Talk at the Yangjiagou Enlarged Central
Committee Meeting
 (December 25 and 28, 1947)
 (1)
Today I will talk a bit about three issues—the situation between the enemy and
ourselves, the united front, and British-American-Soviet relations.
The first issue is the situation between the enemy and ourselves. Regarding
from now on we should all call it an offensive.2 On the economic front, Chiang

Kaishek’s situation this year is already quite grave. We are currently also facing difficulties, particularly in the two areas of Shandong and northern Shaanxi,
but our difficulties can be resolved. Fundamentally speaking, this is because we
have undertaken land reform, whereas Chiang Kaishek has not; furthermore,
after our main forces fought outwards, the burdens on the Liberated Areas were
reduced. Land reform and Party rectification in the Liberated Areas is back on
does not fully encompass the situation. The first phase of the war had the quality of selfdefense, and our directive at that time was to delay a civil war. Now we need to eliminate
Chiang Kaishek and we are no longer defending ourselves.” has entered a high tide, and in the future it will surge even higher. Before, we hoped
that the cities would join the revolutionary upsurge and break out in rebellion, but
it now appears that this will be very difficult and there will only be the type of
coordination with outside forces from within the cities that occurred in the liberation of Paris and in the Northern Expeditionary Army’s occupation of Shanghai.
will be decided on the basis of the level of mass consciousness in the major cities
and in the South. We will therefore strive to continue the war without interruption,
and for now we will set out to do the work of revealing the Guomindang’s phony
peace negotiations. Not relying on outside help (which is different from not wanting
outside help) has been our overarching policy historically, and it is entirely possible.
We will rely on our own efforts and correct policies, and we will rely on the masses
to strive for ultimate victory in the war.
The second issue is the united front. Our principle is to isolate the enemy and
not ourselves. Our Party was not isolated at the time of the Northern Expeditionary
policy we adopted was to both unite with him and also to struggle against him.
Resolutely struggling against Chiang Kaishek’s anti-popular policy is anti-rightism, but if we had only struggled against him and not cooperated with him, and if
we had not stopped confiscating the landlords’ land and had changed to reducing
wavering nature. Regarding the rightist elements among the upper levels of the
petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie, attacking them politically and annihilating them economically are two different matters and the two cannot be confused; during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, some of the “left” opportunists
within the Party mixed up the two. Right now, on the question of how to treat the
centrist elements, we must oppose both rightism and “leftism.” Third, opposing
rightist tendencies in land reform and Party rectification means opposing cadres
who vacillate in the struggle to annihilate the feudalist class and eliminate the bad
elements within the Party. Of course, it is also necessary to oppose the “leftist”
tendencies, and during civil war it is even easier to commit “leftist” errors. The
struggle to annihilate the feudalist class, like the struggle against the United States
and Chiang, demands that we be courageous on matters regarding the big picture
and cautious regarding more concrete struggles. However, we have some comrades who are just the opposite; they pay too much attention to the abstract enemy
and not enough attention to the actual enemy. On the land question, opposing
“leftism” primarily consists of opposing risky policies toward the middle peasants; even if there is only one case of a middle peasant being mistakenly considered a landlord and being made to suffer, we must still do all we can to see that it
is rectified. In the countryside, according to estimates of household numbers, only
8 percent or so are landlords or rich peasants, while middle peasants, poor peasants, and hired laborers together account for 90 percent, and this alignment cannot
be confused. But a number of comrades do not have a correct conception of this
point. Some distinctions also need to be made concerning landlords and rich peasants; the “Outline Land Law” has already stipulated that some distinctions will be
made among the peasantry. Among the peasantry, no distinction will be made
regarding the elimination of feudalist exploitation and the equal distribution of
land, but distinctions will be made concerning the disposal of assets (except in the
case of individual local despots). The distribution of land cannot be done in an
absolutely egalitarian way. Picking fights with the middle peasantry because there
are too few landlords or rich peasants in a certain area is also not right. We should
seek agreement with the middle peasantry on issues relating to them. On the land
question, we definitely want to handle the matter of the middle peasantry well,
and on the question of the cities, we definitely want to handle the matter of the
petty bourgeoisie well. We definitely do not want to repeat the errors of the
Agrarian Revolutionary War; one-sidedly emphasizing the interests of the workers was a mistake. In the factories, laborers and capitalists can map out production
plans together, and in shops both sides can determine business plans together.
Benefiting both laborers and capitalists, and both public and private, is neither
“left” nor right. As for policies concerning students and intellectuals, we also do
not want to commit “leftist” errors; in this regard, the Yan’an cadre vetting should
serve as a serious lesson. In the Guomindang areas, the anti-Chiang struggles of organizations such as the Democratic Alliance are of great use to us, and Feng
Yuxiang’s anti-Chiang activities in America13 are also beneficial to us. “Other
patriots” refers to enlightened gentry, such as the landlords Li Dingming, Liu
Shaobai,14 and others; they have weathered all kinds of adversity with us, and as
long as they in no way hinder land reform, we must take into consideration the
distinctions in these people’s situations, allowing certain individuals to remain in
the upper levels of our government. Right now, the slogan of building a coalition
government should still be raised, and the “three thirds system” does not need to
be raised. Regarding the question of whether to kill reactionaries, we cannot kill
none, but also we cannot kill too many; on this question, we are to oppose both
“leftism” and “rightism.” If not a single one is killed, the masses will not approve;
but not killing too many also is considered in the interests of the masses and not
merely the interests of a small number of people. As long as a person is not
actively sabotaging the revolutionary war or land reform he should not be killed,
and he can be retained as labor. Concerning foreigners, we still need people such
as Henry Wallace,15 and the Central Committee’s instructions of October 27th
should be revised on this point.16 Wallace opposes war and advocates uniting with
the Soviet Union, and his connections with America’s big capitalist class are quite
limited; he primarily represents the middle and petty bourgeoisie and moreover he
depends on the workers. Regarding the question of the relationship between the leaders and the followers in the revolutionary united front, there are two conditions needed for the Communist Party to realize a leadership role: the first is that
