(December 25, 1947)
This was a report by Mao Zedong at a meeting convened by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China from December 25 to 28, 1947, at Yangjiagou, Mizhi County, northern Shaanxi. In addition to the members and alternate members of the Central Committee who were able to attend at the time, responsible comrades from the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the Shanxi-Suiyuan Border Region also participated. The meeting discussed and adopted this report by Mao Zedong and his "Some Estimates on the Current International Situation" (see p. 1184 of this volume). Regarding Mao Zedong's report, the meeting's resolution stated: "This report is a programmatic document covering political, military, and economic aspects for the entire period of overthrowing the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary ruling clique and establishing a new-democratic China. The whole Party and the whole army should link this document with the various documents issued on the Double Tenth Festival of 1947 (referring to the 'Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army,' 'Slogans of the Chinese People's Liberation Army,' 'Order of the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army on the Reissue of the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention,' 'Outline Land Law of China,' and 'Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Promulgation of the Outline Land Law of China,' all published on October 10, 1947), conduct in-depth education, and strictly implement them in practice. Wherever the implementation of policies in various localities does not conform to the principles set forth in the report, corrections should be made immediately." Other important decisions of the meeting included: (1) The Chinese people's revolutionary war should strive to develop uninterruptedly to complete victory, and the enemy should not be allowed to use delaying tactics (peace negotiations) to gain time for rest and reorganization before attacking the people again. (2) The time is not yet ripe for organizing a revolutionary central government; we must wait until our army has won greater victories before considering this issue, and the promulgation of a constitution is a matter for the future. The meeting also discussed in detail the tendencies within the Party at that time and several specific policy issues in the land reform and mass movements. The results of these discussions were later written by Mao Zedong in the article "On Some Important Questions of the Party's Current Policy" (see p. 1267 of this volume). From this piece onward, up to "A Circular on the Situation" dated March 20, 1948, all were written at Yangjiagou, Mizhi County, northern Shaanxi.

I
The Chinese people's revolutionary war has now reached a turning point. That is, the Chinese People's Liberation Army has beaten back the offensive of the several million reactionary troops of Chiang Kai-shek, the running dog of the United States, and has itself gone over to the offensive. As early as the first year of this war, from July 1946 to June 1947, the People's Liberation Army had already beaten back Chiang Kai-shek's offensive on several battlefields and forced him into a defensive position. Then, in the first quarter of the second year of the war, from July to September 1947, the People's Liberation Army went over to a nationwide offensive, wrecking Chiang Kai-shek's counterrevolutionary plan of continuing to carry the war into the Liberated Areas and completely destroying them. Now the war is no longer being fought mainly in the Liberated Areas but in the areas ruled by the Kuomintang, and the main forces of the People's Liberation Army have carried the fight into the Kuomintang-ruled areas.¹ The Chinese People's Liberation Army has turned the counterrevolutionary wheel of U.S. imperialism and its running dog, the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang, onto the road to destruction on this land of China, and has pushed forward its own revolutionary wheel onto the road to victory. This is a turning point in history. It is the turning point from growth to extinction of Chiang Kai-shek's twenty-year counterrevolutionary rule. It is the turning point from growth to extinction of the more than one hundred years of imperialist rule in China. This is a great event. This event is great because it has occurred in a country with a population of 475 million, and once it occurs, it will inevitably lead to nationwide victory. This event is also great because it has occurred in the East of the world, where over one billion people (half of humanity) suffer under imperialist oppression. The shift of the Chinese people's war of liberation from defense to offense cannot but cause rejoicing and inspiration among these oppressed nations. At the same time, it is also a form of assistance to the oppressed peoples of Europe and the Americas who are now struggling.

