Comrades:

Why is victory impossible without an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal national united front that includes the participation of the overwhelming majority of the nation's population? Today, I will address this question.

Should the revolution seek victory? This issue is now very clear. When our Communist Party first began to organize, this question did not yet exist. During the Great Revolution from 1924 to 1927, when we cooperated with Chiang Kai-shek in the Northern Expedition, the question of whether to seek victory arose at that time. However, mistakes were made then—the Communist Party was still immature, and there was capitulationism in the Party's leadership, which relinquished leadership of the revolution, accommodated the Kuomintang, and capitulated to the landlords, rich peasants, local tyrants, and evil gentry in the countryside and the big bourgeoisie in the cities. In particular, it neglected the need for an army, thereby forfeiting the possibility of seizing victory. Later, we carried out the Agrarian Revolution and fought the Kuomintang for ten years. At first, we were a guerrilla force, very small, capable only of wiping out a few enemy regiments and controlling several counties. At that time, the question of victory in a few counties was on the agenda, but nationwide victory still seemed rather distant.

During the War of Resistance Against Japan, we proposed striving for nationwide victory, advocating that through a protracted war we would drive out the Japanese invaders and mobilize the forces of the broad masses to overthrow them. After Japan's surrender, a new problem arose: Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary clique launched a civil war. Had it not been for the support of U.S. imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek would have been slower to start a civil war, but with the active backing of U.S. imperialism, the civil war quickly erupted. The Northern Expedition was a civil war, the Agrarian Revolutionary War was a civil war, and fighting Chiang Kai-shek after victory in the War of Resistance was another civil war—thus we have had three revolutionary civil wars. The current civil war differs from the previous two. The Northern Expeditionary War was directed against imperialism and comprador-feudal forces, but in the end, Chiang Kai-shek seized the fruits of victory, while the Communist Party and the masses of the people were defeated. In the ten-year Agrarian Revolutionary War, the revolutionary forces suffered great setbacks, leading to the Long March. The first two civil wars occurred after World War I and before World War II, during which our struggle was relatively isolated—especially during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, when we were extremely isolated. The War of Resistance itself was part of World War II and enjoyed international sympathy and support. The current civil war is taking place after World War II, in a changed world situation and a changed situation in China, with the prospects for revolutionary victory now very clear. Most of the comrades present here have experienced the four revolutionary periods from the Great Revolution to today. Think about it: in which of these four periods were the prospects for victory clearest? It is the present period.

Well, does Chiang Kai-shek's isolation equal our victory? Does it mean that we can dispense with a national united front in which the overwhelming majority of the nation's population participates? I don't think we can say that. Chiang Kai-shek is isolated because he represents the interests of the landlord class and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and oppresses the people. Some say the Communist Party was forced into existence by Chiang Kai-shek: "Eliminate one Communist Party, and at the same time create ten; eliminate ten, and create a hundred" [6]—the result being universal disaffection and disgust, with the Communist Party growing ever larger. This is one truth. But there is another truth, and that is the correctness of our policies. If our policies are incorrect—for example, if we violate the interests of the middle peasants, the middle bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, democratic personages, enlightened gentry, and intellectuals; if we mishandle prisoners of war; if we mishandle landlords and rich peasants; if we make mistakes on the issue of the united front—then we still cannot win. The Communist Party would change from growing ever larger to growing ever smaller, and Chiang Kai-shek's isolation would turn into isolation for both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, with the people liking neither Chiang Kai-shek nor the Communist Party. This possibility exists—it is not nonexistent in theory.

Our policy on prisoners of war has been a complete success. Not a single Kuomintang soldier who lays down his arms is killed; the majority can join our forces, and one-fifth to one-quarter of Kuomintang officers, after re-education, can be used by us. Chiang Kai-shek practices a closed-door policy; he dares not even use the Kuomintang officers we release and send back. We are bolder than he—for his officers, we boldly use a portion, and release the majority. When we release them, we agree on terms with them, asking them to go out and do work. As long as they do even a little work, it helps us. For instance, during the battle of Yichuan, a captured officer spoke over the radio to the Kuomintang troops, saying he could "guarantee that if you surrender your weapons, you will not be killed." The officers and soldiers of the Kuomintang army pay close attention to our broadcasts; our radio broadcasts enjoy enormous credibility. This shows the importance of the prisoner-of-war policy.

