In his Hai-Hui letter, Commander-in-Chief Zhu raised two important issues.


The first issue concerns the use of democratic discussion to mobilize the soldier masses. Before, during, and after combat, they should deliberate on how to capture enemy positions, annihilate the enemy, and accomplish the mission. Particularly in the course of battle, it is crucial to fully empower company-level Party branches and platoon/squad groups to repeatedly discuss methods for breaching enemy defenses; this approach has yielded remarkable results. The experience of capturing the Panlong position in Northern Shaanxi—the 167th Brigade of the Nationalist Army’s 1st Division—was precisely such a case. At that time, one regiment had been fighting for several days when higher command judged further advance untenable and ordered a withdrawal. However, the company leadership believed the objective was still attainable and refused to retreat. The soldiers organized into small groups to deliberate, devised a viable plan, resumed the attack, and ultimately secured victory. In Northern Shaanxi, this practice came to be known as “military democracy,” while the “speak bitterness” campaign and the “three inspections and three rectifications” were termed “political democracy” and “economic democracy,” respectively. Such democratic life within the armed forces is entirely beneficial and should be implemented in all units.


The second issue pertains to the living standards of workers, shop assistants, and office staff in factories and stores, which must not be set too high. The task of our Party’s policy toward industry and commerce is to develop production, invigorate the economy, balance public and private interests, and ensure mutual benefit for both labor and capital. Should our Party fail to effectively lead the working class in carrying out this mission and instead advocate excessively stringent working conditions—repeating past historical errors—it will inevitably lead to reduced output, economic decline, an inability to reconcile public and private interests, and a failure to achieve mutual benefit between labor and capital. This would constitute a grave setback. This matter demands the utmost attention of the entire Party; we must never focus solely on short-term, partial so-called worker welfare while neglecting the long-term interests of the working class. The Central Committee has already issued directives on this subject. Nevertheless, in many localities these instructions have gone unheeded. Numerous central bureaus and sub-bureaus have failed to issue corresponding guidance or to provide accurate explanations to trade union officials and the working masses, instead accommodating isolated, one-sided, and narrow-minded views within the Party and among workers. As a result, they continue to pursue policies that have historically inflicted severe setbacks upon our Party.


Party committees at all levels below the central bureaus must address this issue with utmost seriousness and promptly correct the erroneous thinking and policies currently prevailing within the Party regarding it.


Printed from the original document preserved in the Central Archives, based on Mao Zedong’s Zi-Shi edition.


Notes: [1] Refers to a letter written by Zhu De on December 10, 1947 (Hai day, Hui month), following his inspection of the Jin-Cha-Ji Field Army and other areas including Central Hebei, to the CPC Central Committee and Mao Zedong. In the letter, Zhu described how troops in the Jin-Cha-Ji region, while engaging in battles to capture Shijiazhuang and other locations, mobilized officers and men to learn mobile warfare, annihilation tactics, and assault techniques through collective deliberation alongside combat, thereby achieving victory. At the same time, he pointed out the problem of excessively high wages and benefits for urban workers, arguing that such conditions would force most state-owned and private factories to close, resulting in widespread unemployment and undermining the fundamental interests of the working class—a policy tantamount to “self-destruction.”  [2] Refers to the May 1947 battle in which the Northwest Field Army of the People’s Liberation Army completely wiped out over 6,700 Nationalist defenders under Hu Zongnan at Panlong Town, northeast of Yan’an.  [3] The “Three Inspections and Three Rectifications” was a Party- and army-wide rectification campaign conducted by the CPC during the Chinese People’s Liberation War, integrated with the land reform movement. The “three inspections” referred to examining class background, ideological stance, and work style at the local level, and class background, work performance, and fighting spirit within the military. The “three rectifications” involved streamlining organization, purifying thought, and improving conduct.