we must lead the followers in a resolute struggle against the enemy, the second is
that we must provide the followers with material welfare and political education.
The question of the Communist Party’s rights of leadership should now be discussed openly, for if it is not discussed openly, the thinking of Party members,
cadres, and the masses might easily become muddled, and the bad points will
outweigh the good.
The third issue is the relationship between England, America, and the Soviet
Union.17 There are two ways of considering this question; one is that they are
either coming to a compromise or splitting apart, the other is that on certain questions (including some very important questions) they are coming to a compromise either earlier or later. In my view, the second way, not the first, is correct.
The reactionary elements of the world want to have a Third World War and the
danger of such a war occurring is quite real, but war is also entirely avoidable.
So-called “compromise” is of course not compromise on each and every issue;
that would be impossible. But America and the Soviet Union will compromise
sooner or later. In the future, America still wants to do a great deal of business
with the Soviet Union and that requires compromise. This kind of compromise
is a democratic compromise and not an opportunistic compromise. The Soviet
Union is a large country, and its compromise will quite likely have a considerable
effect on the people’s struggle in China, France, Italy, and other countries, but it is
absolutely more than a compromise among the great powers; the people of other
countries will all follow with domestic compromises. The overarching policy of
the people of all nations should be to carry out different types of struggle according to their different circumstances.
(2)
This is a meeting one can be happy about; like the Luochuan18 conference, it is
being held as a new situation is unfolding. Japan’s surrender was a great event for us, but at the same time it brought another new worry because just as the Japanese
were on their way out, the Americans came in to aid Chiang Kaishek in fighting
the civil war. The question of the relative strength between Chiang Kaishek and
us was not resolved when the Central Committee published the “February 1st
Directive”19 of this year and when we were preparing to retreat from Yan’an, and
indeed we did in fact retreat eventually, but now the question has been resolved.
The question of comparative superiority, unresolved for twenty years, is resolved
today. Not only the leadership sees this as so but also the masses of people agree.
At the time of the Northern Expedition, the revolutionary struggle experienced a
short-term unfolding, but then came the Guomindang’s oppression. Throughout
the entire period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War we suffered this oppression;
there were very few places where we could survive, and there were many disputes
within the Party. After the Long March, the situation was even more difficult. For
a period of time after the Japanese surrender, I did not write any essays because I
had to act cautiously and deliberately, and I could only make estimations regarding the situation and could not draw any conclusions. Now the international and
domestic situations are much clearer, the people’s war of liberation is currently
achieving uninterrupted victory, Chiang Kaishek has been isolated, and land
reform and Party rectification are back on track. During this conference, the comrades responsible for the Shaan[xi]-Gan[su]-Ning[xia] and [Shanxi]-Sui[yuan]
regions have all spoken very well and very satisfactorily, and they have shown
themselves to be politically mature. The line in northwestern Shanxi taken by
comrades He Long, Li Jingquan,20 and Xi Zhongxun is correct, and the ShanxiSuiyuan Letter to the Peasants21 is generally correct. The Northwest Field Army
under the leadership of Comrade Peng Dehuai has made a great effort to shift from
defense and to fulfill its enormous task, as a result of which there is a great difference between this conference and the one held in July of this year at Xiaohe. This
conference has passed a document,22 and from now on this document will serve as
our blueprint in the fight to topple Chiang Kaishek. Our stance on the three objectives of opposing American imperialism, overthrowing bureaucratic capitalism,
and overthrowing feudalism is correct; the overarching policy of uniting with the
middle peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie against these three great enemies is
also correct. It appears as though this article has not raised any new questions; the turning point in the revolutionary war of which it speaks has already become a
matter of history, not to mention the history of struggle against Chiang Kaishek;
the ten great military principles are also not new, it is only the way of summarizing them that is new; the land question has already been resolved at the National
Land Conference, and the question of the middle peasantry was already resolved
earlier; here it is just a matter of especially emphasizing it; the question of the petty
bourgeoisie was also resolved earlier, but here and now it has a special significance. Because the matter of opposing right deviations has already been resolved
at the National Land Conference, the Northwestern Shanxi Conference, and the
Yihezhen Conference,23 the new issue that we want to resolve here at this conference is the “leftist” deviation that has recently emerged concerning issues of the
middle peasantry, the petty and middle bourgeoisie, and some personages outside
of the Party. The reason why the issue of the middle peasants is being brought up
once again is because in northwestern Shanxi a serious problem occurred when
class background was being determined, and that was the erroneous emphasis on
not uniting with the middle peasants. A deviation has also emerged over the issue
of the petty and middle bourgeoisie: We have some comrades who have experienced some doubts or are wavering concerning the policy of uniting with the petty
and middle bourgeoisie in economic work. The Yihezhen Conference was better
than a river, for in this river, eight out of ten waves were good, but the two waves
of failing to resolve the issue of the middle peasants and the petty and middle
bourgeoisie and of the emergence of deviation were bad, When “leftist” tendencies become a current, Communist Party members must counter this current, just
as during the War of Resistance we opposed the tide of capitulationist tendencies.
Regarding personages outside of the Party, in the past the Central Committee did
not resolve this question, but today it has been resolved. Landlords should be
eliminated as a class, but in terms of individual people, they should be accorded
different treatments depending on their distinct situations. During land reform, we
can employ the method of singling out members of the landlord class who supported the Land Law, or members of the upper class who cooperated with us in
the past, and not struggle against them. Apart from individuals who have committed capital offenses and thus should be executed, in general it is more appropriate
to adopt the above method toward other people.
Regarding the question of whether to beat people, in principle the Communist
Party advocates abolishing corporal punishment. This principle has been the slogan of the democratic capitalists opposing feudalism, and the proletariat should
accept this legacy. A resolution I wrote for the ninth Fourth Red Army Party