II
From the very day Chiang Kai-shek launched his counterrevolutionary war, we have said that we not only must defeat him but can defeat him. We must defeat Chiang Kai-shek because the war he launched is a counterrevolutionary war, directed by U.S. imperialism, against China's national independence and the liberation of the Chinese people. After the end of World War II and the defeat of Japanese imperialism, the task of the Chinese people is to carry out new-democratic reforms politically, economically, and culturally, achieve national unity and independence, and transform China from an agricultural into an industrial country. Yet precisely at this time, after the victorious conclusion of the anti-fascist Second World War, U.S. imperialism and its running dogs in various countries replaced German and Japanese imperialism and their running dogs, forming a reactionary camp against the Soviet Union, against the people's democracies of Europe, against the workers' movements in the capitalist countries, against the national movements in the colonies and semi-colonies, and against the liberation of the Chinese people. At such a time, the Chinese reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek, exactly like Wang Jingwei, the running dog of Japanese imperialism, acted as running dogs for U.S. imperialism, sold out China to the United States, launched a war against the Chinese people, and obstructed the advance of the cause of the Chinese people's liberation. At such a time, if we had shown weakness or made concessions, if we had not dared to rise resolutely and oppose counterrevolutionary war with revolutionary war, China would have become a dark world, and the future of our nation would have been ruined. The Communist Party of China led the Chinese People's Liberation Army in resolutely waging a patriotic, just, and revolutionary war against Chiang Kai-shek's offensive. Basing itself on the science of Marxism-Leninism, the Communist Party of China soberly assessed the international and domestic situation and knew that the offensives of all domestic and foreign reactionaries not only must be defeated but can be defeated. When dark clouds appeared in the sky, we pointed out that this was only a temporary phenomenon, that the darkness would soon pass and the dawn was ahead. When the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang launched the nationwide counterrevolutionary war in July 1946, they thought it would take only three to six months to defeat the People's Liberation Army. They believed they had over two million regular troops, over one million irregulars, and over one million in rear-area military organs and units, making a total military strength of over four million; they had already used the time to complete their offensive preparations; they had regained control of the big cities; they had a population of over 300 million; they had taken over all the equipment of the one-million-strong Japanese invading army in China; and they had received enormous military and financial aid from the U.S. government. They also believed that the Chinese People's Liberation Army was already exhausted from eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan and was far inferior to the Kuomintang army in numbers and equipment; that the Chinese Liberated Areas had a population of only a little over 100 million, in most of which the reactionary feudal forces had not yet been cleaned out and the land reform was not yet universal or thorough—in other words, the rear of the People's Liberation Army was not yet consolidated. Proceeding from such estimates, the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang, disregarding the Chinese people's desire for peace, finally tore up the truce agreement between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party signed in January 1946² and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference of all parties,³ and launched an adventurist war. At that time, we said that Chiang Kai-shek's military superiority was only a temporary phenomenon, a factor that could only play a temporary role; that the aid of U.S. imperialism was also only a factor that could play a temporary role; while the anti-popular nature of Chiang Kai-shek's war and the support or opposition of the people were factors that would play a constant role; and in this respect, the People's Liberation Army held the advantage. The patriotic, just, and revolutionary nature of the war waged by the People's Liberation Army was bound to win the support of the people throughout the country. This was the political basis for defeating Chiang Kai-shek. The experience of eighteen months of war has fully proved our thesis.

III
In seventeen months of fighting (from July 1946 to November 1947, with December not yet counted), a total of 1.69 million of Chiang Kai-shek's regular and irregular troops were killed, wounded, or captured, of which 640,000 were killed or wounded and 1.05 million were captured. Thus, our army beat back Chiang Kai-shek's offensive, preserved the basic areas of the Liberated Areas, and itself went over to the offensive. We were able to do this because, militarily speaking, we carried out correct strategic principles. Our military principles are: (1) Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first; attack concentrated, strong enemy forces later. (2) Take small and medium-sized cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later. (3) Make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective. Holding or seizing a city or place is the result of wiping out the enemy's effective strength, and often a city or place can be finally held or seized only after it has changed hands several