The landlord class must be eliminated as a class, but as individuals they should be protected. Why eliminate the landlord class? Because it represents a reactionary mode of production. Politically overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek aims precisely at destroying the feudal-comprador relations of production economically and liberating the fettered productive forces. In the countryside, this means liberating the peasants, breaking the feudal landownership system, carrying out a thorough equal distribution of land, handing over land ownership to the peasants, so that they can produce with peace of mind and boldness and improve farming methods. In the cities, the bureaucratic capital represented by the four big families is to be taken over by the new-democratic state. Ownership within the relations of production is legally termed proprietorship. As for private ownership, we first destroy a part of it—that is, destroying the private ownership of the landlord class and turning it into private ownership for the peasants, and destroying the private ownership of the four big families and turning it over to the new-democratic state. But abolishing the private ownership of the landlord class does not mean that we do away with the landlords themselves. Landlords and old-style rich peasants account for one-tenth of the rural population, totaling 36 million people nationwide. They are a labor force for society and a kind of wealth. We give them a share of land and property and let them engage in productive labor—they can carry stretchers, produce grain, and even pay public grain taxes, which benefits the country. As for the right to vote, the peasants will not be willing to grant it to them for a few years. Does that mean they will never be given it? No. Initially, they will not be granted it, but after some years, once they have been transformed through labor and become peasants, it can be given. At present, industry is underdeveloped; when industry develops in the future, where will the workers come from? From the countryside, of course. When there is an excess of rural labor, it will be drawn into city jobs; millions will go to the cities. Transformed, those 36 million people will become a huge labor force, almost equivalent to the population of a small country. We must detest feudal exploitation intensely, but the landlords themselves are still a labor force; after transformation, they will even have the right to vote in a few years. We must resettle the landlords properly; if not handled well, chaos will ensue, and we cannot achieve victory. Among landlords, there are distinctions between big, middle, and small landlords, as well as between reactionary and enlightened ones; we should handle them according to different circumstances.

I will also touch upon the issue of beating and killing people here. Our Communist Party does not advocate beating people. People have two hands, which are meant for work, not for beating others. Beating people is a feudal and barbaric act.

A husband beating his wife, a foreman beating a worker, a teacher beating a student, an officer beating a soldier, or a superior officer beating a subordinate officer—all are barbaric practices.


In the countryside, during the struggle against landlords, beating people is also bad and should not be encouraged.


When struggling against landlords, the peasants, in their fury, may go up and hit them. If we immediately step forward and say, "You must not beat people," that would pour cold water on the masses.


If the masses, in their anger, hit someone once, it is not a big deal, but we do not advocate beating people.


Does this not seem contradictory?

It is not contradictory.


Our slogan calls for the abolition of corporal punishment. This is our principle, but we must also have flexibility.


For example, eradicating superstition is our principle, yet in northern Shaanxi there are still frequent temple fairs, and many people attend them—our yangge troupes go there too.


When the masses believe in gods and spirits, we cannot force them not to be superstitious.


There is also a policy in northern Shaanxi stipulating the abolition of mercenary marriages, yet such marriages are still widespread.


These things must be reformed step by step.


As for killing, the fewer the better.


It cannot be completely avoided, but it must not be excessive.


The Manifesto of the People’s Liberation Army states that a policy of differentiated treatment should be adopted toward Chiang Kai-shek’s personnel: first, those most guilty must be punished and pursued to the ends of the earth; second, those coerced into complicity shall not be questioned; third, those who atone for their crimes with meritorious deeds shall be permitted to do so; fourth, those who perform meritorious service shall be rewarded.


This is our policy.


In this way, the number of people to be executed will be fewer.


Counterrevolutionary spies need not be killed in such large numbers.


If we kill a few spies, will others stop engaging in espionage?

They will still do it.


We should use poison against poison, making these "technical" personnel trained by the Kuomintang over many years serve our purposes.


You persecuted the Communist Party in the past, but today you must help us do our work. When Chiang Kai-shek is overthrown, that will count as atoning for your crimes with meritorious deeds.


This time, killing Wang Shiwei was a great pity. He was a bad element, but he could still write articles.


So, does that mean not a single person should be killed?

Not a single person killed cannot be taken as a legal principle.


