Under the command of Deputy Commander Peng [2], our Northwest Field Army comprises three local brigades, making a total of ten brigades. Each brigade numbers from just over 3,000 to more than 5,000 troops, with the entire force numbering slightly over 40,000.
The Border Region has a population of 1.5 million, about one-third of whom now live under enemy occupation. All county seats and most villages have at one time or another been overrun by the enemy, and eleven counties remain in enemy hands.
This year has been marked by severe drought and famine, resulting in an extreme shortage of food in recent months.
Over the past seven months of combat, we have not received any new recruits from liberated areas; all replacements have come from enemy prisoners, who are incorporated into our ranks immediately upon capture.
During these seven months, we have never conducted a formal training period lasting longer than two weeks. The vast majority of our time has been spent on marching and fighting.
Nevertheless, our troops exhibit exceptionally strong combat will and high morale. Our equipment and firepower have been significantly strengthened, and thanks to prisoner replacements, our strength has slightly increased since operations began in March.
Taking advantage of the Border Region’s vast territory and the unwavering support of the local population, we have, over the past seven months, repelled offensives by Hu Zongnan [3]’s central government–aligned forces—comprising twenty-four infantry and cavalry brigades—as well as ten brigades of miscellaneous units. A total of eleven enemy brigades have either been annihilated or suffered crippling blows. Coupled with the enemy’s exhaustion, starvation, and demoralization, this has enabled us to go over to the counteroffensive.
Despite the devastation and rapacious exploitation inflicted by the enemy, the people’s revolutionary consciousness has risen markedly.
Although our forces are several times smaller in number than those of the enemy, we enjoy a clear edge in combat effectiveness, particularly in terms of spirit. The enemy fears us greatly, while we harbor no fear of them.
At present, the main body of our army is preparing for another brief phase of operations within the enemy’s lines, with the aim of striking deep behind enemy lines.
We estimate that in roughly another year we will be able to destroy the bulk of Hu’s forces and liberate many areas in the Northwest.
It is hoped that all commanding officers will convey this experience to their subordinates for study and reflection.
There exists among certain cadres the view that major victories can be achieved only through regular, extended periods of rest and reorganization; that each regiment must be fully manned with two to three thousand soldiers; that large detachments of civilian porters and heavy transport vehicles must accompany the army; and that ample supplies of food and ammunition must be maintained in the rear. Any sign of fatigue or attrition is met with widespread complaints. This mindset needs to be replaced by one that relies entirely on the enemy for sustenance and materiel, dispenses with rear-area support, drastically reduces the number of porters and wagons, conserves food and ammunition, encourages resilience in the face of casualties, emphasizes continuous combat, skillfully exploits the intervals between campaigns or battles for brief rests of seven, ten days, or up to half a month, seizes every opportune moment to strike, consistently maintains high morale, strives to win every engagement, secures victory in each battle, and resolves all problems through successful military action.
This latter approach must be firmly established throughout all armies, especially those inside the Pass. Even when rear-area support is available, we must never become complacent; the primary focus should always be on self-reliance at the front, with field armies solving their own problems directly on the battlefield.
Such experience is not confined to the Northwest; every theater undoubtedly possesses similar lessons. It is imperative that these be systematically summarized, the lessons reinforced within the troops, and that we press forward toward a decisive counteroffensive victory.
Printed from Mao Zedong’s manuscript.
Notes: [1] This is part of a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, addressed to the commanders of various strategic zones.
[2] Deputy Commander Peng refers to Peng Dehuai, who at the time served as Deputy

Commander-in-Chief of the People’s Liberation Army and Commander and Political Commissar of the Northwest Field Army.
[3] Hu Zongnan was then Director of the Xi’an Pacification Office of the Nationalist Army.