times. (4) In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four, and sometimes even five or six times the enemy's strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly, and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing crushing blows to the enemy, that is, concentrate all our strength to strike at the enemy's front and one or both of his flanks, with the aim of wiping out one part and routing another so that our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy forces. Strive to avoid battles of attrition in which we lose more than we gain or only break even. In this way, although we are inferior as a whole (in terms of numbers), we are absolutely superior in every part and in every specific campaign, and this ensures victory in the campaign. As time goes on, we shall become superior as a whole and eventually wipe out all the enemy. (5) Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle, make every effort to ensure victory in the given conditions as between the enemy and ourselves. (6) Give full play to our style of fighting—courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting several battles in quick succession without rest). (7) Strive to wipe out the enemy when he is on the move. At the same time, pay attention to the tactics of positional attack and capture enemy strongholds and cities. (8) With regard to attacking cities, resolutely seize all enemy strongholds and cities that are weakly defended. Seize at opportune moments all enemy strongholds and cities that are defended with moderate strength, provided circumstances permit. Wait until conditions are ripe and then seize all enemy strongholds and cities that are strongly defended. (9) Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy. The main source of our army's manpower and materiel is at the front. (10) Make good use of the intervals between campaigns to rest, train, and consolidate our troops. Periods of rest, training, and consolidation should in general not be too long, and the enemy should as far as possible be given no breathing space. These are the main methods by which the People's Liberation Army has defeated Chiang Kai-shek. They have been forged in the course of the People's Liberation Army's long experience in fighting against domestic and foreign enemies and are entirely suited to our present situation.⁴ The Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang and the U.S. imperialist military personnel in China are well acquainted with these military methods of ours. Chiang Kai-shek has repeatedly assembled his generals and field officers for training and distributed our military writings and documents captured in the war for them to study, in an attempt to find countermeasures. U.S. military personnel have recommended to Chiang Kai-shek one kind of strategy and tactic after another for destroying the People's Liberation Army; they have trained Chiang Kai-shek's troops and supplied them with military equipment. But none of these efforts can save the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang from defeat, because our strategy and tactics are based on a people's war, and no army opposed to the people can use them. On the basis of a people's war, and on the principles of unity between the army and the people, unity between commanders and fighters, and the disintegration of the enemy forces, the People's Liberation Army has built up its own powerful revolutionary political work, which is an important factor in our victory over the enemy. When we avoided the enemy's deadly blows, shifted our forces, and sought to wipe out the enemy on the move, and on our own initiative abandoned many cities, our enemies were jubilant. They took this to be their victory and our defeat. They were momentarily dizzy with this so-called victory. On the very afternoon Zhangjiakou was occupied, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the convening of his reactionary National Assembly,⁵ as if his reactionary rule were henceforth as secure as Mount Tai. The U.S. imperialists also danced with joy, as if their wild plan to turn China into a U.S. colony could now be carried out without hindrance. But as time went on, the tone of Chiang Kai-shek and his U.S. masters changed. Now all enemies at home and abroad are gripped by pessimism. They sigh and groan, cry out about a crisis, and not a trace of joy can be seen. In the course of eighteen months, most of Chiang Kai-shek's senior frontline commanders have been dismissed because of their defeats. They include Liu Zhi in Zhengzhou, Xue Yue in Xuzhou, Wu Qiwei in northern Jiangsu, Tang Enbo in southern Shandong, Wang Zhonglian in northern Henan, Du Yuming and Xiong Shihui in Shenyang, and Sun Lianzhong in Beiping. Chen Cheng, Chiang Kai-shek's chief of general staff, who bore overall command responsibility for all operations, was also relieved of this command authority and demoted to commander of a single battlefield in the Northeast.⁶ And during the period when Chiang Kai-shek himself took over overall command in place of Chen Cheng, the situation arose in which Chiang's army shifted from offense to defense and the People's Liberation Army shifted from defense to offense. The Chiang Kai-shek reactionary clique and its U.S. masters should now realize their own mistakes. They regarded all the efforts the Communist Party of China made over a long period after Japan's surrender, representing the wishes of the Chinese people and striving for peace and opposing civil war, as a sign of cowardice and weakness. They overestimated their own strength, underestimated the strength of the revolution, and adventurously launched the war, thus falling into the trap they themselves had laid. Our enemies' strategic calculations have been completely defeated.

