To Comrade Su Yu[1]

(January 27, 1948)

Regarding the issue of you commanding the three columns of Ye, Wang, and Tao[2] to cross the river and advance southward to carry out broad mobile tasks, we have studied the matter together with Comrade Chen Yi and there are three plans: (A) Rest and regroup for another half month under the current posture, then you lead the three columns of Ye, Wang, and Tao to cross the river from the upper and lower reaches of Yichang, taking the enemy by surprise. Chen and Tang[3] command the 3rd and 8th Columns as well as Chen Geng’s main force to enter the Jianghan region, strike the 85th Division and other units, and cover your river crossing. The drawback of this move is that new recruits and cadres cannot be sent up in time. (B) During the three months of Chou, Yin, and Mao, proceed according to the original plan into the area south of the Funiu and Qinling Mountains, north of the Yangtze River, and west of the Ping-Han Railway. Apart from operations, you lead the three columns of Ye, Wang, and Tao to strive for a full month of rest and regrouping in that area, then cross the river. Chen and Tang command the 3rd and 8th Columns to the north and south, referring to the Liu-Deng Field Army south of the Huai River and the Chen-Su Field Army and Chen-Xie Group north of the Huai River. Deng Zihui, then Deputy Secretary of the East China Bureau, was carrying out land reform and army consolidation work in the Bohai region of Shandong. and Chen Geng’s main force provide cover north of the river. The advantage of this move is that new recruits and cadres can be sent up; the drawback is that the enemy can make preparations. (C) During the three months of Chou, Yin, and Mao, operate between the Funiu Mountains and the Yangtze River; in the month of Chen, the entire army returns north; you lead Ye, Wang, and Tao to select a place for two to three months of rest and regrouping, and cross the river in the autumn. The advantage of this move is thorough preparation; the drawback is that the task of maneuvering the enemy can only be realized between autumn and winter. Each of the above three plans has its own merits and demerits. Please give them careful

[1] This is the main content of a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee to Su Yu.

[2] Ye, Wang, and Tao refer to Ye Fei, Wang Bicheng, and Tao Yong, then respectively commanders of the 1st, 6th, and 4th Columns of the East China Field Army.

[3] Chen and Tang refer to Chen Shiju and Tang Liang.

consideration and reply. As for after you lead the three columns across the river, it will inevitably force the enemy to alter their deployment and may attract twenty to thirty enemy brigades back to defend Jiangnan. With a force of seventy to eighty thousand going to Jiangnan, first maneuver in the two provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi for a period of half a year to a year, circling around along the way, ensuring that rest time exceeds marching and combat time, and by means of leaps advance through several stages to reach Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi, placing the enemy entirely in a position of passive response, unable to guard against all threats, and exhausted from ceaseless奔波. The river crossing site seems more suitable if chosen near Zigui and Yichang, near Yidu and Jiangling, or near Shishou and Jianli, selecting a place to cross the river and enter western Hunan. Crossing from the Honghu and Mianyang area to southern Hubei, which the enemy would likely anticipate even less, may also be considered.