**Part I: Minutes of the December Meeting and Chairman Mao’s Directives**

After Japan’s surrender, especially in the year 1947, a fundamental change occurred. One could say it was a great event. The reason lies in the fundamental transformation of the situation between the enemy and ourselves. Fundamental shifts took place in politics, the economy, land reform, and Party consolidation. These changes formed the hallmark of this great event. The political change was that Chiang Kai-shek became isolated, and we won support from all strata across the nation—a phenomenon unseen in the past. Economically, Chiang Kai-shek fell into a vortex of crisis from which he could not extricate himself. We too had difficulties, but we could overcome them. Militarily, the People’s Liberation Army won great victories—this is the primary hallmark. We had land reform; Chiang Kai-shek did not. We had solutions, although different conditions emerged after our land reform. In terms of Party consolidation, we discovered impurities within the Party, and found ideological tendencies and lines reflecting those of landlords and rich peasants. We carried out a rectification ideologically and organizationally. These five factors constituted the main reasons for the change, fundamentally reversing the situation between the enemy and ourselves. This fundamental change manifested itself in every aspect in 1947.

Politically: The orientation of people’s hearts has completely changed; everyone turns toward us. The hopes of the people nationwide are pinned on the Communist Party, while they harbor deep-seated hatred for Chiang Kai-shek. Isolating Chiang Kai-shek was a long-term struggle, a problem that remained unsolved for a long time, but it is now solved. During the civil war period, we were isolated; we only had the workers and peasants in the Soviet areas and were detached from all other social strata. At that time, Chiang Kai-shek’s base was relatively large. During the civil war period, this problem was not resolved, hence the civil war failed. During the War of Resistance against Japan, we also strove to solve this problem. The situation changed somewhat, and our friends increased, because we adopted appropriate policies. By resolutely fighting Japan, implementing rent and interest reduction, firmly holding the banner of resistance against Japan, neutralizing the small and medium landlords, improving relations with the landlords, promoting democracy, we won over the bourgeoisie and other political parties. Our military policy was one of dispersed guerrilla warfare, appropriately countering friction, and guarding against adventurism. The various policies during the War of Resistance period were generally correct. To oppose the policies of that period, to negate everything, calling this opportunism and that opportunism—in the late period of the Great Revolution, mistakes due to opportunism led to defeat. During the War of Resistance period, the general policies were correct: we isolated Chiang Kai-shek and gained friends. Wang Ming’s line did not gain a dominant position; we avoided the Rightism of the Great Revolution period and the “Leftism” of the civil war period, allowing the Party to gain a leading position. We must carefully study the policies of the War of Resistance period; we cannot crudely say they were wrong. Chiang Kai-shek’s main errors were passive resistance, sitting on the mountain to watch the tigers fight, not having his troops fight battles, thus causing him to lose his status as a national leader. The second was economic monopolization, and politically, engaging in secret police and one-party dictatorship. These three mistakes cost him the Guomindang’s state power. People’s hearts turned toward us, resolving the problem of isolating Chiang Kai-shek. This is mainly due to the appropriateness of our policies. This was the fundamental cause as it stood in 1947.

Militarily: Since we shifted to the strategic offensive in July last year, Chiang Kai-shek shifted to a defensive position, whereupon the military situation was completely transformed. For ten or twenty years, we were long on the defensive, in the position of being “encircled and suppressed”; we never carried out punitive expeditions against the enemy, nor attacked the enemy. During the War of Resistance period, we were still in a position of dispersed defense. In July last year (1947), for the first time in our history, we shifted to the offensive. This is a revolutionary offensive; do not call it “counter-offensive.” “Counter-offensive” carries a flavor of defense and cannot fully capture the content of this situation. In the early phase, the war was defensive in nature; our policy then was to delay the civil war. Now we want to annihilate Chiang Kai-shek; it is no longer defensive in nature. Since Chiang Kai-shek convened the bogus National Assembly and enacted a bogus constitution, he increasingly lost popular support. At the same time, the nationwide implementation of a revolutionary offensive—not self-defensive defense—has smashed Chiang Kai-shek’s attacks, creating a Great Revolution. Calling it “offensive” better suits its content. It is now impossible for Chiang Kai-shek, no matter what, to return to the past situation. The yellow crane once gone, never returns. Henceforth, the issue is how we advance into Jiangnan, Sichuan, and the two Guangdong provinces; Chiang Kai-shek can no longer think of crossing the Yellow River or the Longhai Railway.

Since we switched to the offensive last July, the United States and Chiang Kai-shek discussed it several times. The Americans were deeply anxious, with some in Washington even advocating abandoning the area north of the 40th parallel north (from Andong in the east, passing along the Beiping-Liaoning, Beiping-Suiyuan railways, through Datong, westward to Xi’an). That is to say, abandon the Northeast, fight for North China, consolidate the Yangtze River region, and manage South China.

The Americans advocated that some areas must definitely be abandoned. Because of unclear troop morale and dispersed forces, it was better to pull the troops down, reorganize and re-equip them, so as to be able to attack the Communists again. Wedemeyer said, “[We can] neither attack effectively nor hold firmly; it’s better to abandon.” Chiang Kai-shek disagreed, saying, “There are difficulties that make it impossible to abandon. If we abandon one place, the Communists will push all the way down.”

The U.S. advocated for three types of zones: An abandonment zone, i.e., north of the 40th parallel north, the line from Andong, Datong, Jiayuguan, west of Xi’an; a zone to be fiercely contested, south of the 35th parallel north, north of the Longhai Railway; and a zone to be firmly held, south of the 30th parallel north. Chiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, advocated for firm defense in the Northeast, fierce struggle in North China, extermination campaigns in the Central South, defense in the region south of the Yangtze River, and management of South China (including the two Guangdong provinces, Taiwan, Fujian, to be handled by the U.S.). The U.S. advocated withdrawing from the Northeast, bringing the troops to East China for training, and then counter-attacking later. Chiang Kai-shek said he could not afford to abandon or withdraw; if he withdrew, the Communists would push down immediately.

Chiang Kai-shek wanted to drag things out as long as possible until a third world war erupted. He pinned all his hopes on a third world war, saying: “There is hope if a third world war breaks out within three or four years.”

Since we shifted to the offensive last July, Chiang Kai-shek can never recover. Local offensives might still be possible, but a strategic offensive is no longer possible.

Economically: Chiang Kai-shek’s economic situation in 1947 was even more severe than in 1946. American aid could not solve his problems. In the past, we worried about the Northwest battlefield, where civil war operations were combined with famine—few people but many troops. Northwestern Shanxi also suffered famine. With the enemy pressing on the borders of Shandong, our economy was also problematic. But since shifting to the offensive, we took the initiative, moved out, lightened our burdens, recovered large tracts of land, gained more solutions, and our economic problems were solved. Because Chiang Kai-shek lacks land reform, he will be in greater difficulty in 1948.

Land Reform and Party Consolidation: This puts Party members on the right track. The situation differs vastly between before and after the promulgation of the Land Law. The May Fourth Directive was an inner-Party directive; people did not speak fully of it, and there was some doubt. When it was made public and we simply called for equitable distribution, people approved. Since the Land Conference last September, district-level land conferences nationwide were held well. The Land Conference was also a Party consolidation conference; it thoroughly exposed serious phenomena within the Party, causing the Party’s appearance to change completely. The political direction in Northwestern Shanxi and Suiyuan is correct, because they are engaged in land reform and Party consolidation. The work in the Northeast is done well; the work in Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan is also done well. It is estimated that even greater changes will occur in 1948. The advantage belongs to us; the situation develops favorably for us. For example, regarding popular sentiment, a great change has occurred in people’s hearts; the masses lean toward us. Chiang carries out total mobilization, but the people oppose him. The student movement has not ceased. The Three People’s Principles Youth League (San Qing Tuan) used to have energy; now it has none. The students are sons of landlords and rich peasants. While we are carrying out land reform, the students are rebelling against Chiang Kai-shek—this is noteworthy. Before the May Fourth Directive was published, we feared others’ opposition; after publicizing it openly, things actually improved.

Given these circumstances in the military, economy, land reform, and Party consolidation, if we continue this work for another year in 1948, there are grounds to say that even greater victories will surely come. Now the revolutionary high tide has arrived. In the past, the high tide was considered based on two aspects: large-scale urban insurrections and military victories. Now, we should not view it this way; we need not necessarily hope for big cities. If we still viewed it that way, then after Japan’s surrender, it would depend on whether we could enter large cities like Beiping and Tianjin. “Now we do not view the big cities in this way. (1) In the second half of 1947, the mass movement did not ebb; in 1948, it will surge higher. (2) Before the army arrives, a big city insurrection is very difficult (the same was true for Paris; the Shanghai workers’ uprising occurred only after the Northern Expeditionary Army reached Longhua). Military action is primary. Therefore, the shift to the offensive in July represents the beginning of the high tide, primarily marked by military victories. Future victories will be even greater. Do not speak of it as independent urban insurrection; big cities are the result of victories in field warfare.

