The Situation and Our Experiences on the
Battlefront in the Northwest
(October 11, 1947)
To all commanders:1
The situation and our experience on the battlefront in the Northwest:
	 1.	 The four brigades in our army’s two sections under Wang Zhen and Wang
Shitai2 have been operating north of the Wei River, east of the [Shaanxi]
Xianyang Road, west of the Yellow River, and south of the LuochuanYichuan line in the vast Guomindang regions, annihilating and dispersing
the enemy there and establishing base areas.
	 2.	 Peng [Dehuai] and Zhang [Zongxun]3 are leading a main force of six brigades,
and after capturing Yanchang and Yanchuan, today they took Qingjian,
where they wiped out the unit directly under the Seventy-sixth Division,
the unit directly under that division’s Twenty-fourth Brigade, one of that
brigade’s regiments, and all those below the level of Division Commander
Liao Ang and Brigade Commander Zhang Xin were killed or captured.
	 3.	 Ten brigades plus one regiment of Hu [Zongnan]’s4 main force have been
deployed since the end of last month on the Guaimao (40 li east of Yan’an)-
Yan’an-Ganquan-Fuxian line; morale is low and they are in a dilemma,
unable to advance or retreat. On October 8, Liu Kan5 led two brigades from
the First Division, two brigades from the Ninetieth Division, one brigade
from the Twenty-seventh Division, and one regiment from the Seventy-sixth
Division’s 144th Brigade in a rush toward Qingjian to provide reinforcements, and they were blocked by us yesterday (the 10th) during a night march when they reached the area 30 li west of Qingjian. This enemy force relies
entirely upon airdrops for its food supplies. The fact that Hu Zongnan’s main
force has temporarily been lured to northern Shaanxi is very advantageous
for the fighting being done by Chen Geng6 and company in western Henan,
and by Wang Zhen and company north of the Wei River.
	 4.	 Hu Zongnan has already returned from Yan’an to Xi’an. The enemy forces on
the Xi’an-Tongguan line consist of two brigades from the Thirtieth Division
transferred over from Linfen (this division is what was sent as reinforcements
after it was destroyed last winter in Handan), the 167th Brigade of the First
Division (with only one intact regiment, the rest being reinforcements after
being wiped out this May at Panlong), the Thirty-sixth Division’s Twentyeighth Brigade, transported by air from Yulin, the Second Cavalry Brigade
transferred over from Gansu (one of this brigade’s regiments has been provided with reinforcements after being annihilated in May near Huanxian),
and other units. It is estimated that the most the enemy on this line can do
is to have one section advance to harass us in the direction of Wenxiang7
and Lingbao, which would not pose much of a hindrance to the battles now
being waged by our army units under Chen Geng in the Luoyang area. The
two brigades of the Sixty-fifth Division, which have been transported by air
from Hankou and Zhengzhou to Xi’an, and the Eighty-third Brigade of the
Tenth Division, which has been transported by air from Yuncheng to Xi’an,
are now being used for the purpose of maintaining the Xi[an]-Jing[ziguan]
Highway, and they have been deployed in the areas around Shang[zhou],
Luo[nan], and Shangnan to deal with the operations of our two brigades of
Chen [Geng]’s forces in southern Shaanxi, so there is no force left to advance
eastward.
	 5.	 In Wayaobao, there is one regiment of the Seventy-sixth Division (minus one
battalion, which was wiped out this time in Qingjian); in Suide, there is one
regiment of the Seventy-sixth Division plus the remnants of the Thirty-sixth
Division’s 165th Brigade; in Luochuan, there are the remnants of the Thirtysixth Division’s 123rd Brigade; on the Yaoxian-Sanyan-Chunhua-Xunyi
line there are two brigades, the New Ninth and the Temporary Second; in
eastern Gansu there are Ma Buqing’s8 two brigades plus one regiment; in

