Today I will discuss three issues: the situation between the enemy and ourselves, the united front, and the relations among Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

First, the situation between the enemy and ourselves.

Regarding the international situation, the Soviet Union’s Zhdanov, Molotov [2], and others have already spoken about it, more comprehensively than we have. I will now focus on the domestic situation. The domestic situation has now undergone a fundamental change. Politically, the mood of the people in the Kuomintang-controlled areas has shifted; Chiang Kai-shek has become isolated, and the broad masses of the people have come over to our side. The problem of isolating Chiang Kai-shek remained unresolved for a long period in the past. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War, we were relatively isolated. After entering the War of Resistance, Chiang Kai-shek gradually lost popular support while we gradually gained it, but the problem was still not fundamentally resolved. It was only in the past year or two, after the victory in the War of Resistance, that this problem was finally resolved. Militarily, Chiang Kai-shek has shifted to the defensive, and we have shifted to the offensive. Previously, we called shifting to exterior-line operations a counteroffensive, which was not entirely appropriate; from now on, it should be called an offensive [3]. Economically, Chiang Kai-shek’s situation has become very serious this year. We are also facing difficulties now, especially in Shandong and northern Shaanxi, but our difficulties can be overcome. Fundamentally, this is because we have carried out land reform while Chiang Kai-shek has not; in addition, after our main forces struck outward, the burden on the liberated areas was reduced. Land reform and Party consolidation in the liberated areas have been set on the right track. The promulgation of the Outline Land Law [4] was a major event. Previously, the middle-of-the-roaders had urged us to issue public bonds to purchase the land of landlords; now that we are carrying out equal distribution of land, they also approve. Before, and especially after, the Land Conference [5], land reform and Party consolidation in all liberated areas have been set in motion on a broad scale. The Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan and Northeast regions have done the best work in this regard; the Northeast established a very large army in a short period, mainly thanks to land reform. The land problem is most serious in Shandong and the Northwest. The direction of work in the Shanxi-Suiyuan area is correct, although there may be some shortcomings and mistakes. The conference presided over by He Long and Xi Zhongxun [6] was very well conducted and very necessary. Recently, the *Shanxi-Suiyuan Daily*, *Combat Daily*, and *Border Region Masses Daily* [7] have all become very appealing to readers, which is a sign that the direction of work is correct. From now until next year, the domestic situation will undergo further great changes, changes favorable to us. The Chinese revolution has already entered a high tide, and it will rise even higher in the future. Previously, we had hoped that urban uprisings would coordinate with the revolutionary high tide, but now it seems this is very difficult; we can only have coordination from within and without, like the liberation of Paris and the Northern Expeditionary Army’s capture of Shanghai [8]. The urban mass movement did not decline after Chiang Kai-shek issued the "General Mobilization Order" [9]; after land reform, students from landlord and rich peasant backgrounds are not rebelling against us but against Chiang Kai-shek. Now the Three People’s Principles Youth League [10] is completely dejected. During wartime, the revolutionary high tide is mainly manifested in military victories; this is true not only in China but also in other countries. The war will still be protracted; such powerful enemies as Chiang Kai-shek and U.S. imperialism will not be willing to accept defeat. The possibility of the United States directly sending troops to help Chiang Kai-shek fight the civil war is very small, but it cannot be said to be absolutely nonexistent. The Americans are only afraid that the Soviet Union might also send troops; otherwise, they would not care about launching an undeclared war against us. We must still prepare for the war to last four or five more years, and possibly even longer. The war needs to be waged continuously, without giving Chiang Kai-shek time to rest, regroup, and replenish. But this cannot be stated as an absolute certainty; there may be interruptions of a year or half a year. For example, if Chiang Kai-shek steps down and puts forward someone else to negotiate peace, the question of war or peace at that time will have to be decided based on the level of consciousness of the masses in the big cities and the South. Therefore, we must strive to keep the war going on without interruption and must now begin work to expose the Kuomintang’s phony peace talks. Not relying on foreign aid (which does not mean rejecting foreign aid) has always been our policy, and it is entirely achievable. We must rely on our own efforts and correct policies, and rely on the masses, to win victory in the war.

Second, the united front.

