Make the Best Use of Time to Discipline the
Troops; Then Attack the Han River Valley
 (February 21, 1948. 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.)
To Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping] and Li [Xiannian], and for the information of
Su [Yu] and Liu [Xiansheng], Chen [Shiju] and Tang [Liang], and Chen [Geng]
and Xie [Fuzhi]:1
	 1.	 After sending our telegram between 9:00 and 11:00 P.M. on the 20th, we
today received your telegram of February 17th.2
	 2.	 We have decided to move Su Yu’s forces to an area north of the Yellow
River to rest and reorganize in safety for two months. They will not be able
to move south until early May. After Su’s forces move north, the enemy
will inevitably think that Su has either returned to Shandong or is moving
to attack the [Bei]ping-[Tian]jin area or Taiyuan, and enemy forces such as
the Fifth Army and the Seventy-fifth Division will remain in southwestern
Shandong for the time being. There is, however, a possibility that they will
eventually move south of the Sha River to put pressure on you. Will it really
be possible for your four columns to amass between the Sha and Huai rivers to reorganize and begin to move west as quickly as you said? We estimate
that you will need at least one month to do so. There are currently eleven
brigades of the armies of Chen [Shiju] and Tang [Liang], and Chen [Geng]
and Xie [Fuzhi] west of the [Bei]ping-Han[kou] railway, so it seems that the
enemy’s Eleventh and Tenth divisions, having attained their goal of reaching
the [Bei]ping-Han[kou] railway, will not threaten your gathering and reorganizing. You should also use this time to do some training. In addition, after
you complete your reorganization and move west to join the existing strength
of the Chen and Tang and Chen and Xie armies, there will be a total of more
than twenty-one field brigades. There is therefore no need to add the Tenth
and Eleventh columns. If these two columns were in fact added, there would
be twenty-six field brigades, which would mean that our entire main force
would move west and southwest. This would pull the entire enemy force to
the west and the southwest and this would be detrimental to the war situation.
Furthermore, when Su’s units move south in two months, support forces will
be lacking in the east. Therefore, after the Tenth and Eleventh columns complete the task of escorting new soldiers to you, you should return south of the
Zheng[zhou]-Xu[zhou] railway under the command of Su, as instructed in
our telegram sent between 9:00 and 11:00 P.M. on the 20th. After fighting in
this area for two months, you will also support Su Yu’s actions there without
crossing the [Bei]ping-Han[kou] railway.
	 3.	 In order to keep track of Hu Lian and Sun Yuanliang,3 and to help amass
and reorganize your forces and bring them up to full strength, before you
cross the rail line and meet up with the eleven field brigades of the armies of
Chen and Tang and Chen and Xie, you should take the opportunity to fight
the relatively weak enemy forces west of the [Bei]ping-Han[kou] railway,
and you should not move toward the coastal provinces4 for the time being. If
no opportunities for a good fight come along, you should keep an eye on Hu
Lian, wait until you move westward, and then amass twenty-one brigades to
move simultaneously in the direction of the Han River valley. You will need
to prepare for two or three months for action in that direction.
	 4.	 We do not estimate that Pei Changhui’s corps5 (of seven brigades) will
achieve much of anything. If this enemy joins Sun Yuanliang to attack
Song county and Ye county, then the forces of Chen and Tang and Chen
and Xie can choose one to annihilate [them]. [Xu] Xiangqian’s units6 are just now in the Fushan-Yicheng region undergoing training in the art of
siege warfare in preparation for attacking Linfen. Taking Linfen will be of
great help to the armies of Peng [Dehuai] and Zhang [Zongxun],7 and those
of Chen and Xie, as well as yours. We therefore do not intend to change
this plan. The forces of Peng and Zhang will attack Yichuan and Hancheng
at the end of February. Regardless of whether or not they are successful,
they will march into the area between Huanglong Mountain and the Wei
River to fight the main force of Hu Zongnan’s8 army. After your twentyone brigades have completed their two- or three-month-long task of moving toward the Han River valley, and after Su’s forces have finished their
assigned task, you must use a force of at least fifteen brigades to fight a battle with Pei Changhui so you can reoccupy the Zheng[zhou]-Tong[guan]
railway. Doing so will open up a second path behind you, which will be the
only path behind the armies of Chen and Xie.
The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 399–401, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.
# Source: en:MRP

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Liu Bocheng was commander of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field
Army, Deng Xiaoping was political commissar of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army, and Li
Xiannian was deputy commander of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army. Su Yu and Liu Xiansheng (1901–1977, born in Xiangtan county, Hunan) were deputy commander and deputy
chief-of-staff, respectively, of the East China Field Army. Chen Shiju and Tang Liang were
chief-of-staff and director of the Political Department, respectively, of the East China Field
Army. Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi were secretary and deputy secretary, respectively, of the
Chen-Xie Group Front Committee of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army.

2.  The telegram from Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping stated that the troops under
Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi and those under Chen Shiju and Tang Liang would mobilize
in early March to consolidate the troops under Su Yu. They felt it best to move toward
Nanyang and Xiangfan to enable moving the Eleventh Division and to facilitate the concentration of Communist forces. They proposed that when doing battle, the Chen-Tang and
Chen-Xie units should primarily surround one point to draw the enemy in and then ambush
its reinforcements. If the enemy sends reinforcements west, the Communist forces could
annihilate one or two of their weaker divisions.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-91

3.  Hu Lian was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Eighteenth Army, and
Sun Yuanliang (1904–2007, native of Sichuan) was commander of the Reorganized Fortyseventh Army.

4.   Nanyang, translated here as “the coastal provinces,” was used at the end of the Qing
dynasty to signify the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong.

5.  Pei Changhui (1896–1993, native of Shandong) was commander of the Guomindang’s Fifth Army.

6.  Xu Xiangqian was deputy commander of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Military Region.

7.  Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army
and Zhang Zongxun was deputy commander of the Northwest Field Army.

8.  Hu Zongnan was director of the Guomindang army’s Xi’an Pacification Office.