However, the war will still be protracted. We must prepare to face the enemy’s maximum resistance. The “Seventh Congress” envisioned seventeen difficulties; some were correctly anticipated, some were not. That estimation at the time was not harmful. Those unanticipated bring only benefits, no harm. Yet, do not imagine the enemy has maximum resistance; they lack the strength to attack but can defend. Resistance they will still put up. The United States trains and equips their second-line troops. (The possibility of U.S. troops entering is not large.) Specifically, if the U.S. sends troops to garrison cities, occupying Nanjing and Shanghai, not letting us enter, that would be troublesome. Whether the U.S. fights or not makes no difference; the main point is that Chiang Kai-shek will collapse. Only after Chiang Kai-shek collapses will we work for change. This is a difficulty, but we must not fear it.

The landlord class is being eliminated; it will still take ten years for land distribution nationwide to be completed well. Prepare for four to five years; probably by 1949 to 1950, we can defeat Chiang Kai-shek nationwide (a five-year victory, counting from 1946). By the end of this war, both sides will need five million casualties (half a million each per year). This year, we must still anticipate several difficulties. Fight on, but without haste; it is not a relaxed affair.

The war should not be interrupted; it must be fought through to the end, giving the enemy no chance to rest. But we should not speak absolutely. The main determining factors will be the attitude of the masses and the middle class in the large southern cities. For example, when Chiang Kai-shek’s situation becomes hopeless and he talks of stepping down, pushing forward figures like Li Jishen, then whether peace or continued war ensues depends on the Southern masses. If the masses want peace and you refuse to make peace, they will call you a warmonger. But to make peace! It is clearly Chiang Kai-shek’s deception, a cunning scheme of shedding his cicada shell or grafting one twig onto another, aiming to gain a chance to rest and attempt a comeback. To foresee such events, we must expose them in our propaganda and clearly explain to the masses that the goal is not merely to eliminate Chiang Kai-shek the individual, but to eliminate Chiang Kai-shek’s clique and the class it represents. Whether the masses realize that there is no way out unless Chiang Kai-shek is destroyed. If the masses’ illusions about the big bourgeoisie are completely swept away, then this problem does not exist. But if Chiang Kai-shek steps down and elements from the middle forces come forward, can the masses’ illusions about the opposition faction of the big bourgeoisie be completely swept away under such circumstances? There are two understandings: (1) Eliminate Chiang Kai-shek the individual; (2) Eliminate Chiang Kai-shek’s clique and the class it represents. Now it is necessary to carry out propaganda and explanatory work, clearly explaining to the masses to expose [the deception]. Otherwise, there could be an interruption of the war.

Rely on ourselves, not on foreign aid. Not relying does not mean not wanting it; we still want it, but we want it without relying on it. We always want it, but we must never rely upon it. Even when we achieve nationwide victory and have a central government, we still will not rely on it. Chiang Kai-shek’s strategy has fundamentally been one of reliance on foreign aid; this is dangerous, hence his defeat. Foreign aid is not the determining condition for us. During the Soviet Area period, we did not rely on foreign aid, yet we failed to rely on ourselves well. If we had relied on ourselves well, we might have avoided the Long March. If we relied well on ourselves, the Dongjiang Column could have moved north, and more could have been left in Eastern Zhejiang, Southern Anhui, Western Anhui, and Eastern Hubei—therefore, everything depends on our own good policies (military, mass-oriented). We can completely rely on ourselves.

United Front:
The overall goal is to draw a clear line between the enemy and ourselves, in order to isolate the enemy and avoid isolating ourselves. First separate, then negotiate and unite. Isolate the bourgeoisie. In the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie—he tries to isolate me, I try to isolate him—ultimately we will isolate him.

In the later period of the Northern Expedition, there was Rightism: we were detached from the masses (the peasants) and detached from the army (we did not build our own armed forces), leaving only the proletariat, thus isolating ourselves, leading to defeat. At the beginning of the Northern Expedition, we were not originally isolated. But when the masses demanded land, we did not give it; we also did not build armed forces. Thus, the peasants were disappointed, causing our own isolation and subsequent defeat.

During the civil war period, there was excessive “Leftism”: the cities were completely isolated, leading to the isolation of the Party. Forced demonstrations, forced strikes led to 100% losses in the White Areas. In the countryside, “Leftist” policies in warfare and land reform—attacking big cities, landlords not being allocated land, rich peasants being allocated poor land—these led to fierce antagonism between the Red and White areas. This was related. Regarding the petty and middle bourgeoisie and intellectuals, rural policies confiscated everything. Excessively high labor conditions, maximum wages, and other one-sided interests of workers ruined the economy and destroyed industry and commerce, fueling antagonism between Red and White areas.

We were not completely isolated in the countryside, but because we harmed the middle peasants, and especially the merchants, in the end only the workers, poor peasants, and farm laborers remained. How could we not have been defeated?

During the civil war period, we isolated ourselves.

During the War of Resistance against Japan, we learned to be wiser. We consistently opposed focusing only on unity without struggle, and we consistently opposed focusing only on struggle without unity. We opposed believing in the Guomindang to a degree exceeding the belief we placed in the masses. It was not that we didn’t believe in the Guomindang at all; it was resisting Japan, so why shouldn’t we believe? The problem lay in believing in it but not in the masses, only uniting without struggling. By opposing this, we succeeded. We developed the progressive forces, won over the middle forces, and isolated the die-hard forces. By adopting this policy early on and fighting for eight years, we succeeded in isolating Chiang Kai-shek. If we had not adopted the policy of isolating Chiang Kai-shek during those eight years, it would be too late today.

Two principles: Combat Rightism to isolate the enemy; combat “Leftism” to win over the masses.

The "three-thirds system" was a strategy of making concessions to landlords, combining alliance with struggle—requiring them to participate in the government while also compelling them to obey rent and interest reductions. The land policy could confuse the middle and petty bourgeoisie in the cities; one must not think that, with the upsurge, it is time to open fire in all directions. Now it is necessary to win over the middle and petty bourgeoisie in the cities. At the time, it would have been wrong not to form the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation. The Kuomintang-Communist cooperation was in reality Kuomintang-Communist struggle; cooperation was the form, struggle the content—toward Chiang there was both cooperation and struggle. It is the same toward the national bourgeoisie, but with less struggle; there is a distinction from Chiang, and it proceeds gradually. At first, it was correct for the newspapers to speak only of cooperation and not of struggle, but this had a drawback: it created illusions about Chiang Kai-shek. Rent and interest reductions are absolutely necessary, not optional. Our strength was small, our land was small, and our troops were few. Moreover, rent and interest reductions mobilized the masses; only by first dominating the localities could we transition to land reform. It was necessary to bring enlightened gentry into the government. Even members of the landlord exploiting class who had opposed the Communists were still needed. This remains the case today. It is wrong now for some to call it opportunism. Li Dingming’s death must be announced publicly, and we must hold a memorial service. Everyone, recall the Double Tenth Declaration. The Double Tenth Declaration included four categories of people: (1) those who had done no bad deeds; (2) those who had not shed human blood but had opposed the Communists; (3) gentry with meritorious service; (4) those pursued to the ends of the earth—these four categories. Only the fourth category must be pursued to the ends of the earth, but even if caught, they may not necessarily be dealt with. This is considered from the standpoint of workers and peasants, so that fewer people may die. The leniency policy is not leniency for the enemy’s sake, but leniency for the sake of the masses; it is a matter for the masses, not sympathy for landlords and rich peasants.

Therefore, the struggle against right-leaning tendencies must not go so far as to reject the united front, to claim that the three-thirds system was wrong, that rent and interest reductions were wrong, or that the Wu Manyou campaign was wrong. That would be incorrect. The three-thirds system is currently neither promoted nor opposed. Now we oppose both Right and "Left" deviations, and draw clear boundaries; otherwise, we will still fail.