Congress in 1929 proposed abolishing corporal punishment,24 but the use of corporal punishment still occurred afterwards. Even in Yan’an, corporal punishment
was still not entirely done away with; this was an expression of the Communist
Party’s lack of capability and reliance on feudalistic methods. Now we must reiterate that the Communist Party absolutely does not encourage beating people and
absolutely will not institutionalize beating people; this is our principle.
This year, the finances of the Shanxi-Suiyuan region faced difficulties, and
famine occurred in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region; these are serious
problems, and the utmost effort must be exerted to solve them. I have faith that the
comrades in these two regions can solve these problems.
Regarding a constitution, one will not be promulgated in the near future, as
drafting a constitution too early is disadvantageous, but we should set about doing
the research. Regarding organizing the central government of the revolution, it
is not being considered for now, and we should wait until Chiang Kaishek is in
even more dire straits and we achieve even greater victories; at the very least, we
should wait until after the [Bei]ping-Sui[yuan] railway has been cleared and then
consider this matter.

---

Notes

The source of our text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 328–40.
1.  Andrei Zhdanov (1896–1948) was a member of the Politburo of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union and vice-chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union.
Vyacheslav Molotov (1890–1986) was a Politburo member and vice-chairman of the
Soviet Council of Ministers.
2.  The version of this speech that Chen Yi transmitted on February 21, 1948, contains
the following words: “On the military front, since we transitioned into an offensive in July
of this year, Chiang Kaishek has been put on the defensive, so the complexion of our military affairs has changed completely. For ten or twenty years, we were on guard, we were
in the position of ‘bandits’; we did not advance on the enemy or attack the enemy. During
the War of Resistance, we were still divided and in a defensive position. In July 1947, we
launched an offensive for the first time in history. This was a revolutionary attack. We
should not use the term ‘counteroffensive,’ because it carries the implication of defense and
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-63
3.  The “Outline Land Law” was passed at the Chinese Communist Party’s All-China
Land Meeting on September 13, 1947, and it was promulgated by the Central Committee
on October 10, 1947.
4.  This refers to the Conference on Land Reform held by the Central Committee Work
Group in Xibaipo, in Jianping county, Hebei, from July 17 to 19, 1947, which summed up
the experience of land reform implemented following the “May Fourth Directive” of 1946,
corrected the rightist trend within land reform, confirmed the policy of ensuring equal distribution of land, drafted and passed the “Outline Land Law,” and decided to organize land
reform and Party rectification together.
5.  He Long was commander of the Shaan-Gan-Ning-Jin-Sui (Shaanxi-Gansu-NingxiaShanxi-Suiyuan) Joint Defense Force, and Xi Zhongxun was political commissar of the
Shaan-Gan-Ning-Jin-Sui Joint Defense Force.
6.  Shanxi-Suiyuan Daily was the newspaper of the Central Committee’s Shanxi-Suiyuan Bureau. It began publication as War of Resistance Daily on September 18, 1940, but
its name was changed on July 1, 1946. The newspaper ceased publication on May 1, 1949.
Combat Bulletin, an organ of the Political Department of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Military
Region, began publication in October 1936. It was moved to the Northwest Military Region
in April 1949 and ceased publication in 1950. Border Region Masses Bulletin, which began
publication on March 25, 1940, was a popular newspaper for peasant-class cadres and
peasant readers in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.
7.  The Guomindang government issued the “General Mobilization Order to Suppress
the Communist Bandits’ Armed Rebellion” on July 4, 1947.
8.  This refers to the Three Principles of the People Youth Corps, which was established
on July 9, 1938, and was incorporated into the Guomindang on June 30, 1947.
9.  Chen Duxiu was one of the main founders of the Chinese Communist Party and was
one of the main leaders of the Party during its first six years. Chen was accused of rightdeviating capitulation during the First Revolution.
