It Is Better for the Western Army Corps Not to Divide Its Forces East of the Canal for the Time Being[1]

(September 15, 1947)

Chen and Su, and inform the East China Bureau:

Your telegram of the 14th at 2400 hours[2] received. (1) Our Western Army Corps has just concentrated six columns and fought a victorious battle. If two columns are again detached to go east of the canal, will this not weaken our combat strength in southwestern Shandong? Moreover, before long you will be preparing to maneuver the enemy into battle in the Henan-Anhui border region. Will four columns be sufficient? How many men does the Western Army Corps now have in total, how many in each column, what is the combat effectiveness of each column, which two columns do you intend to send east of the canal, whom do you plan to send to command them? If the commander’s ability is insufficient, will it be difficult to achieve results, leading to failure on both fronts? The central issue at present is to win battles. As long as we fight two or three more victories like the one at Shantuji, we will not only be able to divert the enemy troops in Jiaodong but also secure the rear communication lines for you and for Liu and Deng.[3] As long as we win battles at the front, the enemy will be unable to cut our rear lines. However, for a certain period, our army must have the determination to press forward irresistibly without regard for the rear.

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee to Chen Yi, commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, and Su Yu, deputy commander.

[2] Refers to the telegram sent by Chen Yi and Su Yu at 2400 hours on September 14, 1947, to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, with copies to Zhang Yunyi, Deng Zihui, Rao Shushi, and Li Yu. The telegram stated: Judging from the current situation of the enemy’s offensive against Jiaodong, it seems difficult for our forces in Jiaodong to hold out for long. If so, tens of thousands of wounded and disabled personnel would be in danger of being destroyed. For this reason, we propose sending two columns to the area west of Tai’an to open up the situation, coordinate with operations in southwestern Shandong, and also threaten Jinan, thereby diverting the enemy attacking Jiaodong, allowing our Jiaodong forces sufficient time to smash the enemy’s offensive.

[3] Liu and Deng refers to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, who were then respectively commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army.

It Is Better for the Western Army Corps Not to Divide Its Forces East of the Canal for the Time Being

The above requests a reply from Chen and Su. (2) What is the situation of the wounded in Jiaodong? Is it absolutely necessary for the Western Army Corps to send two columns east of the canal? Can the dispatch of troops be postponed for two months before reconsideration? The above requests a reply from Rao and Li.[1]

Military Commission
15th, 1500 hours

[1] Rao and Li refers to Rao Shushi and Li Yu, who were then respectively political commissar and deputy political commissar of the East China Military Region.