Opposing the Right: (1) Overestimating the enemy, fearing Chiang, fearing the United States, afraid to go to the Kuomintang-controlled areas, afraid that the Americans might prove formidable. Yet the three great armies of Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, and others moved into the Kuomintang-controlled areas and solved the winter clothing problem within a month, completely proving that operations can be conducted in Chiang’s areas. (2) Blurred concepts regarding vacillating elements among the middle-of-the-road factions—failing to distinguish clearly the middle parties, the national bourgeoisie, and the middle class. For instance, the Xinhua News Agency greatly praised Zhang Lan and Luo Longji for not compromising with the Kuomintang; it served as a voluntary propagandist for Feng Yuxiang and Li Jishen opposing Chiang, and also publicized Huang Yanpei, while underestimating his vacillation. Huang Yanpei is of the right-wing faction of the middle bourgeoisie, very prone to vacillation. Do not publicize Feng Yuxiang, Li Jishen, or Huang Yanpei. These people have no military power and, before coming to power, may profess revolution. Once they have military forces, they will fight us to the death. After all, they represent landlord armies. The national bourgeoisie is a royalist party; it vacillates on the national democratic revolution. Though they are not numerous, we must criticize and expose them, strike at their political influence, but not eliminate them economically. We must oppose both Right and "Left" deviations.

It is easy to recognize issues like landlords’ access to clothing and food, but it is not easy to distinguish clearly those at the fringe. The analogy: small at both ends, large in the middle. The middle class is very large, but those at the fuzzy edges are hard to deal with—those at the tail end of the bourgeoisie are hard to deal with. For concrete example, it is not easy to differentiate between well-to-do middle peasants and rich peasants. Huang Yanpei opposes Chiang but also kowtows to Chiang; at times he supports land reform, at other times he opposes it. Such people are very difficult to delineate. The interstitial areas are hard to handle. (3) During the land reform, some displayed no determination to eliminate the landlords. Some fought Japan with great vigor but had no vigor in eliminating feudalism. Some were reluctant to resolutely purge landlords and rich peasants who had infiltrated the Party, and showed no determination in Party consolidation—this is also right-leaning opportunism.

After victory over right-deviationism, the most common error is "Left" deviationism. With greater strength comes recklessness and the theory of quick victory. We must remain cautious over the long term and prepare to deal with the enemy’s maximum resistance.

(1) Do not overestimate the enemy. Whether this means underestimating the enemy—it does and it doesn’t. There is an element of underestimating the enemy, yet it is not truly underestimating. Underestimation should not figure in concrete arrangements, but in the overall sense we must despise the enemy (for we both scorn the United States, Chiang Kai-shek, and the landlords). Do not fear these enemies. Be prudent regarding the immediate enemy.

Strategically, despise the enemy, scorn the United States and Chiang; operationally, take the enemy seriously; in specific battles, pay careful attention and treat the enemy with caution. Some people are mortally afraid of U.S. military intervention, the atomic bomb, and a third world war, yet they are extremely careless about the immediate enemy.

When conducting land reform, we must despise the feudal forces, but toward the concrete landlord and rich peasant enemy before you, treat them with caution, refrain from indiscriminate beating and killing, and use meticulous tactics and struggle to subdue them.

Our comrades often do the opposite: the farther away the enemy, the more afraid they are; the closer the enemy, the less heed they pay. They dare to start a revolution, but carrying it out concretely is difficult. Our comrades are also contrary in this regard: many stumble over concrete revolution. Strategically, the enemy is backward, and we are new and rising, but we must take the immediate enemy seriously because it is venomous.

The error of "Leftism" consists precisely in taking rash, unanalyzed action against the immediate enemy.

(2) Do not be impatient. The land reform nationwide will be completed in ten years; after liberation, within three years—that is, by 1950. The war will be won in five years. Do not advocate the theory of quick victory; the theory of quick victory is a root cause of "Leftism."

(3) The "Leftist" error in land reform is the violation of middle peasant interests, which principally contravenes the basic principles of communism. We must treat the middle peasants with the utmost solicitude—solicitude means inquiring after their warmth and cold, their well-being. The middle peasants are our permanent allies. Encroaching on middle peasant interests to satisfy the demands of poor peasants and hired laborers is like cutting out flesh to patch a sore. The middle peasants are our own.

We must win 90 percent of rural public opinion. Many comrades lack this concept. Landlords and rich peasants do not amount to much—no more than 8 percent. If the figure is higher, it is unacceptable. We must firmly establish this concept among comrades; a degree of rigidity is good, for it prevents strategic errors. If the percentage exceeds this, the scope of attack broadens and harms the basic interests of the revolution. These two figures—90 percent and 8 percent—must be fixed. The exploiters amount to no more than this; this is a fact. Do not fear that "others will rise in rank and fortune." Middle peasants generally constitute only 20 percent; poor peasants and hired laborers, 70 percent. We must not disrupt our own battle lines.

Indiscriminate beating and killing of landlords throws a perfectly good Liberated Area into chaos. Landlords and rich peasants are a social problem. If we make the land full of beggars and bones white as snow, can we still lead China?

In the cities, the issue is the middle and petty bourgeoisie. We must have a strategy towards the middle and petty bourgeoisie. In the countryside, the issue is the middle peasants; in the cities, it is the middle and petty bourgeoisie. If these two issues are handled well, victory is assured. During the War of Resistance, we struck at the big landlords and neutralized the middle and small landlords. Now the big, middle, and small landlords as a class must all be eliminated; eliminate them as a class, but preserve them as individuals. The bourgeoisie also divides into big, middle, and small. We must definitely win over the middle bourgeoisie and small capitalists, strike at the big bourgeoisie, and place the middle and petty bourgeoisie under protection.

Today we must fight the big bourgeoisie and protect the middle and petty bourgeoisie—just as we dealt with landlords during the War of Resistance. As for the right-wing faction of the middle bourgeoisie, we must strike at them politically, but still support them economically (the small bourgeoisie referred to here are small capitalists, different from what is usually called the petty bourgeoisie between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. That petty bourgeoisie between bourgeoisie and proletariat is a revolutionary, progressive force; middle peasants are working people).

In the cities, handle the middle and petty bourgeoisie well; in the countryside, handle the middle peasants well—success in this ensures victory. This is a strategic question of the revolution. A distinction must be drawn between landlords and rich peasants; this distinction is a matter of our guiding thought. From the peasants' perspective, they are all exploiters, without distinction. From the standpoint of eliminating feudalism, there is no distinction either. But there is a difference between sweeping out the door and requisitioning property. During egalitarian redistribution, the peasants hate the landlords; it is permissible to give them a bit less. But it will not do to give the peasants a bit less. The peasants approve of giving the landlords a little less because the landlords have hidden wealth, so it equals egalitarian redistribution in effect. In principle, landlords must divide land and property; absolute egalitarianism is unattainable in practice, nor is it proper in principle. If the middle peasants do not agree to egalitarian redistribution, we must never force it. Do not waste too much time over movable property. Thorough egalitarian redistribution is not absolute equalitarianism. (Chairman Mao attaches great importance to the number of people and households.)

(4) In the cities, adventurist policies toward the petty bourgeoisie must be avoided. Do not one-sidedly emphasize workers’ interests. Undermining industry and commerce is detrimental to the masses. Whether public or private, in joint production and business, pay attention to planning, raw materials, costs, sales, and wages.

It is wrong for trade unions to attend only to workers’ interests and disregard the overall interest. In the Liberated Areas, trade unions oversee workers’ interests but must also look after the interests of the entire Liberated Area, because the working class is the leading class.

In the cities, we must emphasize benefits for both public and private, benefits for both labor and capital, development of production, and a thriving economy.

No over-Left adventurist policies toward students and intellectuals. Most of those previously thought suspect are in fact without problems. When we later enter the big cities, we must not act recklessly. In Yan’an in the past, forty were shot because they were thought suspect; now in the Taihang area, most are good.

Organizations like the Democratic League in the Kuomintang-controlled areas cannot be said to have no role. Such groups provide us with great help and assistance, and we still plan to help them in the future.

In the Double Tenth Declaration, the phrase “other patriotic elements” refers precisely to enlightened gentry (though there are some problems among them as well). Even a person like He Shaonan should be treated with opposition. Those people’s opposition to He Shaonan once played a role; those who shared hardships with us—if they now do not obstruct our land reform, why kick them away? If we are so heartless and ungrateful, who will still work with us? At the lower levels (village landlords and rich peasants) they can be dispensed with, but keeping a few at the upper levels—what harm is there?

The three-thirds system need no longer be mentioned now. The "February 1" Directive still mentioned it, because at that time we still felt isolated and the issue of our superiority had not been resolved. Now it need not be mentioned, but we will not proclaim its cancellation either. Once the feudal forces and bureaucratic capital are eliminated, we will have plenty of grain; let a little be given to others to eat, and they will come around.

(5) On the question of beating and killing: It is impossible not to kill at all, but we must not kill many. "Not a single killing" is not "forever." The masses do not approve of not killing a single person. Some must be pursued to the ends of the earth. Whenever one can refrain from killing, do not kill. The policy during the Yan’an cadre screening—not killing a single one and not arresting the majority—had its benefits.