Those whose crimes are monstrous and whom the masses bitterly hate may be executed.


As for ordinary landlords, rich peasants, and captured officers, they shall be dealt with separately.


Now we have eighty thousand captured officers and two million captured soldiers—have we killed a single one of them?

Not one has been killed.


Have the eighty thousand officers rebelled?

No, they have not.


Has it hindered the revolutionary war?

No, it has not.


On the contrary, it has even been helpful to us.


The broad intellectual class—students, teachers, lawyers, doctors, engineers, and the like—must be dealt with prudently.


In the past, these people served the bourgeoisie. Now, influenced by the revolutionary movement and after education, they can work for us.


If we do this, victory is assured; if we fail to do so—that is, if we do not unite the overwhelming majority of the entire nation within the national united front—victory will be impossible.


Some people ask: What should we do after national victory?

Will we still need a united front then?

Does it mean "Once power is in hand, we can issue decrees as we please," and with one order the united front is discarded?

No, it does not.


At that time, the problem will be consolidating victory. Without a national united front in which the overwhelming majority of the entire nation’s population participates, victory cannot be consolidated.


Comrades, last year we achieved a great victory—one aspect was fighting battles, another was training and consolidation. The rear-area work was also done very well.


East of the Yellow River and west of the Yellow River have been unified. We are now confident of winning battles. The front captured a great amount of materiel, and the rear supplied ample grain and artillery shells.


This has made us very satisfied.


The Central Committee convened a meeting and assessed the combat achievements of all the liberated areas nationwide. Over 1.6 million enemy troops have been annihilated, including your victories.


For the Northwest Field Army, the rear indeed contributed tremendous effort.


The issue of funding was once extremely difficult.


In mid-August last year, it was said that north of Zhenchuan Fort there was no more grain. We wanted to go to Hu Zongnan’s territory to "borrow" grain, but in the end, we did not go to "borrow"; instead, Comrade He Long obtained fifty thousand piculs of grain, which sustained us from mid-August through December. The army always had grain to eat.


Generally speaking, under the leadership of Comrades Peng Dehuai and He Long, the front and rear have been united and cooperated very well.


Once the Communist Party has an army and political power, difficulties can be resolved.


Now we must strike out to exterior lines. You can rest assured about the rear-area work, rest assured about the front leadership. The Central Committee is also at ease—this is mainly due to the leadership of the Northwest Bureau and the Suiyuan-Jinxian Sub-bureau, and the leadership of the Front Committee.


All you numerous cadres have this confidence. No matter how the landlords rebel, we shall not fear.


Your units, after two months of training and consolidation, learned the grievance-denunciation campaign from the peasants, raised their political consciousness, and strengthened unity.


If our two-million-strong army is united through the grievance-denunciation campaign, there is no reason we cannot defeat Chiang Kai-shek.


So long as our policies are correct, we rely on the poor peasants and hired hands, firmly unite with the middle peasants, protect the interests of industry and commerce, the middle bourgeoisie, and intellectuals, and do not kill captured officers and soldiers—this country will be ours.


With the united front of the whole nation, victory will be achieved.


The greater our strength, the greater our certainty of victory. This is a very solid truth.


So, can we afford to underestimate the enemy?

No, we cannot.


In that report, I said that U.S. imperialism is a paper tiger. Its strength is superficial and transient.


It cannot assist Chiang Kai-shek like flowing water—endlessly and without limit.


Toward U.S. imperialism, toward Chiang Kai-shek, generally speaking, we should despise them, but we must not despise specific enemies. If we despise them, we will commit errors of principle.


There are two aspects to principle: we despise the enemy in general terms, but we must not despise specific enemies.


I recall explaining this principle at the Red Army University.


At that time, a comrade said, "You have spoken so many theories—this principle, that principle. When I go into battle, I don’t need so many principles; all I need is one charge."


I told this comrade: You have your own theory. Your single "charge" is correct, but having only one "charge" is not correct. You must add one more "charge," making it two "charges."


Bravery is one "charge," and wisdom is another "charge." Having bravery without wisdom is just one "charge." Only when you have both wisdom and bravery do you have two "charges."


Now let me illustrate further: Eliminating the landlord class is one "charge," while giving individual landlords a share of land is another "charge."


Overthrowing the Kuomintang is one "charge," while not overthrowing the employees of the Kuomintang is another "charge."