IV
Now, compared with eighteen months ago, the rear of the People's Liberation Army is much more consolidated. This is the result of our Party's resolute stand on the side of the peasants in carrying out the land reform. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, in order to form an anti-Japanese united front with the Kuomintang and unite with all those who could still oppose Japanese imperialism at that time, our Party voluntarily changed its pre-war policy of confiscating the land of the landlords and distributing it to the peasants to a policy of reducing rent and interest rates. This was absolutely necessary. After Japan's surrender, the peasants urgently demanded land, and we promptly decided to change our land policy, shifting from reducing rent and interest rates to confiscating the land of the landlord class and distributing it to the peasants. The directive issued by the Central Committee of our Party on May 4, 1946, marked this change. In September 1947, our Party convened a national land conference and formulated the Outline Land Law of China,⁷ which was immediately put into effect everywhere. This step not only affirmed the policy of the "May Fourth Directive" of the previous year but also made clear corrections to certain shortcomings in that directive. The Outline Land Law of China stipulates that, under the principle of abolishing the land system of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation and implementing the land system of land to the tiller, land shall be distributed equally on a per capita basis.⁸ This is a method for the most thorough elimination of the feudal system and is entirely suited to the demands of the broad masses of Chinese peasants. In order to carry out the land reform resolutely and thoroughly, it is necessary not only to organize in the villages the broadest mass-based peasant associations, including farm laborers, poor peasants, and middle peasants, and their elected committees, but also first to organize poor peasant leagues, including poor peasants and farm laborers, and their elected committees, as the lawful organs for carrying out the land reform, with the poor peasant leagues serving as the leading backbone of all rural struggles. Our policy is to rely on the poor peasants, firmly unite with the middle peasants, and eliminate the feudal and semi-feudal system of exploitation of the landlord class and the old-type rich peasants. The land and property that landlords and rich peasants receive should not exceed those of the peasant masses. However, the erroneous ultra-left policy once pursued between 1931 and 1934, under which "landlords were given no land and rich peasants were given only poor land," should not be repeated. Although the proportion of landlords and rich peasants in the rural population varies from place to place, generally speaking, they account for only about 8 percent (calculated on a household basis), while the land they hold, generally speaking, amounts to 70 to 80 percent of all the land. Therefore, the targets of our land reform are very few in number, while the number of people (households) in the villages who can and should participate in the land reform united front is as high as about 90 percent or more. Here two basic principles must be observed: first, the demands of the poor peasants and farm laborers must be satisfied; this is the most fundamental task of the land reform; second, the middle peasants must be resolutely united with, and their interests must not be harmed. As long as we grasp these two basic principles, our land reform tasks can certainly be accomplished victoriously. The reason why the surplus land and part of the property of the old-type rich peasants should be distributed according to the principle of equal distribution is that China's rich peasants generally bear a heavy character of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation; most of them also rent out land and practice usury, and the conditions of their hired labor are also semi-feudal.⁹ Another reason is that they hold relatively large amounts of land of relatively good quality,¹⁰ and if equal distribution is not carried out, the demands of the poor peasants and farm laborers cannot be satisfied. However, according to the provisions of the Outline Land Law, rich peasants should generally be treated differently from landlords. In the land reform, the middle peasants express approval of equal distribution because it does not harm their interests. Under equal distribution, part of the middle peasants' land remains unchanged, part is increased, and only a section of the well-to-do middle peasants have a small amount of surplus land, which they are also willing to contribute for equal distribution because after equal distribution their land tax burden is reduced. Nevertheless, in carrying out equal distribution of land in various places, attention must still be paid to the opinions of the middle peasants, and if the middle peasants do not agree, concessions should be made to them. In confiscating and distributing the land and property of the feudal class, attention should be paid to the needs of certain middle peasants. In determining class status, care must be taken not to mistakenly classify persons who are originally middle peasants into the rich peasant category. Activists from among the middle peasants must be drawn into the work of the peasant association committees and the government. The principles of fairness and reasonableness must be adopted with regard to the land tax and the burdens of supporting the war. These are the specific policies our Party must carry out in implementing the strategic task of firmly uniting with the middle peasants. The whole Party must understand that the thorough reform of the land system is a basic task of the Chinese revolution at the present stage. If we can solve the land problem universally and thoroughly, we will have obtained the most fundamental condition for defeating all our enemies.