(6) Regarding foreign policy: The directive from September 27 against Liu Hangchen stated that opposing Truman now and opposing Wallace in the future is not the correct approach. Wallace opposes us and advocates alliance with the Soviet Union; he represents a segment of the workers, not much of the big bourgeoisie. He does not want war, which the United States dislikes. On this point, we should still unite with him.

On leadership rights: The question of leadership rights has two conditions:

First, resolutely lead those being led in struggle against the enemy and achieve victory. If victory cannot be won in war, they will vacillate, and the leadership position will be lost.

Second, those being led must be given economic benefits, material welfare, and political education. Without this second condition, it won’t work. The two are indispensable. For example: leading the middle peasants requires, on the one hand, leading poor peasants and hired laborers in struggle against feudal forces, but also giving them material benefits; only then will the middle peasants follow us. Fight the United States and Chiang resolutely, win battles, and at the same time give people material benefits. All sectors beneficial to the national economy must be developed. Both are indispensable—omit one, and there is no leadership right.

We must unite with the middle and petty bourgeoisie and, under our leadership, oppose Chiang and the United States. If we do not fight resolutely, it won’t work. But when necessary, we must also give them benefits. If we fail to care for them and instead harm their interests, they will not come along.

Keeping leadership rights unspoken publicly has more drawbacks than advantages; it easily blurs the thinking of the masses and Party cadres. It must be spoken of openly. The Nine-Nation Declaration has already spoken of it publicly; from now on we must also speak publicly. If we do not, thinking will remain muddled. The Nine-Nation Declaration stated the leadership right of the working class (for instance, Feng Yuxiang’s statement: not opposing the Communist Party, forever following the Communist Party). Do you acknowledge the leadership right of the working class? If not, you must be persuaded and criticized—persuaded with reason.

Armed struggle is a condition for winning leadership rights. Armed struggle and the struggle for leadership rights are inseparable. During the U.S. mediation, we never gave up a single rifle, yet some once believed that the Three Powers or the Three Parties could solve the problem. In reality, they could not. The negotiations after June 1946 served only to educate the masses and played no role in actually solving the problem. At that time, we indeed had the sincerity to delay for a few months, and withdrawing from a few places met strategic needs, but it was wrong to believe in the Three Powers or the Three Parties.

International relations (the United States-Soviet Union-Britain-U.S. relationship):

Three propositions. The common phrasing is: rupture or compromise. Rupture means a third world war among Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union; compromise means everything is compromised. The correct formulation should be as follows:

(1) It is not a question of rupture or compromise, but a question of early compromise or late compromise. That is to say, there is no danger of a third world war in the near future. A third world war is a distant prospect; the danger of a third world war fully exists, but it is not about to break out immediately. Do not think that they do not want war, but there is also a full possibility that war may be averted. Therefore, it is a question of sooner or later compromise.

Many people believe that the Soviet Union and the United States will definitely rupture, that a third world war is inevitable, and that there is no hope whatsoever for a U.S.-Soviet compromise. This view is incorrect. It is a question of sooner or later compromise; the United States has no intention of going to war (its propaganda about war is bluffing). The Soviet Union also has no intention of going to war; therefore, war cannot break out. When Pan Youxin went to the United States to discuss repayment of a $13 billion loan, the United States asked Pan whether the Soviet Union wanted to borrow $1 billion. Pan replied: We will not take the initiative to borrow the $1 billion. Pan also said that the current state of antagonism between the two governments did not hinder cooperation between the two countries. So it is a matter of sooner or later compromise; war is a distant prospect. Democratic forces are powerful and can overcome war. Sooner or later compromise—the sooner-or-later compromise is the result of the strength of democratic forces.

(2) (Omitted) (3) (Omitted)

Supplementary Notes on International Relations (Based on Chairman Mao’s remarks at the Political Group meeting on November 8, 1947)

(1) The Possibility of the Danger of War (Omitted)

(2) The Possibility of Eliminating the Danger of War

...Marshall’s approach to us was: to push us into the government to dissolve us, but Chiang Kai-shek was afraid. Toward us, on one hand, he boldly negotiated, and on the other, he clung to the principle of not surrendering arms. You hit me, and I hit you back. When Marshall ran out of schemes and could no longer deceive, he let Chiang Kai-shek start fighting.

Thus, compromise among the major powers does not equate to compromise between revolution and counter-revolution in other countries. The reason reactionaries in various countries have been able to come to power is mainly because the workers were unarmed, the united front was not established, the broad masses were not mobilized, treaties were signed that tied their own hands, and they did not mobilize the masses to take up arms and act independently and autonomously. Then it is different again—treaties among major powers cannot tie one’s own hands. The Soviet Union and China share the same strategic tasks, though their specific methods differ.

At that time, France and Italy had the revolutionary conditions to seize power. We cannot draw this conclusion. But we can view the issue this way: pay attention to the people rising in revolution—whether Britain and the United States would dare to shoot at the people of France and Italy. De Gaulle participated in the Consultative Assembly in Europe, and the French Communist Party went to join, which tied itself up. If the French Communist Party had not joined, it could have acted independently and autonomously. France surrendered its arms (only secretly retaining a portion). Surrendering arms was a mistake and brought losses. Greece did not surrender its arms, once occupied Athens, could not hold the city, and then went to the countryside to fight guerrilla warfare, continuing to this day. The mistake lies in being deceived by Yalta or Potsdam—being intimidated and confused, overestimating the strength of Britain and the United States. This was exactly the case with Browder.

History proves that toward reactionaries, the only way is resolute struggle, trusting the masses, boldly mobilizing the masses—and the struggle will certainly be victorious. In 1927, opportunism dared not struggle, and even a great force collapsed. Later, a very small force was gathered and persisted in the struggle, and it rose again, thus fighting out today’s situation. After the war against Japan, the masses were no longer afraid of the United States, Britain, or Chiang Kai-shek; it was the cadres who were afraid. The same is true in Greece. Greece faced intervention from two imperialist powers, but it has fought on and carved out territory. Thus, as long as one relies on the masses and relies on arms, victory can be achieved. Being intimidated leads to losses.

The French Communist Party said: first strike down De Gaulle, second strike down the People’s Party, third strike down the Socialist Party, and only then come forward at the fourth step. The French Party believed there was a parliament and relied mainly on parliamentary methods and peaceful struggle. Now it seems there may be a shift in attention, with either a direct development to revolution or a tortuous path to revolution. The strikes in France and Italy have trained the masses and reviewed their strength, and they can come again.

Drawing from the experience of Greece, the direct deployment of troops by the United States and Britain has little effect—the two paper tigers have been punctured. China must also puncture this paper tiger.

Therefore, there are two inevitabilities regarding the danger of war.

(1) As long as imperialism exists, war is unavoidable—this is one inevitability.

(2) The people will inevitably rise in revolution, and the revolution will inevitably be victorious—this is another inevitability.

Imperialism wants war, but the revolutionary forces are powerful and can overcome the danger of war, thus giving rise to the inevitability of eliminating war.

Imperialism needs sedan-chair carriers. Franco, Chiang Kai-shek, Greece, Turkey—none will do. So it seeks Germany and Japan as sedan-chair carriers, but Germany and Japan have been defeated and cannot carry the chair either. If Hitler had not first occupied the European countries, and if Japan in the East had not been there to carry the chair, he would not have dared to attack the Soviet Union.

We must expose the war-mongers. War is only a distant prospect, but to intimidate people, they describe it as so imminent. One must not fall into the trap—it is a propaganda war. Two years ago, Stalin already wrote that Churchill was intimidating people. Why has there been no war in the two years since? It was intimidation. After another one or two years, the danger of war will be even smaller, and it may be possible to eliminate the danger of war altogether. No war means peace. These two years have been neither war nor peace. One cannot imagine it will always be neither war nor peace. The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union want peace—long-term coexistence refers to the United States and Britain. The cases of France and Italy are about overthrowing the reactionaries.

On the relations between revolutionary countries and imperialist countries.

Imperialist countries are certain to intervene against revolutionary countries. In Greece, Italy, and France, there has been intervention by Britain and the United States. In China, there is intervention by the United States.

The forms of intervention may be sending troops, or the current type of intervention in China. For Greece, that means stationing troops, sending advisors, and supplying weapons, but not joining the war. The ways of intervention are diverse. Even if troops are sent to join the war, they can also be beaten and delayed. We will not issue a challenge; we will only respond to the challenge. For instance, if U.S. troops only station themselves in Qingdao and do not station troops in Nanjing and Shanghai, then after we capture Nanjing and Shanghai, we can use soft methods to take Qingdao. If U.S. troops station soldiers in Nanjing and Shanghai, then a direct conflict is unavoidable.