10.  During the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Communist base areas established
a political structure in which one-third of the personnel were Communist Party members,
one-third were leftist progressives, and one-third were centrists and others.
11.  See “Manifesto of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” October 10, 1947, in
this volume.
12.  This refers to the advance on the Central Plains from July to September 1947, by
the combined fighting forces of Deng Xiaoping, Chen Geng, Xie Fuzhi, Lin Biao, Chen
Yi, Su Yu, and others.
13.  Feng Yuxiang (1882–1948, born in Chaohu, Anhui) previously served as vice-president of the Guomindang’s Military Council. In September 1946, he went to the United
States to observe water conservancy and irrigation, and while there he actively and openly
assisted the opposition to the civil war and the Nationalist government, and he published
articles stating that U.S. foreign policy on China was following the wrong path.
14.  Li Dingming (1881–1947, native of Shaanxi), a member of the enlightened gentry,
served as vice-chairman of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government. Liu
Shaobai (1883–1968, native of Shanxi) was vice-chairman of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Provisional Council. During the Land Reform Movement, he voluntarily surrendered his family’s land and extra houses to the people’s government.
15.  Henry A. Wallace (1888–1965) was an American political activist and agronomist.
While vice-president of the United States under Franklin D. Roosevelt from 1941 to 1945,
he emphasized international cooperation, supported China’s resistance against Japan, and
opposed appeasing Japan. In June 1944, President Roosevelt sent him to China to persuade
Chiang Kaishek to maintain cooperation between the Guomindang and the CPC against
the Japanese and to strengthen the relationship between China and the Soviet Union. He
resigned from his position as Secretary of Commerce in 1946 because he disagreed with
Truman’s containment policy toward the Soviet Union.
16.  This refers to the part of the Central Committee’s directive that states: “Today, we
need to cut off all of those classes, political parties, and leaders who still have dreams of
America and of Chiang; tomorrow, we will also need to cut off even the classes, political parties, and American leaders such as Wallace who oppose Truman, and compatriots
such as Li Jishen [ed.: (1885–1959, born in Cangwu county, Wuzhou)], a Chinese military
commander serving in the Fourth Army of the Republic of China. After opposing Chiang
Kaishek, he was expelled from the Guomindang in 1947 for issuing a statement calling for
reconciliation with the Chinese Communist Party that opposes Chiang.”
17.  In April 1946, Mao Zedong expressed deep pessimism regarding international relations in “Some Points in Appraisal of the Present International Situation,” which he initially
circulated among only a few members of the Central Committee leadership (see the document of that name in Vol. IX, pp. 261–262, of this series). The document was approved at
an enlarged Central Committee meeting.
18.  The Luochuan conference refers to the enlarged meeting of the Central Committee Politburo held from August 22 to 25, 1937, in Luochuan of northern Shaanxi, during
which the “Central Committee Resolution on the Present Situation and Party Tasks” and
the “Chinese Communist Party’s Guiding Principles for Resisting the Japanese and Saving the Nation” were passed, and Mao drafted the outline “For the Mobilization of All the
Nation’s Forces to Achieve Victory in the War of Resistance” on behalf of the Central Committee Propaganda Department. See Vol. VI of this series.
19.  See “Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the
Current Situation and Tasks,” February 1, 1947, in Vol. IX, pp. 476–83, of this series.
20.  Li Jingquan was secretary of the Central Committee’s Shanxi-Suiyuan Sub-Bureau
and political commissar of the Jin-Sui [Shanxi-Suiyuan] Military Region.
21.  This refers to the “Shanxi-Suiyuan Border Region Peasants’ Association Provisional Committee Letter to the Peasants,” issued on September 24, 1947. The letter referred
to the need to thoroughly defeat the landlord class and thoroughly expunge feudalism, to
equally distribute land and fairly distribute its fruits, and to thoroughly develop democracy
and supervise all organizations and cadres.