Our principle is to isolate the enemy, not to isolate ourselves. During the Northern Expedition, our Party was originally not isolated; later, it became isolated due to Chen Duxiu’s [11] right-leaning errors, becoming detached from the masses, the peasants, and the army. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the main characteristic of opportunism within the Party was "leftism," first manifested in urban work. Not only did it isolate us, but later we could hardly maintain a foothold in the cities and had to retreat to the countryside. Once in the countryside, they again exhibited "leftism" in military struggle and in land and industrial-commercial policies. They made the antagonism between Red and White areas absolute; adopted excessively left policies toward the middle and petty bourgeoisie, one-sidedly stressing workers’ interests and quickly ruining industry and commerce; advocated that landlords should receive no land and rich peasants only poor land, and harmed the interests of a portion of the middle peasants. Of course, our Party still had a following among the peasants in the countryside; it cannot be said that we were completely isolated among the peasants. In short, as a result of implementing "left" policies during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, we failed to isolate Chiang Kai-shek and instead isolated ourselves. During the War of Resistance, we isolated Chiang Kai-shek (if we had waited until after the victory in the War of Resistance to isolate him, it would have been too late). We adopted a strategy of both uniting with him and struggling against him. Resolutely struggling against Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-popular policies was to oppose rightism. But if we had only struggled and not cooperated with him, not stopped confiscating landlords’ land and instead implemented reduction of rent and interest, and not implemented policies like the "three-thirds system" [12], the masses would not have understood us. The Party’s implementation of these policies during the War of Resistance was entirely correct. In the past, it was absolutely necessary for us to bring some enlightened gentry into government work, and it will still be necessary in the future after we occupy places like Xi’an, Taiyuan, and Shanghai. The different policies toward personnel on Chiang Kai-shek’s side stipulated in the *Declaration of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army* [13] are also absolutely necessary. We must oppose both rightism and "leftism" in order to draw clear lines and avoid causing our own isolation and defeat. In opposing rightism now, the first task is to oppose overestimating the enemy, not daring to go into Kuomintang areas to fight, and fearing the United States. The United States has been meddling in China for so long; now we can see it clearly—it is actually not so fearsome. The three armies under Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, and others that marched into Kuomintang areas [14] solved the problem of winter clothing within a month, proving that fighting in Kuomintang areas is not fearsome either. The second task is to oppose unclear understanding of the middle-of-the-roaders and underestimating their vacillation. Regarding the right-wing elements of the upper petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie, political blows and economic elimination are two different things and must not be confused. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the "left" opportunists within the Party confused these two points. Now, on the question of dealing with the middle-of-the-roaders, we must oppose both rightism and "leftism." Third, in the work of land reform and Party consolidation, opposing right-leaning tendencies means opposing the wavering, weak, and feeble stance of some cadres in the struggle to eliminate the feudal class and expel bad elements from the Party. Of course, we must also oppose "left" tendencies; during the civil war period, it is easier to commit "left" errors. The struggle to eliminate the feudal class, like the struggle against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek, requires us to be bold on overall issues and cautious in specific struggles. Yet some of our comrades do the opposite, attaching importance to abstract enemies and belittling concrete enemies. On the land question, opposing "leftism" mainly means opposing adventurist policies toward the middle peasants. Even if only one middle peasant household is wrongly targeted as a landlord, we must pay great attention to correcting it. In the countryside, calculated by household, landlords and rich peasants account for only about 8 percent, while middle peasants, poor peasants, and hired peasants together account for 90 percent. This alignment must not be confused, yet many comrades lack a firm concept of this. Some distinctions must also be made between landlords and rich peasants. The *Outline Land Law* already has provisions, and the peasants will also make distinctions. Between them, there is no distinction on the question of eliminating feudal exploitation and equally distributing land, but there is a distinction on the question of disposing of property (except for individual local tyrants). Land distribution must not pursue absolute egalitarianism. Because local landlords and rich peasants are too few, dragging the middle peasants down to the same level is also wrong. On matters related to the middle peasants, their consent must be sought. On the land question, the issue of the middle peasants must be handled properly; on the urban question, the issue of the middle and petty bourgeoisie must be handled properly. We must absolutely not repeat the mistakes of the Agrarian Revolutionary War period; one-sidedly stressing workers’ interests is wrong. In factories, labor and management can jointly formulate production plans; in shops, they can jointly formulate business plans. Benefit both labor and capital, benefit both public and private—this is neither "left" nor right. Regarding students and intellectuals, we must also not commit "left" errors in policy; the Yan’an cadre screening was a serious lesson. In Kuomintang areas, the anti-Chiang Kai-shek struggles of groups like the Democratic League are of great help to us; Feng Yuxiang’s anti-Chiang Kai-shek activities in the United States [15] are also beneficial to us. "Other patriotic personages" refers to enlightened gentry, such as Li Dingming and Liu Shaobai [16] from the landlord class. They have shared hardships with us; under conditions that in no way hinder land reform, it is necessary to give them consideration according to their individual circumstances, and a few individuals may even remain in our higher-level governments. Now, the slogan of establishing a coalition government should still be raised, but the "three-thirds system" need not be mentioned anymore. On the question of whether to execute reactionaries: we cannot refrain from executing any, nor can we execute too many. On this issue, too, we oppose both "leftism" and rightism. The masses would not approve of executing none; that we must not execute too many is also out of consideration for the masses, not for a minority. As long as a person does not actively sabotage the revolutionary war and land reform, they can be spared execution and kept as labor power. As for foreigners, people like Wallace [17] are still needed by us; the Central Committee’s directive of October 27 should be revised on this point [18]. Wallace advocates opposing war and uniting with the Soviet Union; he has very few ties with the American big bourgeoisie, mainly represents the middle and petty bourgeoisie, and relies on the workers. Regarding the relationship between the leader and the led in the revolutionary united front, the Communist Party needs two conditions to achieve leadership: first, to lead the led in resolutely struggling against the enemy; second, to provide the led with material benefits and political education. The question of the Communist Party’s leadership must now be discussed openly; not discussing it openly can easily blur the thinking of Party cadres and the masses, doing more harm than good.

