Comrade Shaoqi: ︹︺１(1) I received your telegram of Chou–Qiao early this morning.
The points you raised are very good and have already been incorporated into the Central Committee’s directives on work in old and semi-old areas, ︹︺２. However, with regard to the relationship between policy and experience, it seems appropriate to understand that the correctness of a policy, as well as the degree of its correctness, can only be verified through experience; all experience (practice) arises from the process of implementing a particular policy. Erroneous experience is the result of implementing wrong policies, while correct experience stems from the implementation of sound policies.
Therefore, whenever any action involving the masses is undertaken, there should always be clearly defined policies guiding it. It is my view that many of the mistakes made in various localities are primarily—aside from the factor of sabotage by hostile elements—due to the lack of clarity in the policies laid down by the leading organs, which have failed to draw a clear and public distinction between what may and what may not be done. The reason for this failure to establish clear boundaries lies either in the leaders’ own insufficient experience with the tasks at hand—lacking adequate practical experience in executing certain policies—or in their disregard for the experiences of others, or else in unwarranted negligence that has prevented them from delineating policy boundaries properly.


Secondly, even when leaders are aware of the need to define policy boundaries, they often provide only brief, cursory explanations rather than systematic expositions. Experience has shown that any policy, if explained merely in a superficial manner without a thorough, structured presentation, will fail to mobilize the Party and the masses for sound practice.
In both these situations, responsibility must be shared by the respective Central Bureaus and the Central Committee itself. In the past, we have carried out numerous undertakings that neither clearly demarcated boundaries in a publicly accessible way—this is crucial, meaning publication in the newspapers so that the broad populace is informed—nor offered systematic explanations. To place sole blame on the Central Bureaus would be unjust; I myself bear a deep sense of this responsibility.
Over the past three months or so, we have been diligently studying and elaborating on various policies in order to rectify this deficiency. Nevertheless, the Central Bureaus naturally have their own specific responsibilities in this regard.


Thirdly, there are cases where the policies themselves were fundamentally flawed. In many instances, lower-level Party organizations have arbitrarily adopted what they deemed correct but were in fact erroneous policies, without seeking instructions either from the Central Committee or even from the Central Bureaus. For example, the indiscriminate killings that occurred in numerous localities fall into this category. At the same time, several Central Bureaus have also erred in certain policy decisions. Take the Jin–Sui Sub-Bureau, for instance: its violations of the interests of intermediate peasants during land redistribution, its imposition of ruinous taxes on industry and commerce, and its abandonment of enlightened gentry—all constituted mistakes of its own making. However, it appears that the more serious instances of “left” deviation were not found in Jin–Sui, but rather in the North China, East China, and Central China regions—from the time of Japan’s surrender onward, though such errors also occurred prior to the surrender. The severity of the problems in Jin–Sui seems to rank second.
I would ask you to review whether this assessment is accurate.


Fourthly, there are errors in leadership methods, specifically an inadequate vertical communication network that has hindered the timely understanding of movement dynamics and the prompt correction of mistakes at the lower levels.


Please formally present these points to the comrades attending the meeting of the Central Work Committee and initiate a discussion on them.
︹︺３︹︺４(2) After drafting the document on class differentiation, I came to feel that the content of the January draft was no longer sufficient. I am now revising a new decision, taking a major section from the January draft as its foundation, with the intention of publishing it as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the opening and closing sections of the January draft will be issued as an editorial. Since the Central Committee has already released the Key Points on Land Reform in the Newly Liberated Areas, there is no longer any need to dispatch the telegram I had prepared for Su Yu. Therefore, I have decided not to send it, but instead to incorporate certain portions into the editorial for public release, which I believe will be more beneficial.
(3) Su Yu’s forces will not be able to complete their full concentration in Yanggu until after March 15th. ︹︺６ You, along with Rao, Chen, Kang, and Deng, might consider traveling to Yanggu around March 20th. This would give you ample time to discuss the entire range of policy issues—centering on the book on class differentiation—as well as matters concerning the organization of the North China Bureau and other related questions.


Mao Zedong, March 6th. Printed from Selected Letters of Mao Zedong, published by the People’s Publishing House in 1983.
Notes ︹︺１ refer to Liu Shaoqi’s telegram to Mao Zedong dated February 18, 1948. In the telegram, he expressed his hope to receive promptly the Central Committee’s documents on land reform, stating: “Without these documents, it is impossible under normal circumstances to avoid errors and detours. Even with them, some mistakes will still occur; ultimately, it is through the personal experience of Party cadres and members that we can truly set our course aright. Nevertheless, having the correct documents does enable us to steer clear of many unnecessary detours.” Liu Shaoqi also put forward specific suggestions regarding land reform in old areas, including the need not to redistribute land again, to refrain from artificially reconstituting poor-peasant associations, and on how to carry out land readjustment.
︹︺２ refers to the Central Committee’s directive of February 22, 1948, entitled “Land Reform and Party Rectification in Old and Semi-Old Areas.”
︹︺３ refers to the “Draft Regulations of the Central Committee Concerning the Classification of Social Classes in the Course of Land Reform and Their Treatment.”
See note [1] on page 62 of this volume.
︹︺４ refers to Mao Zedong’s draft decision for the Central Committee, drawn up on January 18, 1948.
See note [1] on page 42 of this volume.
︹︺５ refers to Mao Zedong’s telegram of January 22, 1948, addressed to Su Yu, Deputy Commander of the East China Field Army, concerning land reform in the newly liberated areas. See pages 35–39 of this volume.
︹︺６ Rao refers to Rao Shushi (1903–1975), a native of Linchuan, Jiangxi Province, who at that time served as Secretary of the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Political Commissar of the East China Military Region. Chen refers to Chen Yi, who at the time held the post of First Deputy Secretary of the East China Bureau and Commander of the East China Military Region. Kang refers to Kang Sheng (1898–1975), a native of Jiaonan, Shandong Province, who served as Second Deputy Secretary of the East China Bureau. Deng refers to Deng Zihui, who at the time was a Deputy Secretary of the East China Bureau and Deputy Political Commissar of the East China Military Region.