--- Notes

the international situation, the Soviet Union’s Zhdanov, Molotov,1 and others
have already discussed it, and more comprehensively than we have. I would like
now to focus on saying a few things about the domestic situation. At present, the
domestic situation has already undergone a fundamental change. On the political
front, in the Guomindang areas the trend in popular feeling has changed, Chiang
Kaishek has been isolated, and the vast masses of the people now stand on our
side. For a long time in the past, the question of isolating Chiang Kaishek was
not resolved. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War we were the ones who
were more isolated. Upon entering the period of the War of Resistance Against
Japan, Chiang Kaishek gradually lost mass support and we gradually gained
mass support, but the issue was still not fundamentally resolved. This issue was
not resolved until the last one or two years following the victory of the War of
Resistance. On the military front, Chiang Kaishek has already shifted to defense
and we have shifted to offense. Previously, we referred to moving to the front
lines and fighting a “counteroffensive,” but that is not entirely appropriate, and

track. Promulgation of the “Outline Land Law”3 was a major event. Previously,
the centrist parties advised us to issue public bonds to buy the landlords’ land, but
now we are undertaking equal land redistribution and the centrist parties support
this. Before, and particularly after, the National Conference on Land Reform,4
land reform efforts and Party rectification all got moving in the Liberated Areas.
Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, Henan, and the Northeast have done their best with this
aspect of work; the Northeast was able to build a very large army within a short
period of time, primarily because of its competence in handling land reform. The
land reform question is most serious in Shandong and the Northwest. The direction of work in the Shanxi-Suiyuan region is correct, although there are probably
some flaws or mistakes. The conference held by He Long and Xi Zhongxun5 was
run very well, and was very necessary. Recently, Shanxi-Suiyuan Daily, Combat
Bulletin, and Border Region Masses Bulletin6 have all been run in such a way that
they have attracted many readers, indicating the correct direction of their work.
The domestic situation will continue to change significantly over the course of
the coming year, and this change will be beneficial to us. The Chinese Revolution