In short, imperialism is suffering from multiple ailments, nothing more—it is not fearsome.

Tito described imperialism as the fiercest (because the U.S. had already set its sights on Yugoslavia). Zhdanov was relatively moderate. Molotov denounced war. These three different attitudes carry great strategic significance.

In agricultural countries, crises are not critical. In the United States, because of its vast size, a crisis comes as a terrible calamity.

On the united front, we must study the experience of Yugoslavia.

The "middle" no longer exists. The Democratic League has been dissolved. As for the Liberated Areas, there have always been no middle parties.

China still has a broad united front. The dissolution of the Democratic League does not mean the dissolution of the united front.

It is wrong to think that "a national united front must coexist with many political parties, while a people’s united front includes only a minority."

Yugoslavia, with a population of 15 million, had 24 parties. The national united front swept them all away. France, on the other hand, fell into a trap by signing accords with various parties, thus tying its own hands.

China has no freedom and no multi-party system. But it is not without groups and individuals. Once we occupy the big cities, they will all emerge. We will still adhere to the People’s Liberation Army’s proclamation, uniting all who participate in the struggle. In the countryside, apart from landlords and rich peasants, we must unite the middle peasants and win over 90 percent of the rural population. In the cities, we must win over all those who oppose imperialism and feudalism. The slogan is "national united front."

We have never signed treaties with various parties; only with Chiang Kai-shek have there been treaties. They do not hinder the struggle at present and can even be of help—why would we not want them?

Their democratic stance has been stated by themselves: neither Nationalist nor Communist. We have helped the Democratic League, and the Democratic League has also exerted a beneficial influence on us. Now that Chiang Kai-shek has dissolved it, it is on one hand a forced dissolution, and on the other, it represents their own surrender and loss of prestige. We must criticize them, but we must also help them.

The "three-thirds system" will no longer be mentioned in the future, but it will also not be declared abolished.

The right wing of the middle bourgeoisie should be struck down, but not eliminated as a class.

Now Chiang Kai-shek is very isolated, and our circle is very large.

The coalition government has been canceled. Because the workers’ and peasants’ government is a coalition government, and the alliance between the Party and non-Party elements is a coalition government.

In the past, when speaking of the united front, it was from the standpoint of Party members who were landlords and rich peasants forming alliances with others, rather than from the standpoint of Party members who were workers and peasants fighting for revolutionary gentry. The reason is that many Communist Party members were themselves landlords and rich peasants, and ××× was in turn part of the "four big families" (all were Party members). When they went to talk about the united front, it was an alliance between the landlords and rich peasants inside the Party and the non-Party landlords and rich peasants.

The united front should stand on the standpoint of poor peasants and farm laborers, uniting the middle peasants. During the anti-Japanese period, it included the enlightened gentry. During the anti-Japanese period, the relationship with landlords was not alliance but neutralization, while simultaneously eliminating and weakening a portion of them.

As for Chiang Kai-shek, it is also hard to speak of alliance; rather, it is isolating the Nationalist Party and isolating the die-hards. Hence, there is a contradiction: on one hand, cooperation between the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party; on the other hand, everywhere destroying and isolating the opponent. Chiang toward us, and we toward Chiang, both sides are mutually isolating, mutually destroying—eliminating whatever can be eliminated. Toward the entire Nationalist Party, there was nothing to be done, so it had to be described as cooperation. In fact, what we did in the Nationalist-controlled areas was to pursue a policy of striking at the Nationalist Party—wherever it could be eliminated, eliminate it. Because for many years we adopted a policy of elimination and striking, we thus achieved ××. Therefore, so-called cooperation is:

① Wherever it can be eliminated, eliminate it.
② Wherever it cannot be eliminated, strike at it—partial elimination, total striking.

In the future, the Nationalist Party will no longer exist, only small cliques.

The major powers will compromise; sooner or later, compromise is the direction. Further study is needed.

On some issues, compromise is possible; on others, it is not. Peace treaties for Japan and Germany will inevitably be compromised sooner or later. The stalemate of neither war nor peace will last for some time. War is a distant prospect. The United States has gone abroad to negotiate and seek compromise. Pan Yushin said: "The opposing positions of the two countries do not preclude bilateral negotiations." The Soviet Union has not taken the initiative to propose loans, which indicates that the two countries want compromise. Marshall said, "I am unwilling to sign a paper agreement; I will see how the situation develops before making a decision."

Comrade Chen asked Chairman Mao: "Is there also in the European and American countries a situation similar to China’s, where people fear the United States and underestimate their own strength?" Chairman Mao said that Zhdanov had already addressed this separately. The Northeast Field Army also has those who fear the atomic bomb and fear U.S. military involvement. Su Yu’s report also noted some such sentiments in the troops, and local Party organizations also have this kind of mood. China prepared for this long ago—it was discussed during the Rectification Movement and at the Seventh Party Congress. Because at that time some said the reactionary forces were powerful, we thus discussed this issue.

Fear of U.S. imperialism is a psychological effect. China has struggled with U.S. imperialism year after year and suffered defeats, so psychologically there is some fear. After the defeat of Japanese imperialism, the masses no longer feared Britain and the United States. It is the cadres who still fear, especially those of landlord and rich peasant origin. The philosophical reckoning and literary and artistic reckoning in the Soviet Union. In literature and the arts, they transported foreign things, transported the dead, admiring American bulldozers, American cigarettes, and looking down upon the great realism—this is capitulationism. It is because the war caused trauma, and they were also spiritually liberated, afraid of the paper tiger. Now it should be explained clearly among the cadres: when we achieve great development south of the Yangtze River, the Americans may yet put on a few fierce displays to frighten you. If they want to intimidate you and you are intimidated, you will fall into their trap. If they cannot intimidate you, then so be it. Bombing ×× Base, attacking ×× County—such things may yet be repeated. Some people, when talking about imperialism, seem to turn pale at its very mention. One is the ideological root; the other is the psychological root. We have the experience of failure in our history. The Soviet Union is a new country and also has this situation. This is because imperialism has a long history, and countries invaded by imperialism traditionally fear it—it has traditional force. Now, in our 500-person directly affiliated unit, in our own cave dwellings, there are such people: afraid of war, afraid of imperialism, lacking trust in their own strength, lacking trust in the creativity of the masses. Chen Bojun felt smug and satisfied about the rank of major general, looking down on the glory of the Red Army. This is a psychological issue, and liberation must be achieved in this respect.

Comrade Zhou Enlai said: When Comrade Lu ××’s document on the international situation was issued, the British Communist Party’s congress had just concluded. Upon receiving this article, it specially suspended the conference for one day, held a meeting, read out the article, and then amended its own resolutions based on the article.

The world proletariat eliminating the world bourgeoisie is a momentous event.

Proposing an Eastern European federation is a "Leftist" tendency. When victory is at hand, it is easy to turn "Left." (Both Ji and Tie hold such views.)

In some situations, one may underestimate the enemy; in others, one does not.

The development prospects of the democratic front may eliminate war. Partial confrontations are possible. The situation in Indonesia may fall into a trap, because the Communist Party does not hold the main strength. In Vietnam, Bao Dai surrendered to France. Ho Chi Minh had no ammunition; the main positions were lost, and in the countryside they are fighting guerrilla warfare. Only when we advance to Guangdong and Guangxi in the future can we provide them with assistance.

All these reasons form a series. The spirit has not yet been liberated from the old traditions.

Regarding the United States and Chiang Kai-shek, the main problem is the cadres. We must prepare very well. We must hold the United States in contempt. The sole source of U.S. pride is money—but it is limited. After all, how much can it bring out? It is nothing extraordinary. We must have the courage to struggle. When we go south of the Yangtze in the future, we will not provoke the United States. First, we will retreat a distance of three stages, and then we will strike them a fierce blow, and they will leave.

On the issue of the Eastern European federation, Pravda said: "It is artificial and lacks a mass foundation." Chairman Mao said: "Probably the circumstances were favorable, and some were dizzy with victory. On the other hand, they ignored reality. The proposal for an Eastern European federation offers no other benefit; it only provides a pretext for those promoting a Western European alliance. The main point is the lack of a mass foundation. The Communist Party is cooperating with the Social Democratic Party. If a federation is proposed, what if the Social Democratic Party disagrees? There is strategic danger in it. That it gives Britain and the United States a pretext is still secondary; the lack of a mass foundation is primary."