Third, the relations among Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union [19].

There are two formulations: one is that they will either compromise or break with each other; the other is that on a number of issues (including some major issues), compromise will come sooner or later. I believe the correct formulation is the second, not the first. The reactionaries of the world want to start a third world war; the danger of war fully exists, but war is entirely avoidable. The so-called compromise is, of course, not compromise on all issues—that is impossible. The United States and the Soviet Union will compromise sooner or later. In the future, the United States will also engage in large-scale trade with the Soviet Union, which will require compromise. This kind of compromise is a democratic compromise, not an opportunist one. The Soviet Union is a big country; its compromises may have a certain influence on the struggles of the people in countries like China, France, and Italy, but it absolutely does not mean that when the big powers compromise, the people of all other countries must accordingly carry out domestic compromises. The policy of the people of each country should be to wage different struggles according to different circumstances.

This has been a very gratifying conference, similar to the Luochuan Conference [20], both convened as the situation was developing. Japan’s surrender was a happy event for us, but at the same time it brought new worries. Because the Japanese left, and then came the United States supporting Chiang Kai-shek in fighting a civil war.

The issue of the balance of strength between us and Chiang Kai-shek remained unresolved until the Central Committee issued the "February 1" Directive [21] this year. At that time, we were still prepared to withdraw from Yan'an, and indeed we did withdraw later. It is only now that this issue has been resolved.

The issue of superiority in the balance of strength, which remained unresolved for twenty years, has been resolved today.

This is evident not only to the leaders but also to the masses of the people.

During the Northern Expedition, the revolutionary struggle saw a brief period of development, but soon the oppression by the Kuomintang followed.

Throughout the entire period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, we were under oppression, with very limited areas for survival and numerous internal disputes within the Party.

After the Long March, the situation became even more difficult.

For a period after Japan's surrender, I did not write any articles because I was extremely cautious, able only to make assessments of the situation rather than draw conclusions.

Now, both the international and domestic situations are very clear. The People's War of Liberation is continuously winning victories, Chiang Kai-shek has been isolated, and work such as land reform and Party consolidation has been put on the right track.

At this conference, the speeches by the responsible comrades from the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia and Shanxi-Suiyuan regions were very good and very satisfactory, demonstrating that they have reached political maturity.

The line in northwestern Shanxi, as pursued by Comrades He Long, Li Jingquan [22], and Xi Zhongxun, is correct. The Shanxi-Suiyuan Letter to the Peasants [23] is generally correct.

Under the leadership of Comrade Peng Dehuai, the Northwest Field Army made great efforts, transitioning from defense to offense and accomplishing major tasks. Therefore, this conference is vastly different from the one held at Xiaohe in July this year.

This conference has adopted a document [24], which will serve as a programmatic role in the coming period of overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek.

The three objectives—opposing U.S. imperialism, overthrowing bureaucratic capitalism, and overthrowing feudalism—are correctly established. The policy of uniting with the middle peasants and the middle and petty bourgeoisie to jointly oppose these three major enemies is also correct.

This document may seem to contain nothing new. The turning point in the revolutionary war it mentions has already become a historical fact; recounting the history of the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek is certainly not new; the Ten Major Military Principles are not new either, only their summarization is new; the land issue was already resolved at the Land Conference, and the issue of the middle peasants was also resolved long ago, only being particularly emphasized this time; the issue of the middle and petty bourgeoisie was also resolved long ago, but it holds special significance today.