[Dingbian], [Anbian], and [Qingbian], there are Ma Hongkui’s9 three brigades; in Yulin there is one brigade under Deng Baoshan.10 All are performing garrison duty.
	 6.	 Our army in the Northwest, under the command of Deputy Commander-inChief Peng [Dehuai], has a total of only ten brigades, including three local
brigades. The larger of these brigades each has more than 5,000 men and
the smaller each has more than 3,000, making a total of more than 40,000
men for the whole army. The population of the border region is 1.5 million,
approximately one-third of which has fallen under enemy occupation. All
county towns and most villages have been occupied by the enemy at one
time, and eleven towns remain in enemy hands at this time. There has been
drought and famine this year, and in the last few months food has been in
very short supply. Over the past seven months of fighting, no new recruits
have been supplied from the Liberated Areas. Rather, all reinforcements
have been captives who are recruited the moment they are captured. During
these seven months, there was never any formal reorganization and training
that lasted longer than two weeks, and almost all time has been spent on the
move and waging battle. Yet our army’s will to fight is extremely strong,
its morale extremely high. Its equipment and firepower have been greatly
enhanced, and because the numbers have been supplemented by captives,
there has been a slight increase from the time the fighting began in March.
Taking advantage of the vastness of the border region and the people’s support, within seven months we crushed the offensive by twenty-four infantry
and cavalry brigades of Hu Zongnan’s central forces11 and ten brigades of
his miscellaneous troops. The number of brigades we annihilated or dealt
destructive blows reached as many as eleven, and on top of that, because
the enemy was exhausted and starving, we shifted to a counteroffensive.
Although the people suffered the calamity of devastation and plunder at
the hands of the enemy, their consciousness has been raised enormously.
Although our army has only a fraction of the number of the enemy’s forces,
its fighting capacity is superior to that of the enemy, and it outstrips the
enemy especially regarding spirit. The enemy is very much afraid of us, but
we are not afraid of the enemy. At present, the main force of our army is prepared to remain for a short period of time on the interior lines, and then we
will fight at the enemy’s rear. We estimate that within one year’s time or so
we can wipe out most of Hu’s army and seize many places in the Northwest.
It is expected that all commanders will inform their subordinates of this experience and that they will study it carefully. Some cadres seem to believe
that to win a great victory it is necessary to have regular, long periods of rest
and reorganization, to have full-sized, large forces with 2,000 to 3,000 men
per regiment, to have large numbers of civilian porters and large vehicles
serving the troops, and to have plenty of food and ammunition supplies in
the rear, and this mentality has them complaining bitterly when suffering the
slightest fatigue or casualties. This must be transformed into a different mentality, one in which all supplies are obtained from the enemy, the rear is not
relied upon for provisions, the number of porters and large vehicles is greatly
reduced, and food and ammunition are conserved. What must be promoted is
a spirit to face casualties without fear, to fight consecutive battles, to learn to
use intervals between campaigns or battles to carry out short periods of rest
and reorganization (seven days, ten days, or two weeks), to become good at
seizing opportunities to wage battle, to always maintain strong morale, to
win as many victories as possible, to guarantee victory in each battle, and
to solve all problems through fighting victorious battles. This latter way of
thinking must be firmly established in each army, and this must be the case
especially in all armies within the [Shanhai] Pass. Even if there are supplies
and assistance from the rear, we should never allow the mentality of dependence to exist. Instead, what must be emphasized is reliance upon the front
and upon the field army to solve its own problems at the front. This is not
only the experience of the Northwest; every region must have a similar experience of its own in the urgent hope that it will be summed up to deepen the
lessons for the troops in striving for victory in the major counteroffensive.
The Military Commission

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Notes

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 301–4, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.

2.  Wang Zhen and Wang Shitai were the commanders of the Second and Fourth columns, respectively, of the Northwest Field Army.

3.  Peng Dehuai was deputy commander-in-chief of the People’s Liberation Army, as
well as commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army. Zhang Zongxun
was deputy commander of the Northwest Field Army.

4.  Hu Zongnan was director of the Guomindang army’s Xi’an Pacification Office.

5.  Liu Kan was army commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Twenty-ninth
Army.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-44

6.  Chen Geng was secretary of the Chen-Xie Group Front Committee of the Jin-Ji-LuYu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army.

7.  Wenxiang county was incorporated into Lingbao county in Henan in 1954.

8.  Ma Buqing (1901–1977, Hui nationality, native of Gansu) had been army commander of the Fifth Army of the Guomindang army cavalry and deputy commander-inchief of the Fortieth Army Group, but he did not hold a post after the reorganization of the
Guomindang army in 1946.

9.  Ma Hongkui was director of the Guomindang government’s Northwest Field Office.

10.  Deng Baoshan was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang army’s ShandongShaanxi-Suifen Border Region General Headquarters.

11.  The editors of Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan, Vol. 4, p. 318, explain that “central
forces” means forces directly under Chiang Kaishek’s control.