Conclusion

On the ideological trends during the period of the conference: Such ideological conditions existed. In the Northwest and the Jin-Sui area, some comrades persisted in "Leftism"—killing people, purging figures from the three-thirds system, infringing on the interests of middle peasants, destroying industry and commerce, and so on. The Chairman said: "Some say that An Wenqin’s initiative represents a firm landlord standpoint. I say: Accept that his landlord standpoint is firm; if it were not firm, it would not exist. He is a landlord; why shouldn’t he represent the landlord standpoint?" Someone proposed including the prospect of socialism. Chairman Mao said: "That is an impatient illness. Over there, in 1917, the October Revolution passed fifteen or sixteen years before they formally embarked on socialism in 1932. Today we are still eliminating feudalism—it is still early! Why bring up socialism?"

Some also said that a Third World War is certain to break out, and that the outbreak would be catastrophic.

There seems to be an atmosphere suggesting that the entire eight years of the War of Resistance was wrong, that absorbing intellectuals was wrong, that rent and interest reduction and the Wu Manyou movement were wrong, and that it is necessary to return to the Civil War period. The cause may be traceless or not; there are grounds for suspicion, but no solid evidence yet—I have sensed it.

① A very gratifying meeting. The issue of superiority that had been unresolved for twenty years has been resolved today. The situation is unfolding, victory is in sight. Neither the Luochuan Conference nor the Sixth Plenary Session resolved this issue.

Before, we could only say "the situation is favorable to us"; now we can say "victory is within our grasp." In particular, from the three anti-Communist offensives to the surrender of the Japanese aggressors, the situation was always severe. We were in a position where we could only parry blows without being able to strike back. Now we have grown strong. The Kuomintang is at a disadvantage, the revolutionary高潮 has arrived, and we are on the offensive. The current situation has indeed changed. The prospect of victory is felt not only by leading organs, the masses, and non-party personages outside the Liberated Areas, but even by foreigners. This has been a very happy meeting. Although there are serious shortcomings in our work and many difficulties, all can be resolved. This has been a very successful meeting.

During the Northern Expedition, the situation was also developing, but the issue of superiority was not resolved, and instead it ended in failure. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War, there was frequent fighting and too many internal party disputes. The Long March marked the revolution’s greatest crisis, which we fortunately survived. Now a fundamental change has indeed occurred, and today’s situation is significant for the whole world.

This period has truly been one of extreme caution and vigilance; we have been very anxious. Especially from the time of Japan’s surrender to my trip to Chongqing—back then, Chiang Kai-shek’s affairs were easy to manage while ours were difficult. It was indeed through extreme caution that we achieved the current situation. Now it is different; we are no longer trembling with fear. Now we can draw conclusions based not on estimates but on facts. In the past, we always estimated things were "favorable to us" or said they were "possible." Now the facts truly are so: our superiority has led to victory; Chiang Kai-shek has been overturned and cannot strike us down. Even at the time of Japan’s surrender, we felt both joy and fear—joy that Japan had surrendered, fear that the issue of superiority was unresolved, that we had gained too little, that Chiang Kai-shek was still powerful, and that a severe civil war loomed over us, with both success and failure possible, hinging entirely on the struggle. Now it is good; we can speak with certainty and feel happy. Continuous victories on the front lines, land reform and Party consolidation getting on the right track (previously unresolved, with no clear path forward)—the September Land Reform Conference, that is, the Party Consolidation Conference, was no accident. Now superiority has been confirmed. Twenty years of arduous struggle have reached their conclusion today. The establishment of superiority is no longer an estimate but a fact.

② The two Central Bureaus of the Northwest and Jin-Sui are politically mature in their leadership, more satisfactory and promising than before. The "Letter to the Peasants" had minor flaws and should be addressed through education. The Yihezhen Conference was satisfactory. The two regions are generally similar but have differences: Northern Shaanxi opposes the Right, while northwestern Shanxi opposes the "Left." Regardless of "Left" or Right, these do not hinder the political maturity of the leadership in both regions. That is, land reform has begun to be resolved, and the line is correct. The Northwest has already accomplished one task: breaking the Hu bandit forces on the interior front, forcing them onto the defensive, turning the two regions into rear areas to support the front lines and liberate the Great Northwest. The issue now has a stronger foundation and basis, making us even more hopeful.

⑧ What problems does the meeting aim to solve? It must resolve this article (referring to *The Present Situation and Our Tasks*). This article is intended as a political program for a period—a program to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and establish a new China. It goes a step further than "On New Democracy" and "On Coalition Government." As for the economic program, after Chiang Kai-shek is overthrown, this line must be followed for a period.

Problems this article seeks to resolve:

A. Declaring that the United States is imperialist—this is definitive.

B. Declaring that Chiang Kai-shek represents bureaucratic capital and must be overthrown—this is definitive. (Some people approve of overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek but not of overthrowing bureaucratic capital, not understanding that Chiang Kai-shek is its representative and bureaucratic capital is its foundation.)

C. Overthrowing the landlord class is correct. Some say landlords are the "roots of Chiang" or "little Chiangs"—this formulation has flaws. We want to overthrow the Chiang Kai-shek clique; Chiang Kai-shek is the representative of this counterrevolutionary clique. We cannot use the same force against 36 million landlords as we use to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek. We must emphasize policy. Overthrowing the landlord class is definitive, but we do not treat all 36 million people the same way; we must have tactics.

If these three points are correct, the rest will not be wrong. The issue of the middle peasants was resolved long ago; problems only arose in handling it, and we must pay attention to correcting them.

The questions of whether the middle and petty bourgeoisie and the middle and small capitalists are still allies and part of the anti-Chiang united front have already been resolved and should be affirmed.

Article 4 of the essay concerns the issue of middle peasants in land reform. The principle is old, but emphasizing the middle peasants to this extent is very necessary.

Article 5 of the essay concerns the national bourgeoisie, which is also not new. But now we concentrate our forces on attacking the big bourgeoisie. Bureaucratic capital is a problem, so this has a role to play.

After the Land Reform Conference, the issue of opposing the Right was resolved. Now the issue of "Left" has been resolved. This conference is not a repetition. What this conference must pay attention to are: (1) middle peasants, (2) middle and petty bourgeoisie, (3) non-party personages.

The issue of middle peasants is not a question of whether we want them or not—this was resolved long ago. Everyone knows we must not infringe upon the interests of middle peasants, yet in actual work, their interests are still violated. Now it is a matter of concretely analyzing class status. The document on analyzing class status from the Taihang Mountains is not greatly harmful, but it has flaws—it is unclear and some parts are inappropriate. This shows how little we have in the way of Marxist-Leninist tools. Originally, northwestern Shanxi had an article on analyzing class status that was correct, but it was burned by themselves—again, a sign of insufficient Marxist-Leninist tools.

The problem is: what emerged at Sanjiao was "Left opportunism," and what emerged at Yihe was Right opportunism. Among ninety-nine households, over ten were labeled landlords or rich peasants, and middle peasants were barred from participating in peasant representative congresses. When I saw this, it shocked me to the core.

I can say definitively: there are only two friends—the middle peasants and the middle and petty bourgeoisie.

It was the same in Sunjiagou; they stressed not wanting middle peasants, rather than stressing the need for middle peasants.

The issue of the middle and petty bourgeoisie is what this Land Conference must address anew:

(1) Do not touch the industrial and commercial enterprises of landlords and capitalists that are not feudal exploitative in nature.

(2) Do not set taxes too high, and do not set labor conditions too demanding.

For example: in the past, Northern Shaanxi subsidized a paper mill run by a landlord; now the subsidy has been stopped. Lijiaqu was prosperous—it was a landlord’s prosperity—and now they want to destroy it. Isn’t that strange? Lijiaqu’s prosperity is the prosperity of the Liberated Areas. Elder Lin could not resolve this issue—isn’t that strange? The fundamental problem is vacillation regarding the middle and petty bourgeoisie. Land reform is meant to create this kind of prosperity. In this context, we must go with the tide to sweep away the sand, but we must absolutely not sweep away the middle peasants and the middle and petty bourgeoisie. If this tide is allowed to develop unchecked, it will be very dangerous. We must go against this tide and even counter it completely. It is not good to let this tide overwhelm everything.

The Party’s experience has been bitter. When cooperating with the bourgeoisie, the main danger is Right deviation; when splitting from the bourgeoisie, the main danger is "Left" deviation. I will oppose it, even if it means I am left alone, maintaining a glorious isolation.

The issue of non-party personages:

When the news about Liu Shaobai was published, I could hardly bear to read it; I didn’t want to, and I didn’t resolve it. Liu Shaobai is a non-party personage. Elder Xie said: "How to resolve the issue of dual character? Liu Shaobai has a dual character—he represents despotic landlords, yet he also opposes Chiang. Today he wants to progress; he has been with us for seven or eight years and has made contributions. To kick him aside now will inevitably isolate us and lead to defeat. Our united front with the Kuomintang gave us not only experience and lessons but also lessons in gaining organic strength—some people within the Kuomintang became familiar with us, which was useful during the War against Japan. This time, we must not repeat the Agrarian Revolutionary period by rejecting everything and everyone, discarding Liu Shaobai as well. Dividing his land and surplus property is one thing—but why subject him to random struggle? What is your policy?