V
In order to carry out the land reform resolutely and thoroughly and consolidate the rear of the People's Liberation Army, the Party's ranks must be rectified. The rectification movement¹¹ within our Party during the War of Resistance Against Japan generally achieved results. These results consisted mainly in enabling our leading organs and the broad ranks of cadres and Party members to further grasp the basic orientation of integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. In this respect, our Party has made great progress compared with the several historical periods before the War of Resistance. However, the problems of impurity in composition and style of work existing in the Party's local organizations, especially in its rural grassroots organizations, have not been resolved. In the eleven years from 1937 to 1947, our Party's membership grew from tens of thousands to 2.7 million, an enormous leap forward. This has made our Party a Party unprecedentedly powerful in Chinese history. This has enabled us to defeat Japanese imperialism, beat back Chiang Kai-shek's offensive, and lead the Liberated Areas with a population of over 100 million and the People's Liberation Army of two million. But shortcomings have also followed. That is, many landlord elements, rich peasant elements, and riffraff elements took the opportunity to sneak into our Party. In the villages, they have seized control of many Party, government, and mass organizations, acted tyrannically, oppressed the people, distorted the Party's policies, alienated these organizations from the masses, and prevented the land reform from being carried out thoroughly. This grave situation has placed before us the task of rectifying the Party's ranks. If this task is not resolved, we cannot advance in the villages. The Party's national land conference thoroughly discussed this issue and laid down appropriate steps and methods. These steps and methods are now being resolutely implemented everywhere together with the decision on equal distribution of land. The first and foremost among them is to unfold criticism and self-criticism within the Party and thoroughly expose the erroneous ideas and grave phenomena in various local organizations that deviate from the Party's line. All comrades in the Party must understand that resolving this problem of impurity within the Party, rectifying the Party's ranks, and enabling the Party to stand completely on the same side as the broadest laboring masses and lead them forward is a decisive link in solving the land problem and supporting the protracted war.

VI
Confiscate the land of the feudal class and turn it over to the peasants. Confiscate the monopoly capital headed by Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung, and Chen Lifu and turn it over to the new-democratic state. Protect the national industry and commerce. These are the three major economic programs of the new-democratic revolution. In their twenty years in power, the four big families of Chiang, Soong, Kung, and Chen have amassed enormous fortunes valued at ten to twenty billion U.S. dollars and monopolized the economic lifelines of the entire country. This monopoly capital, combined with state political power, has become state monopoly capitalism. This monopoly capitalism, closely linked with foreign imperialism, the domestic landlord class, and the old-type rich peasants, has become comprador, feudal, state monopoly capitalism. This is the economic base of Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary regime. This state monopoly capitalism not only oppresses the workers and peasants but also oppresses the urban petty bourgeoisie and harms the middle bourgeoisie. This state monopoly capitalism reached its peak during the War of Resistance Against Japan and after Japan's surrender, and it has prepared ample material conditions for the new-democratic revolution. This capital is commonly known in China as bureaucrat capital. This bourgeoisie is called the bureaucrat bourgeoisie, that is, the big bourgeoisie of China. The tasks of the new-democratic revolution, apart from abolishing the imperialist privileges in China, are, domestically, to eliminate the exploitation and oppression of the landlord class and the bureaucrat bourgeoisie (the big bourgeoisie), change the comprador, feudal relations of production, and liberate the fettered productive forces. The upper petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie, though also part of the bourgeoisie, oppressed and harmed by these classes and their state power, can participate in the new-democratic revolution or remain neutral. They have no ties, or relatively few ties, with imperialism and are the genuine national bourgeoisie. Wherever the power of the new-democratic state reaches, these classes must be resolutely and unequivocally protected. Among the upper petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie in the areas ruled by Chiang Kai-shek, there is a small number of people, the right-wing elements of these classes, who harbor reactionary political tendencies. They spread illusions for U.S. imperialism and the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary clique and oppose the people's democratic revolution. When their reactionary tendencies can still influence the masses, we should expose them to the masses who are under their influence, strike at their political influence among the masses, and liberate the masses from their influence. However, political blows and economic elimination are two different things; if we confuse the two, we will make mistakes. The targets of elimination in the new-democratic revolution are only feudalism and monopoly capitalism, only the landlord class and the bureaucrat bourgeoisie (the big bourgeoisie), and not capitalism in general, not the upper petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie. Because of the backwardness of China's economy, the capitalist economy represented by the broad upper petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie must be allowed to exist for a long period