The mass movements in the cities did not subside after Chiang Kaishek announced
the “General Mobilization Order,”7 and the children of landlords and rich peasants
did not rebel against us during land reform, but rather they rebelled against Chiang
Kaishek, and now the Three People’s Principles Youth Group8 is utterly gloomy
and dejected. In wartime, the revolutionary high tide was primarily manifested in
military victories, not only in China but also in foreign countries. The war is still
long term; enemies as strong as Chiang Kaishek and the U.S. imperialists will not
readily succumb to defeat. The likelihood that the United States will send troops to
help Chiang Kaishek fight the civil war is very small, but it cannot be said that the
possibility does not exist; the Americans are only afraid that the Soviet Union will
also send troops, otherwise they would not think twice about initiating an undeclared war against us. We should be prepared for the war to continue another four
or five years, and possibly even longer. The war needs to be carried out without
interruption; we cannot allow Chiang Kaishek to rest, consolidate, train, or replenish his troops at any time. But we cannot be too rigid about this point, as there may
be a year or half a year of interruption, for instance if Chiang Kaishek steps down
or sends someone to talk peace with us. At that time, the question of war or peace

War, but subsequently we were isolated because of Chen Duxiu’s9 rightism; we
became divorced from the masses, the peasants, and the army. At the time of the
Agrarian Revolutionary War, the primary trait of opportunism within the Party
was “leftism,” which was first manifested in the work in the cities. This caused us to be isolated, and afterwards no matter how we tried to establish ourselves in the
cities, we were simply unable to do so and we had no choice but to retreat back to
the countryside. Back in the countryside, they [the left opportunists] also exhibited “leftism” with respect to the military struggle and “leftism” with respect to
land policy and industry and commerce policy. They made red-white antagonism
absolute; carried out an excessively leftist policy against the middle and petty
bourgeoisie classes and one-sidedly emphasized workers’ interests, rapidly causing industry and commerce to collapse; and they advocated that no land be dispersed to landlords and only poor land be dispersed to rich peasants, while also
harming the interests of some middle peasants. Of course, our Party still had [the
support of] the masses in the countryside; you cannot say it was completely isolated among the peasants. In short, during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the
result of carrying out a “left” policy was that we were unable to isolate Chiang
Kaishek, but rather we isolated ourselves. During the War of Resistance Against
Japan, we isolated Chiang Kaishek (if we had waited until after the victory in the
War of Resistance to isolate him, there would not have been enough time); the

rents and reducing interest rates, and had not carried out the “three-thirds system”10
and other such policies, the masses would not have understood us. The Party was
entirely correct to carry out these policies during the War of Resistance. Our past
practice of absorbing some of the more open-minded members of the gentry into
the work of the government was entirely necessary, and in the future after we have
occupied Xi’an, Taiyuan, Shanghai, and other places it will still be necessary. The
differentiated policies toward Chiang personnel stipulated in “The Manifesto of
the Chinese People’s Liberation Army”11 are also entirely necessary. We should
oppose not only rightism but also “leftism” in order to clearly delineate boundaries and avoid creating our own isolation or defeat. Currently, opposing rightism
means first and foremost opposing overestimating the enemy, not daring to fight
in the Guomindang-controlled areas, and fearing America. Since the Americans
have been operating in China for this long, we have a better feel for them and they
are actually not all that frightening. The Third Route Army under Liu, Deng, and
others dispatched troops to the Guomindang areas12 and within a month resolved their clothing problems. This proves that fighting in the Guomindang areas is not
that frightening. Second, [opposing rightism] means opposing an unclear or muddled understanding of the centrist elements or one that underestimates their

22.  See “The Present Situation and Our Tasks,” December 25, 1947, in this volume.

23.  The Northwestern Shanxi Conference may refer to the meeting of the prefectural
Party secretaries held by the Central Committee’s Shanxi-Suiyuan Sub-Bureau on May 7,
1947, at Haojiapo in Linxian, Shanxi, to discuss the problem of land reform. The Yihezhen
Conference refers to the meeting on implementing the “Outline Land Law” held by the
Central Committee’s Northwest Bureau on November 1, 1947, in Yihezhen, Suide, Shaanxi.

24.  “The Abolition of Corporal Punishment,” December 1927, Mao Zedong wenji, Vol.
1, pp. 107–10.