The Northeast Field Army Should Take
Advantage of the Cold Season to Annihilate a
Large Number of Enemy Forces
(February 7, 1948, 8:00 P.M.)
To Lin [Biao], Luo [Ronghuan], and Liu [Yalou], and for the information of Zhu
[De] and Liu [Shaoqi]:1
We received your telegram of the 6th.
	 1.	 Congratulations on your victory in Liaoning.
	 2.	 With few exceptions, every army on the southern front, most of which had
not enjoyed substantial rest and reorganization in a year and a half, has
recently had a period of thorough rest and reorganization. Peng [Dehuai] and
Zhang [Zongxun]’s army2 will complete their rest and reorganization during
the first ten days of February and will commence operations in the middle
of the same month. The armies of Chen [Yi] and Su [Yu]; Chen [Geng]
and Xie [Fuzhi]; Xu [Shiyou] and Tan [Zhenlin]; and Xu [Xiangqian], Teng
[Daiyuan], and Bo [Yibo]3 will complete their rest and reorganization at the end of February and will commence operations at the beginning of March.
The army of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]4 is partially resting for
the time being, and it is dispersing to fight only small battles. The Northern
Jiangsu Corps5 originally had only four brigades and 20,000 men; now this
will increase to seven brigades with a total of 50,000 men. It will be able to
commence operations in March. Apart from their continuing focused attack
on the Dabie Mountains, the enemy forces on the southern front are all on the
defensive. The army of Yang [Dezhi], Luo [Ruiqing], and Yang [Chengwu]6
should be able to attack the [Bei]ping-Sui[yuan] railway7 around the end
of February or the beginning of March; in April it should be able to move
toward eastern Hebei. This army must master tactical thinking that is broad
and flexible. As soon as they leave the Beiping-Suiyuan railway and eastern Hebei, their eyes will light upon vast tracts of land, their views will
broaden, and unnecessary worries will be swept away. Please have Zhu and
Liu closely supervise this matter.
	 3.	 If you are able to follow the ideas I mentioned in the last telegram of deferring the complete rest and reorganization (which should last for one or
one-and-a-half months, or two months at the most) until after the thaw and
until then simply use the intervals between campaigns and battles to take a
few short breaks (these short breaks are absolutely necessary), then we can
still take advantage of the winter to fight for two months and annihilate a
large number of enemy forces, thus creating a better battlefront for us in the
summer and autumn. The battles you are fighting in Liao[ning], An[shan],
Ben[xi], and Ying[kou] are very important. After this campaign, you will
be able to liberate southern Liaoning and send two columns to reinforce the
main forces. The next big battle will have two directions: one, to fight the
enemy in Fushun, Tieling, and Faku; and the other, to fight the enemy in
Fuxin, Yi county, Jinxi, Xingcheng, Suizhong, Shanhai Pass, Changli, and
Luanzhou.8 Decide where it will be best to fight according to the situation.
You should, however, be prepared to deal with the situation of the enemy
withdrawing from the Northeast into North China. Chiang Kaishek previously considered such a withdrawal, but later he changed his mind, mostly
because our southern forces had not yet crossed the Yangzi River and our forces on the northern front had not yet severely crippled Chiang’s troops.
Nevertheless, you have recently won several major victories. If you continue
to be victorious; if the army of Yang, Luo, and Yang reaches the [Bei]pingSui[yuan] railway and eastern Hebei; and if our forces on the southern front
also act vigorously; then, the probability that Chiang’s troops will withdraw
from the Northeast may suddenly increase. This will probably occur in the
summer or even a bit earlier. Therefore, you must be prepared to complete
your battles in your present positions within about one month and to launch
another campaign (including several battles) thereafter. After that, you will
carry out a large-scale rest and reorganization to prepare to deal with the
aforementioned new situation. But we are not sure that the condition of
your troops will allow us to follow this plan. In your last telegram, you said
there were no battles to be fought in the direction of Jinzhou. What is the
exact situation there? If our troops can completely control the belt of territory from Fuxin to Yi county, Xingcheng, Suizhong, Yuguan,9 Changyi, and
Luanzhou, will it help us to deal with the withdrawal of Chiang’s troops? It
will strategically benefit our army if we trap Chiang’s forces in the Northeast
and then destroy each unit one by one. If our army does not have sufficient
strength to prevent their withdrawal, then Chiang’s troops will probably control Jinzhou, Chengde, Beiping, Tianjin, and the area between these cities,
and will capture the northern segment of the [Tian]jin-Pu[kou] railway. In
such a situation, they will of course have difficulty obtaining provisions for
their armies and troop morale will decline yet further. Their forces will nevertheless be more concentrated. These possible scenarios must be considered
in advance. Of course, there is also the possibility that Chiang’s troops will
cling to the Northeast and not withdraw. Such a situation is, however, almost
inconceivable unless our army is strong enough to force them to remain.
Mao Zedong

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Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 390–92, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Lin Biao was commander and political commissar of the Northeast Field Army, Luo
Ronghuan was deputy political commissar of the Northeast Field Army, and Liu Yalou was
chief-of-staff of the Northeast Field Army. In mid-December 1947, the Northeast Field
Army took advantage of the freezing season to launch a winter attack that continued until
mid-March 1948. During this period, it occupied and recaptured Liaoyang, Siping, Jilin,
Yingkou, and other cities, annihilated 156,000 enemy troops, and confined the enemy
forces to a few isolated cities, such as Changchun, Shenyang, and Jinzhou.

2.  Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army,
and Zhang Zongxun was deputy commander of the Northwest Field Army.

3.  Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, and
Su Yu was deputy commander of the East China Field Army. Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi
were secretary and deputy secretary, respectively, of the Chen-Xie Group Front Committee of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. Xu Shiyou and Tan
Zhenlin were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shandong Corps of
the East China Field Army. Xu Xiangqian was first deputy commander, Teng Daiyuan was
second deputy commander, and Bo Yibo was first deputy political commissar of the Jin-JiLu-Yu Military Region.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-82

4.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army.

5.  The Northern Jiangsu Corps refers to the East China Field Army in northern Jiangsu
under Commander Wei Guoqing (1913–1989, born in Donglan county, Hechi) and Political
Commissar Chen Pixian (1916–1995, born in Shanghang county, Longyan).

6.  Yang Dezhi was commander, Luo Ruiqing was first political commissar, and Yang
Chengwu was second political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Field Army.

7.  The Beiping-Suiyuan railway ran from Beiping to Baotou in Suiyuan (now in the
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region).

8.  Luanzhou refers to Luan county, Hebei.

9.  Yuguan refers to Shanhai Pass in Qinhuangdao, Hebei.