Pin Down the Enemy’s 11th Division and Other Units to Facilitate Rest and Reorganization for Liu-Deng’s Main Force[1]

(February 22, 1948)

Chen and Tang, Chen and Xie, and for the information of Liu and Deng, Su and Liu[2]:

Your telegram of the 21st (17:00–19:00 hours)[3] has been received. Your task for the coming two weeks is to pin down the 11th Division and other enemy forces along the Beiping-Hankou Railway between Zhengzhou and Xinyang[4] so that they cannot threaten the assembly of Liu-Deng’s main force between the Sha River and the Huai River or its recruitment of new soldiers.

After Liu-Deng’s main force has assembled and recruited new soldiers, in our opinion, as long as circumstances permit,

Liu-Deng will still need a short period of rest, consolidation, and training. If Liu-Deng also agree to this and do not object to your carrying out the Zhengzhou-Tongguan campaign, then you may proceed according to your proposal and first strike along the Zhengzhou-Tongguan line[1] with your present forces. However, a concrete decision can only be made in early March. For the coming two weeks, you should seek combat opportunities along the Zhengzhou-Xinyang section to assist Liu-Deng.

Military Commission

21:00–23:00 hours, 22nd day, 2nd month

[1] The Zhengzhou-Tongguan line refers to the railway from Zhengzhou to Tongguan, i.e., a section of the Lanzhou-Lianyungang Railway.

--- Notes

[1] This telegram was drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and addressed to Chen Shiju, chief of staff of the East China Field Army, and Tang Liang, director of its political department, as well as to Chen Geng, secretary of the Front Committee of the Chen-Xie Group of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army, and Xie Fuzhi, deputy secretary.


[2] Liu and Deng: Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, who were then respectively commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army. Su and Liu: Su Yu and Liu Xiansheng, who were then respectively deputy commander and deputy chief of staff of the East China Field Army.


[3] Refers to the telegram sent by Chen Shiju, Tang Liang, Chen Geng, and Xie Fuzhi to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee at 17:00–19:00 hours on February 21, 1948. The telegram put forward the following views on operations for the next two months: 1. The first step should still be to operate along the Zhengzhou-Tongguan railway, destroy the railway, raid and occupy the county towns of Mixian, Xingyang, Gongxian, Sishui, and Yanshi, threaten Zhengzhou, draw out the Pei Changhui Corps for reinforcement, annihilate it in mobile warfare, and seize Luoyang when the opportunity arises. 2. After the first step is accomplished, following a short period of rest and reorganization, move southward in early or mid-April to the Xiangfan and Nanyang area. First eliminate the feudal landlord armed forces and security regiments in the four counties west of Nanyang, seize Nanyang, Xiangfan, Laohekou, and other towns when the opportunity arises, then continue across the Han River to develop toward the Jinghe area, threaten the lower reaches of the Yangtze, link up with the Jianghan and Tongbai base areas, create an encirclement situation around Wuhan, and draw in enemy forces, thereby facilitating Su Yu’s forces in carrying out mobile tasks or coordinating with Liu-Deng in operations along the Beiping-Hankou Railway.


[4] The Zhengzhou-Xinyang section of the Beiping-Hankou Railway, i.e., a section of the present Beijing-Guangzhou Railway.