even after the victory of the revolution nationwide; moreover, in accordance with the division of labor in the national economy, all those parts of it beneficial to the national economy must be allowed to develop; they are still an indispensable part of the entire national economy. The upper petty bourgeoisie referred to here are small-scale industrialists and merchants who employ workers or shop assistants. In addition, there are the broad independent small industrialists and merchants who do not employ workers or shop assistants; needless to say, they should be resolutely protected. After the victory of the revolution nationwide, since the new-democratic state will have in its hands the huge state enterprises taken over from the bureaucrat bourgeoisie and controlling the economic lifelines of the entire country, and since there will be an agricultural economy liberated from the feudal system, which, though still basically scattered and individual for a fairly long time, can later be gradually guided toward the development of cooperatives, under these conditions the existence and development of these small and middle capitalist elements will pose no danger. The same applies to the new rich peasant economy that will inevitably emerge in the villages after the land reform. The erroneous ultra-left policies toward the economic elements of the upper petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie, such as those our Party committed between 1931 and 1934 (excessively high labor conditions, excessively high income tax rates, infringement on industrialists and merchants during the land reform, and the pursuit not of developing production, prospering the economy, giving consideration to both public and private interests, and benefiting both labor and capital, but of the narrow, one-sided so-called welfare of the laborers), must absolutely not be repeated. If these mistakes are repeated, they will inevitably harm the interests of the laboring masses and the new-democratic state. One provision of the Outline Land Law of China states: "The property and lawful businesses of industrialists and merchants shall be protected from infringement." The industrialists and merchants referred to here include all independent small industrialists and merchants and all small and middle capitalist elements. To sum up, the economic composition of New China will be: (1) the state-owned economy, which is the leading element; (2) the agricultural economy, which is gradually developing from individual to collective orientation; (3) the economy of the independent small industrialists and merchants and the small and middle private capital economy. These constitute the entire national economy of new democracy. And the guiding principle for the new-democratic national economy must closely follow the general objective of developing production, prospering the economy, giving consideration to both public and private interests, and benefiting both labor and capital. All principles, policies, and methods that depart from this general objective are erroneous.

VII
In October 1947, the Chinese People's Liberation Army issued a manifesto stating: "Unite with the workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and merchants, all oppressed classes, all people's organizations, all democratic parties and groups, all minority nationalities, overseas Chinese everywhere, and other patriotic elements to form a national united front, overthrow the dictatorial government of Chiang Kai-shek, and establish a democratic coalition government." This is the most basic political program of the People's Liberation Army and also of the Communist Party of China. On the surface, it may seem that our revolutionary national united front has shrunk compared with the period of the War of Resistance. But in reality, it is only in the present period, only after Chiang Kai-shek sold out the national interests to U.S. imperialism and launched the nationwide anti-popular civil war, only after the crimes of U.S. imperialism and the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary ruling clique have been thoroughly exposed before the Chinese people, that our national united front has truly expanded. During the War of Resistance, Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang had not yet completely lost their prestige among the Chinese people; they still had considerable deceptive influence. Now it is different; all their deceptions have been exposed by their own actions; they have no mass following left; they are completely isolated. In contrast to the Kuomintang, the Communist Party of China has won the trust of the broadest masses of the people not only in the Liberated Areas but also in the Kuomintang-ruled areas and the big cities under Kuomintang control. If in 1946 there were still some people among the intellectuals of the upper petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie under Chiang Kai-shek's rule who harbored illusions about a so-called third road,¹² now such illusions have gone bankrupt. Because our Party has adopted a thorough land policy, it has won the heartfelt support of the peasant masses, which is far broader than during the War of Resistance. Because of the aggression of U.S. imperialism, the oppression of Chiang Kai-shek, and our Party's correct policy of resolutely protecting the interests of the masses, our Party has won the sympathy of the broad masses of the working class, the peasant class, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the middle bourgeoisie in the areas ruled by Chiang Kai-shek. These masses, driven by hunger, political oppression, and the fact that Chiang Kai-shek's anti-popular civil war has deprived the people of all means of livelihood, have continuously risen in struggle against U.S. imperialism and the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary government. Their basic slogans are: oppose hunger, oppose persecution, oppose civil war, and oppose U.S. interference in China's internal affairs. Before the War of Resistance, during the War of Resistance, and even for