Strategically, we must despise the enemy; that is one "charge."


No imperialism is truly frightening; they are rife with contradictions and steeped in problems.


The United States faces crises: externally, the Soviet Union opposes it; internally, its own people oppose it.


Chiang Kai-shek’s camp lacks unity of will and unity of military spirit.


We do not fear U.S. aid to Chiang Kai-shek, nor do we fear Hu Zongnan’s two hundred thousand troops.


But in specific matters, we must not underestimate the enemy; this is yet another "charge."


We do not fight unprepared battles, nor do we fight battles without certainty of victory. In battle, we must capture positions one by one.


In summary, we must keep our eyes on the big picture while starting from small steps.


The resolution of this enlarged meeting of the Front Committee is very good, but you must be prepared to amend it in the future.


The May Fourth Directive of the year before last—we revised it last September and put forward the policy of equal land distribution.


Two years ago, would it have been possible to propose equal land distribution?

No, it would not have been possible. At that time, we could not yet resolve on equal land distribution.


Judging from actual circumstances, not making that resolution then but making it last September was better.


During the Xi’an Incident, we released Chiang Kai-shek. Now, we propose to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek. This is not only not contradictory, but only by acting in this way can we avoid alienating the masses.


At that time, Chiang Kai-shek absolutely had to be released. If we hadn’t, our Party would have alienated the masses.


We released him, fought Japanese imperialism first, implemented the policy of rent and interest reduction, and as a result, we expanded the liberated areas, strengthened the Liberation Army, and then proceeded to equal land distribution.


Two years before Japan’s surrender, in some parts of the Taihang region, land was already distributed. They cabled asking whether this should be corrected.


We told them: Since the people have distributed it, let them keep it; do not correct it.


At that time, land could be distributed in certain areas, but it could not be carried out as a national policy.


During the War of Resistance, we cooperated with Chiang Kai-shek and implemented rent and interest reduction. Compared with the policy of confiscating landlords’ land and distributing it to the peasants, was this a step backward?

Yes, it was a step backward.


After the victory of the War of Resistance, we still took a step backward.


What was the purpose of taking a step backward?

It was to prepare to move forward.


Why did we withdraw from Yan’an?

Withdrawing from Yan’an was preparation for advancing on Xi’an.


Take one step back and advance two or three steps forward.


In our thinking and our work, the policy of taking a step backward was adopted proactively.


At the start of the War of Resistance, taking a step backward did not mean we acknowledged that Chiang Kai-shek should not be overthrown or that land should not be distributed; it was because Japan had invaded China. If we had not done so, we would have committed an error.


Now, equal land distribution is correct and the peasants demand it. But comrades must pay attention to correcting "leftist" errors in the work.


If there are shortcomings or mistakes in our thinking and our work, we must be ready to correct them at any time. This is called upholding the truth and correcting mistakes.


Truth must be upheld. Sometimes, truth is not recognized or understood by the majority, and even then we must oppose the "current."


Whether it is an error or a shortcoming, however small, we must be prepared to correct it.


We must get used to hearing idle talk—be prepared to hear a lot of idle talk, and take it as an opportunity to collect public opinion.


In Party schools, there is much idle talk, and we let people speak. This is called legitimate idle talk (in the army, it is called grumbling).


There are two kinds of idle talk: one comes from good people, the other from bad people.


If it comes from good people, it shows that your leadership probably has problems in its work.


When we say the Party should listen to idle talk, this is exactly the principle—pay attention to gathering different opinions.


When opinions are in agreement, disunity will not arise. Disunity arises precisely because there are different opinions that remain unresolved.


We need to gather up different opinions like collecting scrap metal, melt them down, and prepare to correct the defects and mistakes in our thinking and work.


In the past, a comrade had committed a serious error. When he heard idle talk about himself from the next room, he could not sleep all night and came running to me.


I told him: Your error is quite serious. Prepare yourself mentally for not just one or two people talking idle talk about you, but several hundred people. Once you have this mental preparation and still continue to work as usual, eventually no one will talk about you.


After a few months, sure enough, people stopped talking about him.


That comrade has since given his life.


Who among us never makes mistakes in the course of work?

When a mistake is made, it must be corrected. That is called upholding truth and correcting mistakes.


