After Taking Jilin, the Main Direction of
Attack Should Shift to the Beiping-Shenyang
and Beiping-Suiyuan Lines
(October 13, 1947, 4:00 P.M.)
To Lin [Biao]:1
We received your telegram of 10:00 A.M. on the 12th.2 Within the [Shanhai]
Pass, except for Li Zongren’s3 forces, which could transfer a small number of
troops outside the pass, Chiang’s armies on all battlefields are suffering from
inadequate troop strength and they would be hard put to send reinforcements to
the Northeast. Earlier there had been some talk of transferring the Reorganized
Eighth Division and certain other units in Jiaodong, but whether or not this was
carried out remains to be confirmed. After you have taken Jilin, you should
switch your main direction of attack to the Bei[ping]-[Shenyang] and [Bei]pingSui[yuan] railways. The areas between Shenyang and Jinzhou, between Jinzhou
and the Shanhai Pass, between the Shanhai Pass and Tianjin, between Tianjin and
Beiping, and between Beiping and Zhangjiakou are all very good places to engage
in battle. Judging from experience on the battlefields within the pass, during the
period when the enemy still has the capability of launching large-scale offensives,
the enemy’s ability to advance in a highly concentrated manner makes it very
difficult for our amassed large forces to find opportunities for mobile warfare.
At the present stage, when the enemy has been forced to disperse among six or
seven battlefields between the Yangzi River and the Yellow River and to adopt a
position of strategic defense, it is even more difficult for our amassed large forces
to find opportunities for mobile warfare. But if our troop units are not too large,
The source of our text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 305–6, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.
1.  Lin Biao was commander-in-chief and political commissar of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army.
2.  The telegram that Lin Biao sent to the Central Committee stated that in all areas
occupied by the main forces of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army, the Guomindang
had taken a defensive position with a relatively large force. It was therefore not advisable to
attempt mobile warfare, and Lin intended to attack and occupy Jilin while using secondary
forces to eliminate some scattered enemy units.
3.  Li Zongren was director of the Guomindang government’s Beiping Field Headquarters.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-46

then we will still have many opportunities for mobile warfare and may be able to
annihilate large numbers of enemy forces that are dispersed and on the defensive.
Therefore, at present our motorized field army units on the southern lines for
the most part each consists of five to ten brigades, and the rest are waging battle
in dispersed units of columns or brigades. You should also take this experience
into account when organizing field army units in the future, except under certain
special circumstances (such as the current attack on Jilin, for example, or future
attacks on Jinzhou and other places). In view of your present troop strength, you
may form one first-class field army unit composed of about nine divisions, and
several second- or third-class field army units of four, five, or six divisions each,
to carry out flexible warfare simultaneously in several different regions.
Mao Zedong