Regarding the Issues of Attacking Yulin City and Striking Reinforcements[1]

(November 5, 1947)

Peng and Zhang:

(1) Based on the situation of Ma’s[2] forces and an estimate of the distance via Hengshan, they can at the earliest arrive near Yulin City only on the 10th. (2) As for Deng’s[3] reinforcement troops of three regiments plus a portion of artillery, by using eight regiments plus the two regiments of the 4th and 6th, it seems we can be confident of annihilating or routing them. (3) However, it is not known whether the siege operations can indeed be completed within three days as stated in your telegram yesterday, and whether Yulin City can be captured before the 10th. (4) If using ten regiments to strike Deng and eight regiments to attack the city can be assured of success, and the two victories of striking Deng and attacking the city can be achieved before the 10th, then the original plan you set may be carried out unchanged; otherwise, the plan should be altered, the attack on the city halted, and all forces concentrated first to strike Deng, then to strike Ma, and afterward to attack the city. As to how exactly to proceed, handle it as you see fit. (5) Please consider transferring Wang Shitai’s column[4], taking a shortcut from Yanchang, to reach the Hengshan area in six to seven days’ march, to strike the rear of Ma’s forces.

Military Commission

0500 hours, 5th

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, addressed to Peng Dehuai, commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army, and Zhang Zongxun, deputy commander.

[2] Ma refers to Ma Hongkui, then deputy director of the Northwest Administrative Office of the Nationalist Government.

[3] Deng refers to Deng Baoshan, then commander-in-chief of the Shanxi-Shaanxi-Suiyuan Border Area Headquarters of the Nationalist Army.

[4] Wang Shitai’s column refers to the 4th Column of the Northwest Field Army, whose commander was Wang Shitai.