We are prepared to collect different opinions, and we have already passed a resolution that different opinions may be aired openly. Any opinion may be voiced.


Even under the leadership of a correct line, there will still be shortcomings and mistakes, just as the rolling waters of the Yellow River inevitably contain a few small bubbles. When we collect various opinions more thoroughly and clearly recognize the shortcomings and mistakes in our work, we can reduce blindness.


Based on the transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives and published.


Notes

1 This refers to Mao Zedong’s written report delivered on December 25, 1947, at the Central Committee meeting in Yangjiagou, Mizhi County, northern Shaanxi, titled "The Present Situation and Our Tasks" (Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. IV, People’s Publishing House, 1991 edition, pp. 1243–1260).

2 Hu Zongnan was then Director of the Kuomintang’s Xi’an Pacification Office.

3 This refers to the Eight Basic Policies of the Communist Party of China proclaimed in the Manifesto of the People’s Liberation Army on October 10, 1947 (Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. IV, People’s Publishing House, 1991 edition, pp. 1237–1238).

4 Mao Zedong’s report at the Central Committee meeting on December 25, 1947, consisted of eight sections.

The meeting's resolution stated: "This report is a programmatic document for the Communist Party of China in the political, military, and economic spheres throughout the entire period of overthrowing the reactionary ruling clique of Chiang Kai-shek and establishing a new democratic China."

〔5〕 This appears to refer to the nine points set forth in a decision adopted at the First Enlarged Meeting of the Front Committee of the Northwest Field Army, chaired by Peng Dehuai, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, in January 1948.
The main contents were:
(1) Upon entering areas controlled by Chiang Kai-shek, our army has two basic tasks: first, to annihilate large numbers of the enemy, and second, to establish base areas.
(2) After entering enemy-occupied zones, our army must adhere to the ten major military principles outlined in Mao Zedong's report of December 25, 1947, and implement them flexibly and resolutely to achieve the goal of destroying enemy regular forces piecemeal while strengthening our own forces.
At the same time, we must resolutely wipe out reactionary landlord armed forces, establish people's self-defense armed forces, and create effective armed work teams.
(3) Regarding organizations such as religious, superstitious, and secret society groups, we should strive to win their cooperation or secure their benevolent neutrality, provided they do not oppose our land reform or military operations. During the land reform movement, we should gradually divide them, win over their lower-level followers, and isolate their upper-level leaders.
Students, faculty, and intellectuals in general must be protected.
(4) Wherever our army goes, the Kuomintang, the Three People's Principles Youth Corps, and the Kuomintang government must all be declared abolished.
(5) Commerce and industry must be protected, and their operations must not be disrupted by confiscation of goods, seizure of personnel, or any other disruptive acts.
(6) Army supplies should generally be obtained through levies on the landlord class and the seizure of enemy warehouses.
When necessary, requisitions may be imposed on rich peasants.
(7) New methods must be adopted in the political work of our army: 1. Using methods such as grievance recounting to enhance the class consciousness of soldiers; 2. Establishing a disciplinary duty system; 3. Forming various mutual-aid groups, especially combat groups, and instituting systems for recording merits and demerits, reviewing merits and demerits, and holding merit celebration meetings and democratic evaluations.
(8) We must skillfully use intervals between battles for military training.
(9) Under the policy of thoroughly equalizing land distribution and eliminating feudal forces, landlords and rich peasants should no longer be recruited into the army.
Continue the grievance recounting and the "Three Check-ups" campaign, focus on recruiting poor and lower-middle activists into the Party, strengthen the work of Party branches, and ensure that they become the leading core in the future.

〔6〕 See Chu Anping’s article "A Critique of Bullitt’s Biased and Unhealthy Report on His Visit to China," published in the ninth issue of the third volume of *The Observer* magazine on October 20, 1947.

〔7〕 Fu Sinian (1896–1950), a native of Liaocheng, Shandong.
At the time, he served as the director of the Institute of History and Philology of the Academia Sinica.
In July 1945, he visited Yan'an in his capacity as a member of the National Political Council.
On February 15, 1947, he published an article in *Century Review* titled "Such a Son of Sung Tzu-wen Must Go," in which he stated: "Today even many capitalists sympathize with the Communists—an unprecedented phenomenon in the world. He [referring to Sung Tzu-wen] has served his government in such a way that, needless to say about the people, he has no regard for them at all."
"Today there is much to be done, and the first thing is to ask Sung Tzu-wen to leave, and to thoroughly purge the forces of the Kung-Sung families that have eroded the nation."

