture of Luoyang[1]

(March 14, 1948)

Chen and Tang, and for the information of Liu and Deng, Su[2], the Handan Bureau, and the Central Working Committee:

Your telegram of Yuan-Hai[3] noted. (1) After the Luoyang campaign concludes, a portion of the force shall block the reinforcing enemy at the front, covering the removal from Luoyang of necessary and appropriate supplies (pay attention to urban policy), while the main force rests and reorganizes near Luoyang. The Handan Bureau must act swiftly in providing ammunition and other aid to Chen-Tang and Chen-Xie[4]. (2) Regarding the next move: if operational opportunities arise east or southeast of Luoyang, another battle should be fought in that area; if no operational opportunities exist, preparations should be made to strike Nanyang, and after succeeding, advance to the Han River. There are two plans for striking Nanyang: Plan A, proceed along the eastern foothills of the Funiu Mountains to strike Nanyang directly. Plan B, first strike Shangxian, Luonan (where the 65th Division has four regiments), Lushi (situation unclear, enemy forces probably very few), and Xichuan (where there are relatively strong reactionary

[1] This telegram was drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, addressed to Chen Shiju, Chief of Staff of the East China Field Army, and Tang Liang, Director of its Political Department.

[2] Liu and Deng refer to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, who were then respectively Commander and Political Commissar of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army. Su refers to Su Yu, then Deputy Commander of the East China Field Army.

[3] Refers to the telegram sent by Chen Shiju and Tang Liang to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee at the Hai hour on March 13, 1948. The telegram stated: As of dusk today, most of the enemy in Luoyang has been dealt with; approximately 8,000 enemy troops have been captured, and over 2,000 killed or wounded. It has been decided to use the main force to continue the thorough annihilation of the remaining enemy in Luoyang, while the 8th Column blocks the enemy reinforcing from the west in the Heishiguan, Yanshi, and Goushizhen areas, and the 9th Column plus a part of the 4th Column pins down the reinforcing enemy’s 11th Division, in order to halt the 11th Division’s westward deployment. Due to continuous attacks and successive days of rain, the troops are extremely fatigued. After the battle concludes, it is planned to use a portion of the force to intercept and block the reinforcing enemy, while the main force moves to the area south of Luoyang for rest, reorganization, and awaiting opportunities.

[4] Chen-Xie refers to Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi, who were then respectively Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the Front Committee of the Chen-Xie Group of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army.

militia), secure a consolidated rear area, and then strike Nanyang. Which of the above two plans is more suitable, please discuss with Chen Geng and telegraph back. (3) If you lead the 3rd, 4th, and 8th Columns, or additionally a part of the 9th Column, to advance toward Nanyang and the Han River, it will inevitably compel the 11th Division, 20th Division, and other units to move west for reinforcement, and you may be able to seek a war of movement. With over ten brigades, you can operate independently without coordination from Liu-Deng. (4) However, after Liu-Deng complete their rest and reorganization this month, there are two action plans: Plan A, lead the 1st and 2nd Columns across the railway to the west to coordinate with Chen-Tang in annihilating the reinforcing enemy. Plan B, operate independently, leading the 1st and 2nd Columns across the Sha River to join forces with the 10th and 11th Columns to seek out and strike the 74th Division, 75th Division, 84th Division, and other units, striving to annihilate three enemy brigades during April and May to facilitate Su Yu’s maneuver; otherwise, Su Yu’s operations will encounter difficulties. Which of the above two plans is more suitable, Liu-Deng are requested to deliberate and decide; Su, as well as Chen-Tang and Chen Geng, may also express their opinions. (5) The previous telegram’s suggestion that Chen-Tang prepare to assist Peng-Zhang[1] in striking the Xi-Tong Line[2] is to be considered not for execution.

Military Commission

Han-Hai

[1] Peng-Zhang refers to Peng Dehuai and Zhang Zongxun, who were then respectively Commander and Political Commissar, and Deputy Commander of the Northwest Field Army.

[2] The Xi-Tong Line refers to the railway from Xi’an to Tongguan, i.e., a section of the Longhai Railway.