a period after Japan's surrender, their level of consciousness had never reached such a height. Therefore, we say that our new-democratic revolutionary united front is now broader than at any time in the past and is also more consolidated than at any time in the past. This is linked not only with our land policy and urban policy but also with the victories of the People's Liberation Army, with the shift of Chiang Kai-shek from offense to defense and the shift of the People's Liberation Army from defense to offense, and with the general political situation in which the Chinese revolution has entered a new period of upsurge. Now people see that the doom of Chiang Kai-shek's rule is inevitable and have placed their hopes on the Communist Party of China and the People's Liberation Army. This is a very natural logic. For the Chinese new-democratic revolution to triumph, it is impossible without the broadest united front embracing the overwhelming majority of the entire nation. Moreover, this united front must be under the firm leadership of the Communist Party of China. Without the firm leadership of the Communist Party of China, no revolutionary united front can triumph. In 1927, when the Northern Expedition reached its climax, the capitulationists in the leading organs of our Party voluntarily relinquished leadership over the peasant masses, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the middle bourgeoisie, and especially leadership over the armed forces, causing that revolution to fail. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, our Party opposed ideas similar to such capitulationism, that is, making concessions to the Kuomintang's anti-popular policies, trusting the Kuomintang more than the masses of the people, not daring to boldly unleash mass struggles, not daring to expand the Liberated Areas and the people's armed forces in the Japanese-occupied areas, and handing over the leadership of the War of Resistance to the Kuomintang. Our Party waged a resolute struggle against such weak, impotent, decadent ideas that violated the principles of Marxism-Leninism, resolutely carried out the political line of "developing the progressive forces, winning over the middle forces, and isolating the die-hard forces," and resolutely expanded the Liberated Areas and the People's Liberation Army. In this way, it not only ensured that our Party could defeat Japanese imperialism during the period of Japanese imperialist aggression but also ensured that after Japan's surrender, during the period when Chiang Kai-shek launched his counterrevolutionary war, our Party could smoothly and without loss shift to the track of opposing Chiang Kai-shek's counterrevolutionary war with a people's revolutionary war and win great victories in a short period. All comrades in the Party must bear these historical lessons firmly in mind.

VIII
When the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary clique launched the nationwide anti-popular civil war in 1946, the reason they dared to take this risk was that they relied not only on their own superior military strength but mainly on what they considered to be the "extraordinarily powerful," "unrivaled in the world" U.S. imperialism, which held the atomic bomb in its hands. On the one hand, they thought U.S. imperialism could supply them with military and financial needs like flowing water; on the other hand, they wildly imagined the so-called "inevitable war between the United States and the Soviet Union" and the so-called "inevitable outbreak of a third world war." This dependence on U.S. imperialism is a common characteristic of the reactionary forces of all countries in the world since the end of World War II. It reflects the severity of the blow dealt to world capitalism by World War II, the weakness of the reactionary forces of various countries, their psychological panic and loss of confidence, and the strength of the revolutionary forces throughout the world, which makes the reactionaries of various countries feel that they have no way out except to rely on U.S. imperialist aid. But in reality, is U.S. imperialism after World War II really as powerful as Chiang Kai-shek and the reactionaries of various countries imagine? Can it really supply Chiang Kai-shek and the reactionaries of various countries like flowing water? Not so. The economic strength that U.S. imperialism built up during World War II is now confronted with unstable and increasingly shrinking domestic and international markets. Further shrinkage of these markets will lead to the outbreak of an economic crisis. The U.S. war boom was only a temporary phenomenon. Its strength is only superficial and temporary. Irreconcilable contradictions at home and abroad are like a volcano menacing U.S. imperialism every day; U.S. imperialism is sitting on this volcano. This situation has driven the U.S. imperialists to draw up a plan for enslaving the world, to run amok like wild beasts in Europe, Asia, and other parts of the world, to assemble the reactionary forces of various countries—the dregs rejected by the people—to form an imperialist and anti-democratic camp, to oppose all democratic forces headed by the Soviet Union, to prepare for war, and to attempt, in the distant future, someday to launch a third world war and defeat the democratic forces. This is a wild plan. The democratic forces of the whole world must defeat this plan, and they are fully capable of doing so. The strength of the world anti-imperialist camp has surpassed that of the imperialist camp. The advantage is on our side, not on the side of the enemy. The anti-imperialist camp headed by the Soviet Union has already taken shape. The socialist Soviet Union, which is free from crises, is developing upward, and is cherished by the broad masses of the people throughout the world, now already surpasses in strength the imperialist United States, which is seriously menaced by crises, is declining downward, and is opposed by the broad masses of the people throughout the world. The people's democracies of Europe are consolidating themselves