〔8〕 Sung Tzu-wen (1894–1971), a native of Wenchang, Guangdong (now part of Hainan Province).
He previously served as president of the Executive Yuan of the Nationalist Government and was reassigned in September 1947 as governor of Guangdong Province for the Nationalist Government.

〔9〕 Vice Chairman Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai.

〔10〕 Wang Shiwei (1906–1947), a native of Huangchuan, Henan.
He once served as a special researcher at the Literature and Art Research Office of the Central Research Institute in Yan'an.
During the 1942 Rectification Movement, he published articles such as "Wild Lilies" and "The Politician, the Artist," for which he was criticized and expelled from the Party. At the end of the same year, he was imprisoned on charges including being a "counterrevolutionary Trotskyist."
In 1946, his case was concluded, and he was designated a "counterrevolutionary Trotskyist spy."
In 1947, he was mistakenly executed under wartime conditions.
On February 7, 1991, the Ministry of Public Security formally issued a "Decision on the Reexamination of Comrade Wang Shiwei’s Trotskyist Issue."
The decision stated: "The reexamination found no evidence that Comrade Wang Shiwei participated in Trotskyist organizations.
Therefore, the 1946 conclusion designating him a 'counterrevolutionary Trotskyist spy' has been corrected, and his mistaken execution under wartime conditions has been exonerated and vindicated."

〔11〕 The Enlarged Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held from July 21 to 23, 1947, decided that He Long, commander of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia-Shanxi-Suiyuan Joint Defense Forces, would lead unified work in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region west of the Yellow River and the Shanxi-Suiyuan Border Region east of the Yellow River, creating a unified rear area to concentrate all human, material, and financial resources in support of the northwestern liberation war.

〔12〕 Refers to the meeting convened by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China from December 25 to 28, 1947, at Yangjiagou, Mizhi County, northern Shaanxi.

〔13〕 He Long (1896–1969), a native of Sangzhi, Hunan.
At the time, he served as commander of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia-Shanxi-Suiyuan Joint Defense Forces and concurrently director of the Northwest Financial and Economic Office.

〔14〕 "Red University" refers to the Chinese Anti-Japanese Red Army University, founded in Wayaobao, northern Shaanxi, in June 1936.
In January 1937, it was renamed the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, abbreviated as Kangda.

〔15〕 Refers to the decision adopted at the Enlarged Meeting of the Front Committee of the Northwest People's Liberation Army in January 1948.
This decision stipulated the basic guidelines and principles to be followed by the troops after entering enemy-occupied areas, covering the following nine items: the basic tasks upon entering enemy-occupied areas; the combat objectives; policies and strategies concerning religious, superstitious, secret society, and gang organizations; the differentiated handling of Kuomintang reactionary organizations, corrupt officials, local tyrants, special agents, and ordinary Kuomintang personnel without criminal records; the protection of commerce and industry; the procurement of army supplies; new methods of political work in the army; military training during intervals between battles; and the purification of the ranks to ensure the implementation of Party policies.

〔16〕 On May 4, 1946, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the "Directive on the Land Question" (commonly known as the "May Fourth Directive"), firmly supporting the broad masses of peasants in their struggles—such as combating traitors, settling accounts, and reducing rent and interest rates—to obtain land from landlords and achieve "land to the tiller."
This directive marked a significant shift from the Party’s wartime policy of reducing rent and interest rates.
From July 17 to September 13, 1947, the Central Working Committee of the Communist Party of China convened the National Land Conference at Xibaipo, which summarized the experience of land reform after the issuance of the "May Fourth Directive" and formulated the "Outline Land Law of China."
This law affirmed the directive’s goal of satisfying peasants’ demands for land, corrected certain inconsistencies in the directive, and explicitly mandated the abolition of feudal and semi-feudal exploitative land systems, implementing the equal distribution of all land on a per capita basis.

--- Notes

In the report I delivered to the Central Committee meeting on December 25 last year [1], I stated the following: "For China's new-democratic revolution to triumph, it is impossible without a broadest possible united front encompassing the overwhelming majority of the nation's population."


