Liu and Deng, Su, Chen and Tang, and Chen and Xie [1]—with copy to Xu, Teng, and Bo [2]:  (1) We have received Su, Chen, and Tang’s telegram of this morning [3].  The recent operations by the Su–Chen and Chen–Xie forces [4], which resulted in the annihilation of three enemy divisions and the encirclement of Queshan, have drawn six enemy brigades from the Dabie Mountains area westward and northward. Moreover, the 85th Division has been shifted to the Yingcheng region by Zhao’s column [5], while the 5th and 75th Divisions have likewise been moved near the Sha River.  This situation is conducive both to our operations in the Dabie Mountains and to the activities of our troops on either side of the Zheng–Xu Railway line.  However, since the 20th Division has not yet been destroyed, Liu and Deng have not yet had time to transition from dispersed operations to concentrated efforts to annihilate the enemy. Consequently, Bai Chongxi’s forces still retain sufficient strength to mount an offensive against Liu and Deng. If Su, Chen, and Tang were to promptly redeploy to the Zheng–Xu line at this juncture, while Chen and Xie prepared to advance toward Weinan, the difficulties in the Dabie Mountains would remain unresolved. Only through concerted action by the three commands—Liu and Deng, Su, Chen, and Tang, and Chen and Xie—to destroy several enemy brigades within one to two months could a path be opened for a decisive victory.  The establishment of a base area in the Dabie Mountains constitutes a crucial link in securing overall victory on the southern front.  (2) Therefore, we propose the following:  A. Within this month, Liu and Deng should begin concentrating substantial forces inside the enemy lines, aiming to seize opportunities to destroy two or three enemy brigades.  B. One of Liu and Deng’s columns shall continue to hold positions north of the Huai River to pin down the enemy, providing support as needed for operations by Su, Chen, and Tang, as well as by Chen and Xie.  C. The units of Su, Chen, and Tang that have already joined forces are to assemble between Queshan and Xuchang for several days of rest and reorganization, drawing the enemy into their vicinity to facilitate Liu and Deng’s operations and to prepare for an opportunity to destroy an enemy force along a single axis. Should favorable conditions for engagement not materialize in the south, they are to attack the enemy at Xuchang; if Xuchang proves difficult to take, they are to consider having Su, Chen, and Tang capture Nanyang, while Chen and Xie occupy Xiangfan [7], thereby drawing Bai Chongxi’s forces westward to aid Liu and Deng’s operations and to create an opening for the destruction of a portion of those western-moving enemy troops. At the same time, allowing the enemy to reoccupy Xuchang and the Queshan sector would serve future plans for Su, Chen, and Tang to return and destroy part of the enemy there. Once Chen and Xie have captured Xiangfan, they are to establish communication with Liu’s brigade [8], which has already secured Yunyang, thereby establishing a secure rear area along the middle reaches of the Han River to support subsequent operations toward Weinan (after the initial difficulties in the Dabie Mountains have been alleviated) and to assist Wang’s and Zhao’s columns [9] in opening up the Tongbai and Jianghan regions. Should our forces adopt this course of action, it may also disperse a portion of Bai Chongxi’s forces to deploy around Yichang.  D. The Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Columns, after capturing Heze, are to rest for a few days before launching a raiding campaign along the Xuzhou–Bengbu section. Over the next two months, these three columns are to operate independently in the areas east and west of Xuzhou–Bengbu and north and south of Zheng–Xu, without expecting any main-force reinforcements to move eastward.  (3) What are your views on the above deployment plan? Please consider and reply by telegram.  Issued by the Military Commission in Zidong, based on Mao Zedong’s manuscript.

Notes  [1] Liu refers to Liu Bocheng (1892–1986), from Kaixian County, Sichuan Province, then commander of the Jin–Hebei–Lu–Yu Field Army. Deng refers to Deng Xiaoping, born in 1904 in Guang’an, Sichuan Province, then political commissar of the Jin–Hebei–Lu–Yu Field Army. Su refers to Su Yu (1907–1984), from Huitong County, Hunan Province, then deputy commander of the East China Field Army. Chen refers to Chen Shiju (1909–1995), from Jingmen, Hubei Province, then chief of staff of the East China Field Army. Tang refers to Tang Liang (1910–1986), from Liuyang, Hunan Province, then director of the Political Department of the East China Field Army. Chen refers to Chen Geng (1903–1961), from Xiangxiang County, Hunan Province, then secretary of the leading party group of the Chen–Xie Group under the Jin–Hebei–Lu–Yu Field Army. Xie refers to Xie Fuzhi (1909–1972), from Huang’an (now Hong’an) County, Hubei Province, then deputy secretary of the leading party group of the Chen–Xie Group under the Jin–Hebei–Lu–Yu Field Army.

[2] Xu refers to Xu Xiangqian (1901–1990), from Wutai County, Shanxi Province, then first deputy commander of the Jin–Hebei–Lu–Yu Military Region. Teng refers to Teng Daiyuan (1904–1974), from Mayang County, Hunan Province, then second deputy commander of the Jin–Hebei–Lu–Yu Military Region. Bo refers to Bo Yibo, born in 1908 in Dingxing County, Shanxi Province, then first deputy political commissar of the Jin–Hebei–Lu–Yu Military Region.

[3] Refers to the January 1, 1948, morning telegram submitted by Su Yu, Chen Shiju, and Tang Liang to the Central Military Commission of the CPC, requesting instructions regarding coordination with the Dabie Mountains campaign. The telegram proposed three courses of action: First, the Su–Chen forces, the Chen–Xie forces, and one of Liu and Deng’s columns would advance south along the Pinghan Railway, threatening Wuhan in order to draw enemy forces away. Second, the three commands would operate separately: Chen and Xie would move west and enter the Weinan area by the end of the month; one of Liu and Deng’s columns would remain east of the Huai River, operating in the areas east of Zhengyang and Xixian counties; and the four columns under Su and Chen would shift north of the Sha River and east of Xuchang and Zhengzhou, joining with the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Columns to launch a full-scale eastward assault aimed at breaking through the Jinpu Railway. Third, Chen and Xie would continue to operate west of Queshan, keeping enemy forces occupied. The telegram concluded that implementing the second option would be most appropriate.

[4] Refers to the East China Field Army, under the command of Su Yu, and the Chen–Xie Group of the Jin–Hebei–Lu–Yu Field Army, led by Chen Geng.

[5] Zhao’s column refers to the Twelfth Column of the Jin–Hebei–Lu–Yu Field Army, commanded by Zhao Jimei.

[6] Bai Chongxi (1893–1966), from Guilin, Guangxi Province, was then Minister of National Defense of the Kuomintang government and commander of the Ministry of National Defense’s Jiujiang Command Post.

[7] Refers to Xiangyang and Fancheng in Hubei Province, which were merged in 1950 to form Xiangfan City.

[8] Liu’s brigade refers to the Twelfth Brigade of the Fourth Column of the Jin–Hebei–Lu–Yu Field Army, commanded by Liu Jinxuan.

[9] Wang’s and Zhao’s two columns refer respectively to the Tenth Column and the Twelfth Column of the Jin–Hebei–Lu–Yu Field Army, under the command of Wang Hongkun and Zhao Jimei.