The Yang-Luo-Yang Force Should Enter Eastern Hebei on Schedule

(February 25, 1948)

Lin[1]:

(1) Fully agree with the deployment plan in the telegram of the 25th at 10:00[2]; (2) The Yang-Luo-Yang force should enter eastern Hebei at the time stated in the incoming telegram; they have not yet established the intention and confidence to set out for eastern Hebei.

Mao Zedong

25th, 24:00

--- Notes

[1] Lin refers to Lin Biao, then Commander and concurrently Political Commissar of the Northeast Field Army.


[2] Refers to the telegram sent by Lin Biao to Mao Zedong on February 25, 1948, at 10:00. The telegram stated: “1. A portion of our forces is being deployed to attack Kaiyuan Station (fifty li north of Tieling, with about 4,000 enemy troops) and Yingkou (with about 12,000 enemy troops). The bulk of our forces is currently near Xinmin, pinning down the enemy’s main force (including those reinforcing Xinmin, totaling eleven divisions), and plans, starting from the 27th, as the ice begins to thaw, to swiftly cross the Liao River, encircle and annihilate the enemy at Siping (about 15,000 troops), and strike at reinforcements. 2. The Fan Hanjie Army Group that has arrived in the Northeast probably consists of only two to three brigades. Under such circumstances, if our forces are positioned between Shenyang and Jinzhou, the enemy will inevitably be afraid and will not dare to come out to open up the railway, making it difficult for our forces to seek opportunities for battle. Therefore, it is now proposed that after the conclusion of the Siping operation, our forces be positioned between Siping and Jilin and Changchun, on the one hand to carry out replenishment and consolidation, and on the other to prevent the enemy at Jilin from withdrawing and concentrating at Changchun. At the same time, this will draw out the enemy between Shenyang and Jinzhou to open up communications and disperse their forces. 3. The next offensive will either suddenly strike back at the Beining Line or attack Changchun, to be decided according to the situation at that time. 4. In my opinion, the Yang-Luo-Yang force should not come to eastern Hebei too early before the new offensive in the Northeast is launched, so as not to make the enemy afraid to open up the Beining Line. It would be best for them to enter eastern Hebei when the next offensive is launched, so as to create the possibility for us to coordinate with them in striking at large cities (in the absence of small and medium-sized cities to strike) and at large-scale reinforcements.”