Quickly Establish a Mentality of Fighting
without Support from the Rear Area
 (September 3, 1947)
To Chen [Yi] and Su [Yu]:1
I received your telegram sent on the 1st between 3:00 and 5:00 P.M. Your battle orientation and calling up of local operatives are correct. There is, however,
one thing that I must point out, which is that you must fundamentally change your
mentality of relying on the rear areas for support. The Liu-Deng army2 is already
carrying out a policy of going to battle without rear area support. The Chen-Xie
force3 is also resolved to go deep into enemy territory and intends to cut itself off
from the rear area. Your areas of eastern Jiaozhou and Bohai have become battlefronts. You must not hope for the same support you had in the past, and also you
must not make excessive demands on Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, and Henan. Your
entire force, from yourselves to all officers and soldiers in your units, must quickly
start thinking in terms of fighting without rear area support. All your needs, from
personnel, foodstuffs, and ammunition to bedding and clothing, must be obtained
from enemy troops and enemy territory. You must be prepared to retrench after
successive battles and to fight until there are only 3,000 to 4,000 men left in each
brigade while the morale of your army becomes stronger and stronger (as with
Deputy Commander Peng [Dehuai]’s4 army). Immediately replenish your ranks
with captives. Do not take cannons with you and do not be afraid of being cut off
from the rear areas by enemy forces. March bravely toward the area north of the
Huai River and east of the Bei[ping]-Han[kou] railway. In the past, all your columns were excessively dependent on rear area support, and even you revealed this
Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 236–37, where it is
1.  Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, and
Su Yu was the deputy commander of the East China Field Army.
2.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army.
3.  Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi were secretary and the deputy secretary, respectively, of
the Chen-Xie Group of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army.
4.  Peng Dehuai was deputy commander of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and
commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-32

mentality. I expect you to change immediately to adapt to the new situation. The
army must abandon all erroneous thinking, such as fear of sacrifice and hardship,
the desire for large units and long rest periods, and complaining of hardship every
day. The Central Committee has authorized the East China Bureau to remain in
eastern Jiaozhou so you should not insist that it go to Bohai.
 Mao Zedong

reproduced from the manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.