From the landlord class, we should: (1) eliminate them as a class; (2) as individuals, if they do not oppose us, we should gather them in.

Those who can be retained:
(1) Those who cooperated in the past and did not oppose us should continue to cooperate; those who opposed us in the past but are now willing to cooperate should not be cast aside. The landlord and rich peasant population is 36 million. After eating the fish meat, the remaining fish bones still have their uses. These 36 million to 18 million fish bones, if gathered, are useful. Thirty-six million is a large labor force that must not be lightly discarded.

(2) As a class, they are pressed to the ground. But the state, which is composed of classes, oppresses other classes. Leaders must understand that these 36 million are still a form of wealth and should be utilized. People of the landlord class still have a role to play; now they are a productive force, in the future they will be friends (in five years), and then reserve proletarians. Now they must be forcibly reformed, and in the future, they will be reformed successfully.

We must treat them differentially. As long as they support the Land Law, high-ranking personnel should (1) have their land divided but not be subjected to struggle; (2) be subjected to struggle but not physical assault. Individual lawbreakers should be dealt with according to law. By resolving matters this way, people’s hearts will be settled, and we will have reason and justice on our side.

In the past, we did not solve problems comprehensively. The "three-thirds system" during the War of Resistance was successful, though the absorption of some members was individually inappropriate—inevitably, some had landlord-class thinking. We should make concessions and cooperate through the united front.

Corporal punishment and torture must be abolished. This issue was resolved long ago; our Party resolved it at the Ninth Congress of the Fourth Red Army, yet later beatings occurred again. It must be firmly abolished. Corporal punishment cannot be permitted. The only exception to principle and flexibility is when it truly arises from the righteous indignation of the masses, who insist on beating—then we cannot stop them.

Financial and economic issues: Northern Shaanxi and northwestern Shanxi face financial and economic difficulties, and famine is a major problem. Efforts must be made to resolve these issues, the conditions being to repel the enemy and drive them out, and to recover Linfen.

The Constitution: the draft prepared by the Central Committee should not be published hastily. First, publish a program; work on it after victory. If published inappropriately, it will isolate us. A promissory note should not be issued too early.

Whether to establish a central government should be considered after recovering the Ping-Sui Railway. Establishing a central government in Ruijin was unnecessary. There is no hurry to promulgate a constitution and establish a central government.

Part Two — Comrade Chen Yi’s record of some talks by Chairman Mao.

(1) Today’s opposition to "Left" must be viewed in conjunction with the previous Land Conference. The January decision was delayed in its release to allow various places to deliberate, so that opposing the "Left" would not pour cold water and cause a revival of the Right.

Chairman Mao repeatedly considered whether opposing the "Left" would pour cold water.

Last year’s Land Conference eradicated the Right—it was the greatest Party consolidation ever. Removing the stumbling blocks strengthened the Party’s ties with the people, washed away the thoughts of landlords and rich peasants who had infiltrated the Party and similar thinking among Party members, mobilized the masses, and passed a complete Land Law. It was a great conference that guarantees victory. Only by discussing the opposition to "Left" on this foundation will it not pour cold water. If we oppose the "Left" in isolation, that will pour cold water.

Last year’s Land Conference and Party Consolidation Conference were the mainstream of the Yellow River—a great current flowing to the other shore, flowing all the way to the sea, and it was successful. But it is insufficient to speak only of this. When the mainstream flowed into tributaries, it stirred up three splashes: infringing on the interests of middle peasants, destroying industry and commerce, and kicking aside non-party personages. If these three splashes are not countered, they could become a countercurrent. To counter these three splashes and correct these three "Leftist" tendencies is a complete spirit. Opposing the "Left" must not allow the restoration of Rightist tendencies, nor give them an excuse to say, "You went 'Left'—when the problem of the Right was solved, you came to correct the 'Left.'" This ensures the Right cannot influence policy again. If the "Left" is corrected well, it will better guarantee that the Right cannot be restored.

On the issue of middle peasants: to satisfy the demands of poor peasants and hired laborers by infringing upon the interests of middle peasants is like cutting out flesh to patch a sore—the loss outweighs the gain. The correct approach is to look after both poor peasants and hired laborers *and* middle peasants. If we only look after middle peasants but not well-to-do middle peasants and the new-type rich peasants like the Man-you type, we still cannot stabilize the middle peasants. We must tell poor peasants and hired laborers that they absolutely must get along well with middle peasants, well-to-do middle peasants, and new-type rich peasants. Your own future lies in becoming new-type rich peasants. Land alone cannot solve poverty; it can only solve part of the problem. In a village where poor peasants and hired laborers are truly in dire straits and cannot make a living, we can persuade middle peasants to make some adjustments for them, but coercive methods must not be used. To uphold and support the mainstream of land reform, we must look after well-to-do middle peasants and new-type rich peasants. In villages utterly destitute ("with only four bare walls"), the government must find ways to provide relief, and it is not absolutely necessary to create new-type rich peasants, well-to-do middle peasants, or middle peasants there.

Regarding the middle and petty bourgeoisie, we must not adopt adventurist policies.

The labor movement issue remains unresolved. Over the past twenty years, the labor movement’s policy has had a "Left" tradition. Even regarding industries in Chiang Kai-shek-controlled areas, it is not a policy of indiscriminate sabotage. Strikes can be used to oppose and sabotage the factories of bureaucratic capitalists, but toward middle and small capitalists, the policy should still be one of benefiting both labor and capital, in order to get through difficult times.

In the Liberated Areas, the leading position of workers should be adjusted. Beyond workers’ welfare, there are greater interests. We must also consider the interests of the entire Liberated Area and persuade workers to endure exploitation.

If we take Xi’an, should we struggle against the Yuhua Cotton Mill or the Liuyuan Da Refined Salt Company (with pre-war capital of over 20 million yuan)? Only in exceptional cases—if their connections to the Four Great Families are too deep and they are war criminals—can they be confiscated. Other than that, leave them alone. Even war criminals must be assessed by degree. We are still busy fighting Nanjing and Beijing; where do we have the time to deal with them?

Regarding non-party personages: some are friends who have shared hardships with us for ten or twenty years. To kick them aside today shows we think ourselves clever and others foolish. Our comrades know how to fight military battles—with large and small fortresses, inner moats, abatis, and many outer perimeters. But in political battles, we dispense with outer perimeters and thrust ourselves forward. Chiang Kai-shek has stripped away all his outer perimeters, making him easy to hit. In the future, we must set another table. Only on the issue of land will we make no concessions: anyone’s land must be divided (and they themselves will likewise receive a share). We must strictly adhere to this point and not pursue other matters.

On these three issues, phenomena of beating and killing people have emerged. Relying on more beatings and killings to solve problems indicates the Communist Party lacks ability. Those with ability place them under the supervision of the masses. If you’re not afraid of their opposition, 36 million is your capital (labor force), and you can’t kill them all at once. It’s not about sympathizing with landlords; it’s mainly because the masses don’t agree. If you kill, you’ll alienate the middle peasants, poor and hired peasants, small and middle bourgeoisie, and intellectuals—that’s dangerous too. How many will remain among the industrial and commercial sectors and soldiers?

When you go to Beijing, will you arrest Hu Shi? When you arrive in Nanjing, Dai Jitao, Yu Youren, and Sun Ke are war criminals—will you arrest them? Still, don’t arrest them. You could let Hu Shi serve as a library director. When the revolution reaches Nanjing and Shanghai, why would you still arrest them?

Indiscriminate killing demonstrates a lack of ability and discipline.

Destroying temples, historical sites, and ancient relics is not good. The Communist Party must show it has discipline and policies, policies that include strategies. What is the most urgent task? Anyone can act as if they’re in charge, with one person arbitrarily killing others. Presumably, multiple leadership organs or committees are needed? This issue must be handled uniformly and calmly. During the rescue movement, the masses felt righteous indignation toward spies and wanted to kill or beat them. This is a matter of leadership skill. If killing is to occur, it must go through legal procedures. If the masses truly want to beat them, it’s not necessarily about opposing the masses. During the rescue effort, no killing was permitted. Once the impulse to kill arises, the leadership must not simply echo it or waver under public resentment. If one link isn’t held tight, the entire chain will loosen. At that time, every day we reviewed materials—clearly, some were spies, and the question was whether to kill or not. After repeated consideration, we ultimately decided not to kill. Good leadership skill lies precisely here.