Now, should we strive to win nationwide victory in the revolution? In the past, the Northern Expedition did not achieve victory; the Agrarian Revolutionary War did not achieve victory; the War of Resistance defeated Japanese imperialism, but it did not achieve nationwide revolutionary victory. Can we win this time? This question still exists; some people have not yet made up their minds to wipe out Chiang Kai-shek and win nationwide victory. But in our leading organs—the comrades attending this conference, our senior cadres, and the majority of Party members—this issue is already seen very clearly. In my report at the December conference last year, I said that it would require a protracted war, but now it appears that the time needed to defeat the enemy will not be very long. We must have this confidence. Before March of last year, when we said we could win, it was based on the experience of other liberated areas in resisting the attacks of the Kuomintang army—at that time, fighting had not yet broken out in our Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and Hu Zongnan [2] had not yet attacked northern Shaanxi. Now, the nationwide War of Liberation has been going on for eighteen months, and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region has been fighting for ten months, during which we have wiped out so many enemy troops. The point that we can fight and win has thus become even clearer. In the first year, we on average wiped out eight enemy regular brigades per month; in the first half of the second year, the record increased to an average of nine brigades per month. Calculating on the basis of at least eight brigades per month, we can wipe out ninety-six enemy regular brigades in a year. The first time these enemy units are smashed, they can be replenished; the second time, they can still be replenished; but after the third or fourth time, replenishment becomes difficult. If we keep wiping out the enemy like this, in three or four years it will be about finished, and the certainty of victory is very great. When you comrades return, you must clearly explain to those who did not attend the meeting why the certainty of victory this time is greater than in those three previous periods—because the present period differs from those three previous periods, the post-World War II situation differs from the pre-World War II situation, and the People's Liberation Army's circumstances also differ from those of the Red Army.


But the main point I want to address today is not this. What I want to talk about primarily today is why nationwide victory is impossible without a national united front in which the overwhelming majority of the nation's population participates. The experience of the Great Revolution period and the experience of all subsequent periods prove that for the Chinese revolution to triumph, it must implement a general program: namely, a revolution led by the proletariat, by the masses of the people, and directed against imperialism and feudalism. As for specific programs, the Manifesto of the People's Liberation Army set forth eight points [3], my report on December 25 set forth another eight points [4], and Deputy Commander Peng's report set forth nine points [5]. But before imperialism and feudal forces are overthrown and socialism arrives, the general program can only be this one—there is no second. Our united front is one led by the proletariat, of the masses of the people, and against imperialism and feudalism; our army is one led by the proletariat, of the masses of the people, and against imperialism and feudalism. What is meant by proletarian leadership is leadership through its vanguard, the Communist Party. The masses of the people are primarily composed of the peasants. When we speak of being able to win, we must base this on that foundation. Now many people are pinning their hopes on the Communist Party and on the People's Liberation Army. Recently I saw an article in an external publication, such as the magazine The Observer, which said: "If the two decades of rule had not been so corrupt and incompetent, why would so many people feel that the future is bleak and their hearts adrift, and instead pin their hopes on the Communist Party?" [6] Fu Sinian [7] visited Yan'an and scolded T.V. Soong [8]; in his article, he said: What a strange thing—how could there be capitalists who support the Communist Party? It was purely T.V. Soong who caused it. T.V. Soong is a representative of the feudal-comprador class. Last spring, someone wrote an article saying that now the people throughout the country can be said to be universally disaffected and disgusted with the current regime. In autumn, the same person wrote another article, saying that Chiang Kai-shek and the current Chinese government have already lost the people's hearts, like a shadow under the sun. When Vice Chairman Zhou [9] went to Shanghai, many capitalists invited him to dinner. When we lost Zhangjiakou, some capitalists shed tears—the Communist Party's Zhangjiakou actually became linked with the tears of capitalists. As for these capitalists, and also capitalists like those of the Dahua Cotton Mill in Xi'an, we place them within the middle bourgeoisie and want to cooperate with them. They have little or no connection with imperialism, are distinct from the four big families of Chiang, Soong, Kung, and Chen, and are oppressed by bureaucratic capital. Now, many in the middle strata cannot find a way out and are pinning their hopes on us. The civil war has gone on for a year and a half, and Chiang Kai-shek is completely isolated—something that never happened before the War of Resistance, during the War, or even for a period after victory in the War of Resistance.