Because the issue of opposing right-leaning deviations was already resolved at the Land Conference, the Northwestern Shanxi Conference, and the Yihe Town Conference [25], the new issue we need to address at this conference is the "left" deviation that has newly emerged on the issues of the middle peasants, the middle and petty bourgeoisie, and non-Party personages.

The reason the issue of the middle peasants is being raised again is that serious problems occurred in northwestern Shanxi during the classification of class status, with a deviation emerging that emphasized not uniting with the middle peasants.

On the issue of the middle and petty bourgeoisie, a deviation has also emerged: some of our comrades have developed doubts and wavering regarding the policy of uniting with the middle and petty bourgeoisie in economic work.

The Yihe Town Conference can be compared to a river. Of the ten waves in this river, eight are good, but it failed to properly resolve the issues of the middle peasants and the middle and petty bourgeoisie, resulting in deviations. Thus, those two waves were not good.

When "left" tendencies become a trend, Communists must oppose this trend, just as they opposed the trend of capitulationist tendencies during the Anti-Japanese War period.

Regarding the issue of non-Party personages, the Central Committee had not resolved it in the past, but it has been resolved today.

The landlord class as a whole must be eliminated, but individuals within it must be treated differently according to their circumstances.

In the land reform, for those in the landlord class who support the Land Law, or for upper-level figures who have cooperated with us in the past, we can adopt the method of distributing land to them without struggle. Except for a very few individuals who have committed capital crimes and must be executed by firing squad after a public notice is issued, it is more appropriate to adopt the above method for ordinary individuals.

On the issue of corporal punishment, the Communist Party advocates in principle the abolition of corporal punishment. This principle was once a slogan of bourgeois democrats in their anti-feudal struggle, and the proletariat should accept this legacy.

In 1929, in the resolution I drafted for the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Red Army, I already proposed the abolition of corporal punishment [26], but instances of its use still occurred afterward.

Even after arriving in Yan'an, corporal punishment was not completely abolished. This indicates that the Communist Party lacked ability and could only rely on feudal methods.

Now it must be reiterated that the Communist Party must absolutely not advocate beating people, and must absolutely not organize the beating of people. This is a principle.

This year, the Shanxi-Suiyuan region faces financial difficulties, and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region is experiencing famine. These are serious problems that must be resolved with great effort. I believe the comrades in these two regions can resolve them.

Regarding the constitution, it will not be promulgated in the near future. Premature promulgation would also be disadvantageous, but research on it should begin now.

Regarding the organization of a revolutionary central government, we will not consider it for the time being. We must wait until Chiang Kai-shek is in greater difficulty and we have achieved greater victories, at least until after the Ping-Sui Railway is opened up, before considering this issue.

Printed based on the transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.

Notes
[1] This consists of Mao Zedong's speech (Part 1 of this text) and conclusions (Part 2 of this text) at the enlarged meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in Yangjiagou, Mizhi County, Shaanxi Province.
[2] Zhdanov (1896–1948) was then a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Vice Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Molotov was then a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
[3] On February 21, 1948, Chen Yi conveyed Mao Zedong's speech at the December 1947 enlarged meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, which included the following passage: "Militarily, since we shifted to the offensive in July of this year (1947), Chiang Kai-shek has shifted to a defensive position, and thus the military situation has completely changed. For ten or twenty years, we were long in a defensive position, being 'encircled and suppressed,' without ever encircling or attacking the enemy. During the Anti-Japanese War, we were also in a dispersed defensive position. In July 1947, for the first time in our history, we shifted to the offensive. This is a revolutionary offensive; do not call it a 'counter-offensive,' as 'counter-offensive' carries a defensive connotation and cannot fully capture the content of this situation. The war was initially defensive in nature, and our policy at that time was to delay the civil war. Now we aim to eliminate Chiang Kai-shek; it is no longer defensive in nature."
[4] This refers to the "Outline Land Law of China," adopted at the National Land Conference of the Communist Party of China on September 13, 1947, and promulgated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on October 10 of the same year. The Outline Land Law stipulated: "Abolish the land system of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation and implement the land system of land to the tiller"; "All landlord land and public land in the villages shall be taken over by the village peasant associations and, together with all other land in the villages, shall be uniformly and equally distributed among the entire village population, regardless of sex or age"; "The village peasant associations shall take over the landlords' livestock, farm implements, houses, grain, and other property, and shall expropriate the surplus portion of the above-mentioned property from the rich peasants, distributing it to peasants and other poor people lacking such property, and also distributing an equal share to the landlords."