(II) The Situation in New Areas After the December Article Was Published

In new areas, from the very start, we implemented equal distribution of land, but the masses did not accept it. This was because the military situation in new areas was not yet stable, and the masses had not yet awakened. A great deal of effort was expended, but the results were minimal. The first time we distributed confiscated property and land, as soon as we left, the landlords rose again and killed work personnel. When we returned, the masses ignored us. So, in new areas, mechanically forcing land upon the peasants led to their rejection.

In old areas, equal distribution of land is not appropriate, especially regarding new rich peasants, well-to-do middle peasants, and middle peasants who own more land. Equal distribution will inevitably infringe upon the middle peasants, hence it arouses no interest. In old areas, work teams bypassed the Party branches to directly mobilize the masses, presenting landlords and rich peasants who had been overthrown over the past eight years under the guise of new hired peasants. They organized them to oppose old cadres. These circumstances gave rise to a new perspective, namely, the decision made at the January meeting to oppose three "wave crests," deciding that land reform must be differentiated by region—distinguishing new areas and semi-old areas, adopting different steps, applying land policies selectively, and not universally.

In old areas, equal distribution of land should generally not be carried out. Old areas generally refer to old base areas predating Japan’s surrender. After eight years of the War of Resistance, through rent and interest reduction, anti-traitor and liquidation struggles, the May Fourth Directive, land reviews, and so on, the land problem has essentially been resolved. What remains are only residual land issues, which are basically addressed through methods of selective supplementation and adjustment. In such areas, the old cadres should undergo reform, focusing primarily on issues of democratic movements and production movements, Party rectification, and the replacement of individual bad cadres. In these areas, middle peasants form the majority, while poor and hired peasants are very few. Landlords have already been overthrown. The production movement must take new rich peasants into account. In Shandong alone, there are twenty such counties (out of a total of 108 counties), and in northwestern Shanxi, 45 counties. In these areas, only selective supplementation of land is carried out. Some landlords are just beginning to change their class status (starting from 1942) and are peasants, not landlords. In special localities, equal distribution may be used; in general localities, selective supplementation is applied. Party rectification is carried out in a way that unites with the masses, develops the economy, and promotes democratic movements.

The second type of area is that which fell into our hands only during the great advance following Japan’s surrender. From late August 1945 to the present, two and a half years have passed. The May Fourth Directive was not implemented thoroughly. Basically, the approach of the September meeting was adopted: bypassing Party branches, even disbanding some of them, removing "stones," and carrying out thorough equal distribution, essentially applying the Land Law. In Shandong, the population increased from over seven million to over 30 million. Landlords and rich peasants hold the dominant position. Inside the Party, impurity exists, with some exploiting the Party to do evil. The middle and poor peasants have not yet obtained land, and the dominance of the masses and the Party has not yet been established. In some localities where implementation was relatively thorough, mechanical equal distribution is also not pursued.

The third type of area is that which has fallen into our hands since August of last year, called new areas (the previous type is also called semi-raw, semi-cooked areas). For example, the areas south of the Longhai Railway, Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu, and Henan-Hubei-Shaanxi regions are mainly arenas of military struggle. Local Party organizations are absent. The struggle between the enemy and us involves military maneuvers and seesaw advances. The conditions for agrarian revolution are still not met, and the Land Law cannot be implemented immediately. Land reform should proceed step by step. At the start, efforts should concentrate on striking big landlords and the big bureaucratic bourgeoisie, winning over small and medium landlords and intellectuals, protecting the small and middle bourgeoisie, utilizing the left wing of landlords and rich peasants to strike their right wing, neutralizing small and medium landlords, and striking big landlords. Absorb the better elements among the sons and daughters of landlords and rich peasants into the Party, enclosing them within our circle for gradual reform, so as to isolate Chiang Kai-shek. Organize local guerrilla forces. Once the masses’ awareness is raised and their apprehensions are reduced, then proceed in an orderly manner to equal distribution of land.

Different targets should be addressed with different steps to achieve the goal of land reform.

Equal distribution is a strategic task, to be achieved through different methods.

Prepare to complete it in three years in old and semi-old areas, five years in new areas, and ten years nationwide. There must be no rush.

When we first arrive in a new area, the masses welcome us warmly. We strike local tyrants and distribute confiscated property, but then people just leave and enthusiasm wanes. This is the result of mechanically imposing the Land Law.

The policy of rent and interest reduction plays a considerable role. It can win over the left wing of landlords and rich peasants to strike the right wing. When entering large cities, good elements among landlords and rich peasants can be absorbed in large numbers.

Land reform should be integrated with opposing the United States and Chiang Kai-shek.

Some people want to restore everything from the civil war period and abruptly discard many things learned during the War of Resistance. This is truly strange.

Several Issues:

(I) Leading cadres must shatter superstitions.

Dogma, cliques, superstition, Marxist-Leninist phrases—when blindness develops to a high degree of rigidity, it becomes superstition.

Winning a victory and then believing that from then on, one is invincible under heaven is a superstition that military force can solve all problems.

Narrow empiricism is also superstition—superstition that one’s experience can solve problems without analyzing the specific situation at the time.

“Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao” (referring to that book on the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao regarding the peasant and land question) is also superstition, believing that conformity to those points can solve problems.

Superstition must be shattered. Concrete things must be analyzed in detail. Marxism-Leninism means analyzing concrete problems concretely. When self-awareness increases, one can solve problems proactively. Our comrades are, to some extent, superstitious, clinging to abstract provisions and outdated practices from history. The fact that beatings and killings are so numerous is precisely because of the superstition that beating and killing can solve problems.

(II) Within the Party, there exist small-groupism, departmentalism, factional tendencies, problems with the attitudes of leading comrades, issues of ideological consciousness, and problems of asserting biases (often not highly principled among various comrades and units).

Comrades must be told: If you wish to criticize someone or uphold a principle, you have only this right—do not relax it. You must possess political courage to oppose what you consider inappropriate, but at the same time adopt lawful procedures. First, assist, support, and cooperate with the person. Only with this attitude, with this foundation, can you then level stern criticism. Only by first earning the qualification to criticize can the criticism then avoid causing confrontation. The same applies from superiors to subordinates. First, be approving and encouraging, sufficiently recognizing accomplishments, and thereby earn the freedom and position to criticize. Otherwise, lacking this qualification, you may provoke resistance. In some cases, the alternative is either causing confrontation or refraining from criticism entirely—saying nothing. But without criticism, there can be no progress. First, support, first approve, first speak of achievements, and then criticize. In this way, unity can certainly be achieved. Many people, when they speak, merely launch attacks on others.

Only focusing on touching other people’s "tigers’ buttocks" while fearing others will touch one’s own will not do. One must not be merely obsequious. One must oppose the tide. At all times, one must have a clear political stance. At crucial junctures, one absolutely must express one’s political stance, but must also pay attention to lawful procedures.

(III) Regarding views on people: Sometimes it is incorrect to say only that a person has shortcomings, or only that a person has merits. One should see both their merits and their shortcomings. Speak less in terms of "this person has merits but also shortcomings," or "this person has shortcomings but also merits." Zhang Guotao was a huge villain, but he had one merit: he was not impatient. By viewing him this way, even while discarding him, one can still derive some value from it.

(IV) Within the Party, some people’s standards are too broad, while others’ are too narrow. If the measure doesn’t fit, they discard. Like a string on a stringed instrument: if it’s stretched too tight and the pitch is too high, the string will snap. Being excessively strict and severe leaves people at a loss as to what to do. It should be: “In great virtue, do not overstep the bounds; in small virtues, some flexibility is permissible.”

There is a type of person who is flexible but not serious, not sharp. Their virtue is broadness; their flaw is behaving weakly in the face of adverse currents. They should be sharp and dare to oppose adverse currents. Confucius said: “In our group, there are those who are wildly bold and those who are cautiously restrained. The wildly bold advance with zeal; the restrained refrain from doing certain things.” One must have an enterprising spirit. The wildly bold are daring, broad in measure, able to act freely, but their circle is not tightly drawn. The cautiously restrained are overly prudent and meticulous. These two qualities should be balanced and reconciled.

(V) Reports must definitely be made regularly. Implement the system of submitting a report every two months. You must write them personally. The requirement is to reflect reality, raise problems, and solve problems. On matters that require resolution, send a telegram to consult the Central Committee. Past situations include: one type, where no report is made at all, as if the “head office” has been forgotten; another type, where reports are fragmentary, leaving people bewildered after reading them; yet another type, where reports speak mostly of good things and do not address shortcomings—only good news is reported, not worries. After reading, one is still bewildered. When everything said is good, one feels at ease, but then a disaster suddenly appears, and one is caught off guard. Reports can help the Central Committee solve problems while also gaining the Central Committee’s assistance.